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The Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical argument, presented in Chapter 2 of 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), concludes that there 
are no meaning facts. While realism has been denied for a great many subject 
matters, the meaning irrealism motivated by KW’s argument has particularly far-
reaching consequences. This thesis is an investigation into some of these 
consequences, in an effort to determine what is at stake in accepting the argument 
as sound. In Chapter 2, I summarise the argument, assume that it is sound, and 
consider the consequences for one particular body of talk: discourse about 
meaning itself. Three models for characterising that discourse are canvassed: 
error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. The latter characterisation is 
made available by adopting the framework for realism debates proposed by 
Crispin Wright in Truth and Objectivity (1992), of which I give an exposition in 
Chapter 1. I find in Chapter 2 that the three models of meaning discourse each face 
serious problems, and that the upshot is a form of meaning eliminativism: there is 
no value in ascribing meaning. In Chapter 3, I generalise from that discussion and 
consider the consequences of KW’s sceptical argument for any discourse. I find that 
we appear forced to adopt what I call global eliminative strong non-factualism, on 
which no sentence is (1) apt for even minimal truth, (2) correct or incorrect with 
respect to any norm, and thus (3) such that there would be value lost in 
abandoning the practice of uttering it. While I find, then, no outright inconsistency 
in the acceptance of KW’s sceptical argument as sound, it is found to be untenable 
to do so. If these considerations are correct, then without a straight solution to 
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Many humans—as a matter of empirical fact—produce certain sounds and shapes; 
we utter words. But the nature of these expressions and their utterance poses 
questions that need philosophical attention. One way to approach these matters is 
by deploying the notion of meaning. Speakers may mean something by a particular 
sign, and this meaning may partly constitute the nature of that sign and the 
utterance thereof. There are plenty of avenues for philosophical investigation into 
this idea. One such avenue is to consider the metaphysics of meaning, and to ask 
whether meaning is real. It is such considerations with which this thesis is 
concerned.  
 
In particular, my investigation concerns the denial that meaning is real, and 
where that denial might take us. In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 
(WRPL), Saul Kripke draws from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations an 
argument against meaning realism.1 I will give an account of this argument—
which I will call the Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) Sceptical Argument—in §2.2.2 KW’s 
argument can be (and has been) investigated from several angles. The angle that I 
take in this thesis is to investigate what is at stake in the argument, and to thus 
determine whether it is tenable to accept it as sound. To that end, I will assume 
that it is sound, and consider what follows from that assumption. The denial of 
realism about any subject matter has consequences of certain kinds, and these will 
certainly emerge in the present case. But there are other consequences that arise 
when the subject matter in question is meaning. The tenability of any position 
turns at least in part on the severity of its consequences, and by investigating the 
                                                        
1 Kripke’s discussion is an interpretation of Wittgenstein, and may not be representative of the 
positions held by either philosopher. I will set aside any exegetical issues, and focus on the content 
of Kripke’s book. It is Chapter 2 of that book that contains the sceptical argument that opposes 
meaning realism. In Chapter 3, Kripke proposes a sceptical solution which is meant to provide an 
account of discourse about meaning that is consistent with that opposition. Saul A. Kripke, 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition (Harvard University Press, 
1982); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (John Wiley & Sons, 2009).  
2 Note that the kind of scepticism in question is constitutive, and not epistemic: KW’s claim is not 




ramifications of KW’s sceptical argument I hope to determine whether accepting 
that argument as sound is a tenable option.  
 
 Before investigating opposition to realism about meaning, it will be helpful 
to characterise some of the terms and positions at work in debates about realism. I 
will put this initial characterisation in terms of facts. By “fact” I mean precisely 
something that is the case or an existing state of affairs. Realism debates are 
concerned with the nature and existence of a certain class of facts; what I will call a 
subject matter. The subject may be a property, in which case the relevant facts are 
those such that some object has that property. The subject may be a set of objects, 
in which case the relevant facts are those such that those objects exist. Say that we 
have entered into a realism debate about some subject. There are two basic 
components of realism.3 Firstly, that the relevant facts exist. It is necessary for 
realism that the objects or properties in question—or some significant proportion 
of them—are part of reality.4 And secondly, that those facts have a certain mind-
independence, or objectivity. It is necessary for realism that the facts are out there 
in the world.5 This is not meant as a formal account, nor to comprehensively 
represent every form of realism. It is meant as a general characterisation of the 
contentions made by a realist, and will do for now. Take some subject matter Q 
comprised of Q-facts. The basic realist position is this: 
 
Realism(Q): There are mind-independent Q-facts.6 
 
                                                        
3 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. with a new afterword. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 14. 
4 It is not necessary for realism that every state of affairs of a certain type exists. The realist about 
fish, for example, can happily suppose that some object we had thought to be a fish turns out not to 
be so. Devitt makes a point along these lines here: Devitt, 18. 
5 Note that the mind-independence and objectivity at work here are of a particular sort. There is a 
kind of dependence such that chairs depend on minds; chairs are built by humans, and thus depend 
causally on human mental activity. There is a different kind of dependence such that the fact that 
more people like dogs than cats depends on minds; this fact could not obtain if there were no 
minds, and is thus existentially dependent. Neither of these are what the realist means in claiming 
that mind-independence is necessary for a class of facts to be real. What is meant is some non-
empirical kind of dependence. In §1.4 I will introduce Wright’s account of mind-independence, and 
until then I will rely on this informal account. 
6 This characterisation is found here: Devitt, Realism and Truth, 14. 
3 
 
Realism debates are sometimes characterised in terms of truth; as debates about 
whether any of a certain set of sentences are mind-independently true. Given that 
a certain relation obtains between true sentences and facts, such a 
characterisation may be equivalent to that which I have just made. Aristotle 
describes such a relation here: 
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.7 
If a sentence is true precisely when it states a fact (it “[says] of what is that it is”), 
and a fact exists precisely when there is a true sentence that states it, then 
questions about Q-facts may be pursued in terms of whether there are true 
sentences that state Q-facts. My preference for this initial characterisation is to talk 
of facts, but it will on occasion be helpful and harmless to talk instead of truth.8 
 
I will use non-realism as a catch-all for any view that denies realism about a 
certain subject matter. For Q, then: 
 
Non-Realism(Q): There are no mind-independent Q-facts. 
 
One form of non-realism is irrealism. I will use this term to refer to forms of non-
realism for which the chief departure from realism is the claim that the relevant 
facts do not exist. For Q, then: 
 
Irrealism(Q): There are no Q-facts. 
 
Error-theory and non-factualism are two forms of irrealism. These positions share 
the irrealist denial that the relevant facts exist, but differ in their account of the 
discourse about the subject matter in question. A discourse is here defined as the 
                                                        
7 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1011b25. 
8 The initial preference for characterisation in terms of facts stems from this thesis’ concern with 
realism debates about meaning. Truth is a semantic notion, and there is something uncomfortable 
about invoking semantic notions to characterise positions in the metaphysics of meaning. But I do 
not yet mean to claim that this is more than a preference.  
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set of all sentences about a certain subject.9 There may be such a discourse for Q, 
even if the irrealist is right and there are no Q-facts. But if the above Aristotelian 
claim is correct, then it follows that none of the sentences in Q-discourse are true; 
there are no Q-facts for them to state. The error-theorist accounts for the absence 
of true sentences in our discourse about Q by characterising that discourse as 
failed description. Sentences that appear to state potential Q-facts have truth 
conditions and aspire to truth, but are uniformly and systematically false.10 The 
non-factualist accounts for the absence of true sentences in our Q-discourse by 
characterising that discourse as non-descriptive. When we talk of Q, we use 
sentences that have no truth conditions, and which are neither true nor false. It is 
no matter that there are no Q-facts, because in talking of Q we do not seek to state 
any facts at all.11 
 
 Another form of non-realism is anti-realism. Where the irrealist is 
concerned with the existence component of realism, the anti-realist is instead 
concerned with the independence component. The basic anti-realist claim about Q 
is this: 
 
Anti-Realism(Q): There are Q-facts, but they are mind-dependent. 
 
The anti-realist agrees with the realist that there are facts about the relevant 
subject. And they may, then, maintain that there are true sentences that state those 
                                                        
9 Note that this definition is meant to include sets of sentences that merely appear to be about a 
certain set of facts. Discourse about morality, for example, may be characterised as the set of 
sentences that apply moral predicates, like “is impermissible”. If, as it might turn out, this predicate 
bears no relation to impermissibility facts, those sentences nonetheless qualify as sentences about 
morality, and are part of moral discourse. 
10 Two prominent error-theories are Mackie’s error-theory about morality and Field’s error-theory 
about mathematics. Note that an error-theorist claims only that the atomic, positive sentences in 
the relevant discourse are false. They needn’t deny that it is a fact that a putative Q-fact does not 
obtain, nor that sentence stating that it does not obtain is true. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong (Harmondsworth ; New York: Penguin, 1990); Hartry H. Field, Science without Numbers, 
Second edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
11 Non-factualism is perhaps most prominent in metaethics. See, for example: A. J. Ayer (Alfred 
Jules), Language, Truth, and Logic (Penguin Books, 2001), chap. 6; Simon Blackburn, Spreading the 
Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language (Oxford [Oxfordshire] : New York: Clarendon 
Press ; Oxford University Press, 1984); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of 
Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); R. M. Hare, The Language 
of Morals. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). 
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facts. But the existence of those facts, and the truth of those sentences, is not 
sufficient for realism about the subject. The anti-realist about Q opposes Q-realism 
not by denying that anything is Q, but by denying that anything is mind-
independently Q.  
 
I said that this thesis is an investigation into the consequences of accepting 
KW’s sceptical argument as sound. Chief among these consequences are those for 
the nature of linguistic expressions and their utterance. It is these things that we 
might invoke meaning to explain, and they face serious constraints if meaning is 
found not to be part of reality. We appear to engage in discourse: to utter 
sentences about certain things. And it often appears quite valuable to do so. The 
consequences of KW’s sceptical argument that I will primarily consider—and 
those that I will use to evaluate the tenability of accepting that argument—are 
those for the nature of such discourse.  
 
In Chapter 2 I will take the particular case of discourse about meaning, for 
which the denial that meaning is real has many implications. I will consider three 
models of non-realist meaning discourse. The first two, meaning error-theory and 
meaning non-factualism, are discussed in §2.5 and §2.6. My conclusion there will 
be that we must look elsewhere for a tenable destination of opposition to meaning 
realism.12 In §2.7 I discuss an alternative that instead opposes meaning realism 
along anti-realist lines. This is mere minimalism about meaning, which is a position 
within the characterisation of realism debates proposed by Crispin Wright in Truth 
and Objectivity.13 To facilitate the application of Wright’s framework to meaning, I 
will give an exposition of that framework in Chapter 1. 
 
The hope, in surveying the available options for characterising meaning 
discourse, is that one or more of the options may be both consistent with accepting 
KW’s sceptical argument and tenable. I will find, in §2.8, that there seems to be no 
such option. The constraints that KW’s argument imposes upon meaning discourse 
                                                        
12 Specifically: I will find an error-theory about meaning to be incoherent, and non-factualism about 
meaning to either rely on resources that are ruled out by KW’s argument or to imply eliminativism. 
13 Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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for us to adopt an untenable eliminativism, on which there is no value in talking 
about meaning. Then, in Chapter 3, I will show how many of the considerations 
made about meaning discourse generalise to discourse about anything, and that 





WRIGHT’S METAPHYSICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the General Introduction, I characterised anti-realism about Q as the 
conjunction of two claims. There are Q-facts, and there are true sentences in 
discourse about Q that state those facts. But those facts, and this truth, do not have 
the mind-independence necessary for realism about Q. This thesis is, in part, an 
investigation into the non-realist destinations to which the Kripke-Wittgenstein 
(KW) sceptical argument may lead.14 The right kind of anti-realism may offer such 
a destination. I will set aside considerations specific to realism debate about 
meaning for now, and work towards establishing a model of anti-realism.15 
 
Thus far I have characterised anti-realism in only general terms; a 
characterisation insufficiently specific to be of much use. There are two matters 
which must be settled. Firstly, we must clarify the notion of fact and truth that is at 
work; as we will see, there are certain notions which the anti-realist must avoid. 
And secondly, we need to provide an account of mind-independence. Variation 
between formulations of anti-realism can emerge from variation in how these two 
matters are settled. In Truth and Objectivity, Wright develops a framework in 
which realism can be opposed along anti-realist lines.16 The variety—or, strictly 
speaking, varieties—of anti-realism that emerge from Wright’s framework involve 
idiosyncratic responses to the two matters. Wright settles the first matter by 
adopting a certain minimalism about truth, which I will discuss in §1.3. He settles 
the second by characterising the mind-independence of a certain subject as a 
function of how truth in discourse about that subject fares with respect to four 
realism-relevant cruces. I will discuss the cruces in §1.4. In §1.5, I end the chapter 
with a schema for applying this framework to a particular subject. The hope is that, 
at the culmination of this exposition, we will be in a position to apply Wright’s 
                                                        
14 The argument in question appears here: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 
chap. 2. I introduce it in §2.2. 
15 See §2.7 for application of this model to meaning. 
16 Wright, Truth and Objectivity. 
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framework to meaning, and to determine whether it offers a tenable home for KW 
opposition to meaning realism.  
 
1.2 Deflationism 
The anti-realist about Q concedes that there are Q-facts and true Q-sentences that 
state them. If such a position is to be non-realist at all, this concession must not 
suffice for realism about Q. And on some accounts of truth there does appear to be 
such an implication. On certain formulations of the Correspondence Theory of 
truth, for example, a sentence is true if and only if the fact it states objectively 
obtains; truth is correspondence with independent reality.17 Having subscribed to 
such a theory we could not suppose that there are true sentences in a certain 
discourse without thereby granting both of the characteristic realist claims: the 
facts stated by those sentences exist, and do so mind-independently.18 The anti-
realist is forced to avoid conceptions of truth that carry such an implication.19 
What we need is truth that is metaphysically neutral: an account of truth on which 
it is consistent to claim that a sentence is true while denying realism about the 
discourse to which that sentence belongs. And we also need metaphysically 
neutral facts. If facts must be mind-independent, then there is no theoretical space 
for anti-realism I have characterised it. By opposing the independence element of 
realism, and not the existence element, the anti-realist becomes constrained to 
accounts of truth and facts of this sort. (I will focus, for now, on identifying an 
account of truth suitable to the anti-realist. Anti-realist facts will emerge in §1.3.)  
 
One likely candidate for an account of truth available to the anti-realist is 
deflationism.20 Deflationary notions of truth, as we will see, look to be sufficiently 
neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of the subject matter of a true 
                                                        
17 Crispin Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” in Saving the Differences: Essays on 
Themes from Truth and Objectivity. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 245. 
18 This characterisation, introduced in the General Introduction is from Devitt: Devitt, Realism and 
Truth. 
19 This is observed by Wright here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 12. 
20 Deflationism—or at least the precursor redundancy theory—was first introduced by Frank 
Ramsay. It has been significantly developed by Paul Horwich, among others. Paul Horwich, Truth, 
2nd ed. (Oxford [England] : New York [N.Y.]: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1998); F. P. 
Ramsey and G. E. Moore, “Symposium: Facts and Propositions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 




sentence. But Wright does not incorporate deflationism into his metaphysical 
framework. He argues that deflationism is incoherent, and that the anti-realist 
must therefore look elsewhere. In its place he proposes a certain minimalism about 
truth. The aim of this chapter is the presentation of Wright’s position, so I will 
follow him in rejecting deflationism. It is worthwhile to work through the theory 
nonetheless, because part of Wright’s argument against it makes an important 
contribution to the development of minimalism. 
 
Although there is variation among versions of deflationism, these accounts 
share two central contentions, and these will be enough to sustain our 
discussion.21 The first such contention is that truth is not a property. To ascribe 
truth to a sentence—with the predicate “is true”—is not to attribute a property of 
truth to that sentence. It will be useful to characterise this deflationary tenet in 
terms of the Disquotational Schema (DS):  
 
The Disquotational Schema: “P” is true iff P 
 
Whenever some sentence with propositional content P is true, P is the case. And 
whenever some P is the case, a sentence “P” with that content is true.22 There is an 
instance of this schema for any sentence that can be substituted for “P”. For 
example: 
 
“Sunfish are the largest bony fish” is true iff sunfish are the largest bony fish 
 
The DS represents an important characteristic of truth, and it is not specific to 
deflationism. Indeed, Wright argues that the property exhibited in the DS is 
platitudinous for truth; any plausible theory of truth will incorporate it.23 But the 
deflationist gives the schema a distinctive role. They claim that the feature of truth 
represented in the DS exhausts the content of truth ascription. The relation 
                                                        
21 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 30. 
22 The DS can be seen as a characterisation of the Aristotelian claim that I quoted in the General 
Introduction. Given that “P” says that P, “P” is true precisely when P picks out something that is the 
case, and false when it picks out something that is not the case. (Note, though, that the DS itself 
makes no mention of falsity.) 
23 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 23. I will return to this idea in §1.3. 
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between “P” being true and P being the case is not merely covariation. The 
statement of one is precisely the statement of the other; to attach the predicate “is 
true” to a sentence is to do nothing more than assert the sentence itself. A sentence 
gains nothing in being properly described as true that could not be achieved by 
simply asserting the sentence, and there is thus no property to which “is true” 
refers. Where other theories of truth seek to analyse and investigate a truth 
property, the deflationist simply shuts the book and denies that there is any 
property worth analysing or investigating.24 
 
Ascription of truth may be useful, nonetheless. Say that you wanted to 
assert every sentence in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The truth 
predicate helps with this compendious assertion; you can utter the sentence “Every 
sentence in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is true” and thereby assert 
those sentences. Without the truth predicate “is true”, this assertion would be 
arduous; one would have to identify each of the sentences in the encyclopedia and 
assert them individually. The truth predicate also assists with indirect assertion. 
Say, for example, that you wish to assert the sentence just uttered by Aroha, but 
that you didn’t hear it. It may then be useful to say “Whatever Aroha just said is 
true”; otherwise, you would likely have to ask Aroha to repeat her assertion within 
earshot, or make-do with “What she said!”. The deflationist claims that, while such 
cases do show that “is true” has pragmatic value and is not redundant, there is 
nevertheless no property to which “is true” refers. To describe a sentence or set of 
sentences as true is still merely to assert those sentences, even if it is sometimes 
easier to use the device of truth predication than to assert each sentence 
individually and directly. 
 
                                                        
24 Paul Horwich’s deflationism does not involve the denial that truth is a property. Wright argues 
that his discussion applies to Horwich’s account nevertheless: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 21. 
Note, also, that there may yet be a minimal sense in which truth is a property. As I am about to point 
out, the deflationist maintains that the predicate “is true” may still properly be applied to a 
sentence S, and it may thus be correct to say “S has the property of truth”. This may be taken to 
show that there is a truth property of a certain sort. The deflationist’s claim is that there is no 
genuine or robust property of truth, and that truth predication can be correct does not suffice for 
there to be a property of this sort. For the discussion in §1.2 I will mean a property of this non-
minimal sort by “the property of truth”. 
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More specifically, truth predication is a device for endorsement. First, note 
that assertion of a sentence may be governed by some norm or norms. This is a 
matter that will receive much discussion later.25 For now, it is sufficient to say that 
a sentence can be warrantedly assertible or not warrantedly assertible, and that to 
assert it is to endorse it with respect to this norm of warrant.26 Since, on the 
deflationist’s account, truth predication amounts precisely to assertion of the 
subject sentence, “is true” can be attached to a sentence to register it as satisfying 
whatever norms operate over assertion of that sentence.27 The second central 
deflationist contention, then, is this: truth predication is purely a device for 
endorsement. By applying “is true” to a sentence or set of sentences, we can deem 
those sentences to meet the standards of warranted assertion “without specifying 
[their] content”—we can effectively assert them, even when that assertion is 
compendious or indirect.28  
  
 We can thus characterise deflationism as the conjunction of a negative 
claim and a positive claim:  
 
1. Truth is not a property; “is true” does not refer to a property. 
2. Truth predication is purely a device for endorsement.  
 
Let us first consider whether truth is metaphysically neutral when construed as 
the deflationist suggests. For anti-realism to get off the ground it must be possible 
for a sentence to be true without having a real subject matter. There is a sense in 
which deflationism will be unsuitable for the anti-realist: we have denied that 
                                                        
25 In §1.3 I will discuss the discipline that a discourse may exhibit, and this notion will be applied to 
meaning in §2.7. 
26 As an illustrative example of the kind of warrant in question, take the sentence “It is raining 
outside”. In some states of information, and not in others, my utterance of this sentence is 
warranted. My perception that there is water hitting my office window, for example, might be an 
example of the former. The information that I feel hungry, on the other hand, likely does not 
warrant the assertion. The sentence “It is raining outside” is thus correct or incorrect with respect 
to a norm of warranted assertibility. And when I assert it, I deem the sentence to fare favourably (to 
some extent) with respect to that norm. See: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17. 
27 This amounts to a characterisation of truth predication as in some sense normative. We needn’t, 
here, be concerned with the detail of this normativity. Discussion from Wright can be found here: 
Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 15–19; Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 251. See 
also: Paul Horwich, “Is Truth a Normative Concept?,” Synthese 195, no. 3 (March 1, 2018): 1127–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1208-8. 
28 Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 250. 
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there is a property of truth at all, and a fortiori that there can be true sentences 
with a non-real subject matter. But let us reframe the requirement, and ask instead 
whether the predicate “is true” is metaphysically neutral. Does deflationism allow 
the anti-realist to claim that a sentence is true while denying realism about the 
discourse to which that sentence belongs? If there is nothing to truth predication 
over and above assertion, then it is correct to say that a sentence is true precisely 
when it is correct to assert that sentence. All that is required, then, is that it can be 
metaphysically neutral that an assertion is warranted. And there doesn’t seem to 
be anything to prevent this. Nothing is conceded to moral realism, for example, by 
claiming that utterance of the sentence “Torture is impermissible” is warranted.29 
It is quite plausible that this moral ascription could be warranted without there 
being a mind-independent fact about the impermissibility of torture. So, if truth is 
as the deflationist conceives it, nothing is conceded to moral realism by claiming 
that the sentence “Torture is impermissible” is true. 
 
 Deflationism may thus offer the anti-realist an account of truth as suitably 
metaphysically neutral. But Wright argues that the two characteristic deflationist 
claims are inconsistent, and that deflationism is thus incoherent.30 We can 
formulate Wright’s argument as the presentation of a dilemma. The second 
deflationist claim is that truth predication endorses the sentence as meeting some 
standard. Is this standard distinct from warranted assertibility? If so, then there 
appears to be nothing to prevent truth from being a property: 
What the deflationist clearly cannot allow is that ‘true’, when used to 
endorse, has the function of commending a proposition for its satisfaction of 
some distinctive norm which contrasts with epistemic justification and 
which only ‘true’ and equivalents serve to mark. For if there were a 
distinctive such norm, it could hardly fail to be reckoned a genuine property 
                                                        
29 There may be accounts of justification and morality on which no moral judgements are justified 
without the existence of independent moral facts. In that case, let this point be simply that, on at 
least some accounts of justification and morality, moral justification is consistent with the denial of 
moral realism. For a paradigmatic view of this kind, see: Mackie, Ethics, chap. 5. 
30 This discussion derives from the following presentations of this argument: Alexander Miller, “On 
Wright’s Argument Against Deflationism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 51, no. 205 (October 2001): 




of a proposition that it did, or did not, comply with it. And if the norm in 
question were uniquely associated with ‘true’ and its cognates, that would 
be as much as to allow that there was a special property of truth.31 
This is the first horn of the dilemma. The deflationist cannot claim that the 
standard a sentence is deemed to meet when it is attributed the predicate “is true” 
is distinct from warrant. If they did, it would contradict their denial that truth 
predication is the ascription of a property of truth. There would be something more 
to ascription of truth than what is already found in warranted assertion. 
 
 The second horn of the dilemma is that the deflationist also faces a 
contradiction if they contend that the standard is not distinct from epistemic 
justification. Wright argues that, in virtue of the DS, truth inflates under pressure, 
and that a distinction is forced between truth and epistemic justification. We start 
with the DS—which, as I have said, is lionized by the deflationist as capturing all 
there is to truth: 
 
1. “P” is true ⟺ P 
 
Then, given that for any significant sentence that says that P there can be a 
significant sentence that says that P is not the case, we can derive the following by 
substituting the negation of P for P in an instance of the DS: 
 
2. “It is not the case that P” is true ⟺ It is not the case that P 
 
And, given that from a biconditional we can derive another biconditional between 
the negation of the two original constituents, we can also derive the following from 
the DS: 
 
3. It is not the case that P ⟺ It is not the case that “P” is true 
 
                                                        
31 Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 252. 
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Now, from biconditionals 2 and 3, and the transitivity of biconditionals, it follows 
that: 
 
4. “It is not the case that P” is true ⟺ It is not the case that “P” is true 
 
4 expresses the commutativity of truth and negation, for the sentence “P”.32 It is 
the DS—and the admittance of significant negation—that has produced this result. 
The deflationist, who is explicitly committed to the DS, will struggle to deny it.33  
 
 In this horn of the dilemma, the deflationist claims that truth predication is 
the predication of epistemic justification. It had better be the case, then, that 
whatever properties truth is found to have are properties shared by justification. It 
thus follows from the commitments made by deflationism that: 
 
5. “It is not the case that P” is epistemically justified ⟺ It is not the case that 
“P” is epistemically justified 
 
The problem is now clear. Clear counterexamples to 5 arise whenever there is a 
neutral state of information. In such a situation, neither “P” nor “It is not the case 
that P” is justified.34 If such cases are possible—and they seem to be—then the 
right-to-left conditional in 5 is false. It is thus derivable from the deflationist’s own 
claims that truth exhibits a property that warrant does not. This is the second horn 
of the dilemma: the DS is inconsistent with the claim that truth predication is 
endorsement of the subject sentence as epistemically justified. 
 
The deflationist must accept either that truth predication is distinct or not 
distinct from predication of epistemic justification. But we have found that neither 
option is consistent with their basic contentions. The deflationist lionizes the DS 
                                                        
32 Miller, “On Wright’s Argument Against Deflationism,” 529. 
33 Wright points out that the inference from 1 to 3 may be denied by adopting a certain logic of 
negation. But he sets aside this formal option as untenable: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 32. 
34 Think, for example, of substituting “Tomorrow I will have cereal for breakfast” for P, and suppose 
that I have no information about tomorrow’s breakfast. Quite plausibly, neither “Tomorrow I will 
have cereal for breakfast” nor “Tomorrow I will not have cereal for breakfast” would be justified in 
such a scenario. 
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and claims that “is true” is only an occasionally useful device for endorsement of a 
sentence; to claim that a sentence is true is just to deem it to meet the standards 
under which it is warranted. But from the DS alone we have found that truth 
predication has a feature that warranted assertibility does not: commutativity 
with negation.35 The deflationist commits no more to truth than what is expressed 
in the DS, and even this is enough to generate the result that to call a sentence true 
is not merely to call it warranted—and thus that there is a distinct property of 
truth. Wright concludes that deflationism is incoherent; the positive claim about 
the nature of truth predication contradicts the negative deflationary claim. 
 
While deflationary truth may be metaphysically neutral in the manner 
required, then, it faces a severe independent problem. We thus cannot rely on it in 
development of anti-realism. This discussion has been brief, and there may be 
defences available to the deflationist.36 But the point of this discussion was not to 
comprehensively evaluate deflationism, but instead to set the stage for Wright’s 
alternative account of truth. Although Wright finds deflationism to be inadequate, 
it nevertheless makes a key contribution to the minimalism he implements in its 
stead. This minimalism follows deflationism in putting the DS centre stage, and in 
doing so hopes to achieve the same metaphysical neutrality. But it departs from 
deflationism in accepting the inflationary result and maintaining that truth is a 
property. For the minimalist, truth can be sufficiently metaphysically lightweight 





                                                        
35 We can perhaps characterise this result as revealing that truth exhibits the disquotational 
property—evinced in the DS—but justification does not. A sentence is true precisely when what it 
says is the case is the case. But it seems not to be the case that a sentence is justified precisely when 
what it says is the case is the case. (If this was the case, then it would follow from any state of 
information in which neither “P” nor “not-P” is justified that neither P nor not-P is the case, and 
thus that a certain state of affairs both obtains and does not obtain.) It is in virtue of the 
disquotational property that truth commutes with negation, and in virtue of missing this property 
that warrant does not. 





I will now present Wright’s minimalism about truth, and determine whether it can 
be appropriate for the anti-realist. The first question that the minimalist asks is 
this: what must be the case for a property to qualify as a truth property?37 There 
are certain features of a property such that, without those features, it is a priori 
that that property is not truth. Wright calls these features the truth platitudes. If 
these features really are platitudes, of course, any account of truth will include 
them. The minimalist move is to claim that, given that a property exhibits these 
characteristics, it follows that it is a genuinely a truth property.38 Exhibiting the 
platitudes is not only necessary for a property to be true, but is also sufficient. 
Wright sets the platitudes out as follows:39 
 
Transparency: To assert is to present as true, and any attitude to a sentence is an 
attitude to that sentence being true. 
 
Opacity: The truth of a sentence may be, to some degree, beyond the recognition 
of a mind.40   
 
Embedding: Aptitude for truth is preserved under a variety of operations. Truth-
apt sentences have negations, conjunctions, disjunctions and so on which are 
likewise truth-apt. 
 
                                                        
37 In Truth and Objectively, Wright talks both of which predicates qualify as truth predicates and 
which properties qualify as truth properties. I will take it here that the distinction is anodyne—that 
a predicate will exhibit platitudinous features if and only if it refers to a property with those 
features. I will use “property”, in preference for terms that are non-linguistic.   
38 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 24. 
39 This is (for the most part) the presentation found here: Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate 
Reviewed,” 271. I have set out the platitudes in terms of sentences rather than, as Wright does in 
this paper, in terms of propositions. Given that a sentence is true iff the proposition it expresses is 
true this is an anodyne discrepancy. An alternative but largely equivalent presentation of the 
platitudes can be found here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 34.  
40 This platitude marks a variety of possible truth characteristics. It is platitudinous that there will 
be some extent to which a sentence can be true without being recognized by a thinker to be so. 
Wright means for this platitude to capture, inter alia, the possibilities that “a thinker may be so 
situated that a particular truth is beyond her ken, that some truths may never be known, that some 
truths may be unknowable in principle” (Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 271.) 
Which such possibility truth actually exhibits emerges, in part, in the discussion in Appendix A on 
Potential Verification Transcendence. 
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Correspondence: For a sentence to be true is for it to correspond to reality and 
accurately reflect the facts. 
 
Contrast: A sentence may be true without being justified, and vice-versa. 
 
Timelessness: If a sentence is ever true then it always is. 
 
Absoluteness: There is no such thing as a sentence being more or less true. 
 
The minimalist claim, then, is that any predicate with these properties counts as a 
truth predicate. I cannot fully discuss each platitude here. But I will give a brief 
explanation of three of them that are particularly relevant. 
 
 The Disquotational Schema (DS)—“P” is true iff P—is intimately linked to 
the Transparency, Correspondence, Contrast, and Opacity platitudes. Minimalism 
is in this sense inspired by deflationism; while the minimalist does not suppose 
that the DS offers an exhaustive explanation of the nature of truth, the schema 
remains a central component. First, consider Transparency. Given that to assert is 
to present as true, the assertion of P is the assertion that P is true. It then follows 
that P is true iff P is the case.41 Provided, then, that a sentence is true if and only if 
the proposition it expresses is true, and that the sentence “P” expresses the 
content P, the DS follows.42 If Transparency is a platitude of truth, then, the 
property exhibited in the DS is as well.  
 
Wright argues that the Correspondence platitude can be shown to follow 
from the DS.43 True sentences, according to this platitude, are those that 
correspond to reality and accurately reflect the facts. Wright suggests that this 
correspondence can be paraphrased as the claim that a sentence is true if and only 
if what it says is the case is the case—a claim I earlier attributed to Aristotle. A fact, 
on the present characterisation, is simply something that is the case; and reality 
                                                        
41 This claim is the Equivalence Schema—it is, effectively, the analogue of the DS for contents rather 
than sentences. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 24. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 25. 
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may be construed as the set of every fact. We can then see that, given the 
legitimacy of this paraphrase, Correspondence follows easily from the DS. What 
“P” says, if it says anything, is P. So, what “P” says is the case is the case if and only 
if P. Then, from the DS—“P” is true if and only if P—it follows that “P” is true if and 
only if what it says is the case is the case. This result, Wright claims, captures what 
is “genuinely platitudinous” about the correspondence that truth has to reality.44 
 
It is worthwhile, while we are discussing the Correspondence platitude, to 
pause and look again at the relation between truth and facts. Even if all we have 
supposed about truth is that it exhibits the DS, we have ensured that a fact 
accompanies every true sentence; true sentences are those that state a fact. If it is 
the case that “Torture is wrong” is true if and only if torture is wrong, for example, 
then if that sentence is true it follows that torture is wrong. It is surely an 
unproblematic step to then say that it is the case, and thus a fact, that torture is 
wrong. The point is that if we adopt minimalism about truth then we inherit a 
certain minimalism about facts. It is sufficient for some state of affairs to be a fact 
that there is a true sentence that states that it obtains, and given minimalism there 
need be no more required for that truth than what is given in the platitudes.45  
 
The Contrast platitude marks the result of the inflationary argument that 
formed one horn of Wright’s dilemma for deflationism.46 Wright derives from the 
DS the conclusion that truth commutes with negation, and thus, given that 
justification does not so commute, that truth and justification are distinct—and 
needn’t covary. And this, Wright claims, suffices for a minimal satisfaction of the 
Opacity platitude.47 Since a sentence is true but not justified when there is a 
                                                        
44 Ibid. It might be objected that there is more to correspondence than what is derived here. 
Wright’s move is not to outright deny this intuition, but to cast it as a characteristic that truth may 
exhibit, rather than one that it must. It is enough for a property to qualify as truth, he claims, that it 
involves the kind of correspondence captured by this paraphrase. In §1.4.3 and Appendix B I will 
demonstrate how Wright facilitates the possibility of a more robust correspondence. Truth in a 
discourse may exert cognitive command or have a wide cosmological role, and thereby exhibit a 
more than minimal correspondence to the facts.  
45 This need not, again, be all there is to facts. Minimalism, contra deflationism, means only to lessen 
what is necessary, and not to deny that there can be robust truth and facts. 
46 Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 272. 
47 This claim is made here: Wright, 275.  
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neutral state of information, in such a state that truth is, to a minimal degree, 
beyond the epistemic access of the subject in question.  
 
We can put the connection between these four platitudes and the DS like 
this. If a property Φ has the characteristic found in the DS—if, that is, a sentence is 
Φ if and only if what that sentence says is the case is the case—then Φ has these 
four platitudinous features. For Φ to qualify as a truth property, of course, it must 
also satisfy Embedding, Timelessness, and Absoluteness—which are not derived 
from the DS.48 But Wright claims that these three platitudes are easily satisfiable; 
for the most part, they can be secured simply by stipulation about the nature of the 
property in question.49 For our purposes, it is effectively sufficient for a property 
to exhibit each platitude that it has the property found in the DS. And it is, of 
course, necessary that it does so. I will thus take the question of whether a 
property has the platitudinous characteristics to be adequately answered by 
showing that it has the disquotational property—while acknowledging that there 
is, strictly speaking, more to the matter.50 
 
 Say, then, that we have some property Φ such that “P” is Φ if and only if P, 
and stipulate that it satisfies Embedding, Timelessness, and Absoluteness. The 
minimalist claim is that it follows that Φ is a truth property. Two questions arise. 
Firstly, why take Φ to qualify as truth? Φ has many characteristic features of truth, 
and since it exhibits Contrast it is not mere justification. But this is not, of course, a 
knockdown argument. And indeed, Wright does not present one: 
I have, I admit, presented no consideration which, strictly, imposes the 
minimalist way of looking at these matters. Rather, it seems to me that we 
                                                        
48 Part of Embedding does follow from the DS: that the sentence may be truth-apt while appearing 
as the antecedent and consequent of a conditional. But this does not alone ensure that it can 
significantly appear in the other essential contexts. 
49 This point is made in footnotes here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 74; Wright, “Truth: A 
Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 275. Such stipulation may not, in some cases, be possible. But the 
point need only be that these latter three platitudes can, in most cases, be unproblematically 
granted. 
50 The most likely error this assumption could produce is that, in consideration of the candidate 
truth properties available to sentences in discourse about meaning, a candidate sustains the DS yet 
somehow fails to satisfy one or more of the other three platitudes. This is possible. But since most 
of my discussion in §2.7 concerns whether there can be a property in meaning discourse that 
sustains the DS, this possibility is inconsequential for the present project. 
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are here concerned with issues which turn on theoretical advantage. And 
minimalism promises considerable advantages if it can be sustained.51 
The advantages to which Wright here refers are found in the framework for 
realism debates facilitated by minimalism, which will be the subject of later 
discussion. The advantages the view might have for non-realism about meaning, of 
course, are of central relevance to this thesis. So, while the option remains to 
simply reject minimalism outright, I will take it to be enough for present purposes 
that the minimalist’s claim that Φ is a truth property is plausible and compelling. 
The aim is to establish a tenable non-realist account of meaning, and we don’t need 
to argue against other theories of truth to do this. 
 
 The second question is this: can a sentence have a minimal truth property 
Φ without having a real subject matter? It must be possible for the matter of 
whether a sentence is Φ to be metaphysically neutral, if minimal truth is to be an 
option for the non-realist. To answer this question, we will first establish what it 
takes for a sentence to be apt for minimal truth, and then consider what it takes for 
a sentence to be minimally true. The claim will be that both truth-aptitude and 
truth are adequately metaphysically neutral when truth is construed as the 
minimalist suggests. 
 
 Wright claims that any sentence will be apt for minimal truth if it has the 
following two properties:52 
 
Syntax: the sentence is of the appropriate form to be situated within negations, 
conditionals, conjunctions, disjunctions, and propositional attitudes. 
 
Discipline: the sentence is subject to recognised standards of warrant.  
 
Wright further claims that the sentences of any assertoric discourse have these 
properties. The result, then, is that all assertoric discourses are comprised of 
truth-apt sentences that are true or false. Let us piece together this implication. 
                                                        





It is necessary for a property to be truth that it exhibits the disquotational 
property, and is thus substitutable for Φ in the schema “P” is Φ iff P. Now, since it 
suffices for a sentence to be truth-apt that it is a candidate for possessing the 
property of truth, all we have to do to identify which sentences are truth-apt is to 
identify which sentences may be substituted for “P” in the schema.53  
Wherever we can introduce a concept which is a satisfier [of the platitudes] 
with respect to a particular class of contents, that fact on its own will justify 
us in regarding the contents in question as apt for truth.54 
A sentence is truth-apt if and only if it is equipped to sustain an instance of the DS. 
Wright’s claim is that meeting the requirements of Syntax and Discipline is 
sufficient for a sentence to be so equipped. 
 
I will first note the role played by Syntax. It is sentences of declarative form 
that meet this requirement. If a sentence does not satisfy Syntax, then it cannot 
appear as the antecedent or consequent of a conditional, and is thus of improper 
form to sustain the schema. Take, for example, the sentence “Dinner time”. This 
sentence, at least as ordinarily construed, does not have the declarative syntax 
necessary for the following to be grammatical: “Dinner time” is true iff dinner time. 
The sentence is not, then, a candidate for minimal truth. Declarative sentences, on 
the other hand, have precisely the necessary form. It is grammatically correct to 
say that “Torture is impermissible” is true iff torture is impermissible. 
 
Satisfaction of Syntax is thus a necessary condition on truth-aptitude. But it 
is not sufficient.55 To see this, consider a nonsense sentence, like “Foom is foog”. 
Say that this sentence is declarative in form and can be embedded in conditionals. 
                                                        
53 Note that truth-apt sentences may, of course, be false. For our purposes it isn’t necessary to work 
through the same thought mutatis mutandis for falsity. The assumption is that any sentence that is 
a candidate for truth in the sense guaranteed by the DS will likewise be a candidate for falsity: 
given that to every content P there corresponds a negation, we may simply say that “P” is false iff 
not-P. Regardless, candidacy for truth will be taken to suffice for truth-aptitude.  
54 Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 275. 
55 This point is well made here: Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith, “Minimalism and 




From such syntactical considerations alone it does not follow that the sentence can 
be substituted for “P” to produce an instance of the DS. For the substitution to go 
through, there must be some content P that corresponds to “P”: there must be 
something that “Foom is foog” says. We cannot simply assume that it says that foom 
is foog; it may indeed say nothing at all. 
 
Discipline is thus added to the set of conditions necessary and sufficient for 
a sentence to sustain an instance of the DS.56 The nature and role of this discipline 
is an important theme for this thesis, and it will return throughout the discussion. I 
have said that a disciplined sentence is a sentence that is subject to recognised 
standards of warrant. For such a sentence, there is a distinction between occasions 
on which it is correct, or proper to utter it and occasions on which it is incorrect or 
improper. Warrant, or justification, is one species of such correctness—and truth is 
another.57 For our purposes, discipline need only be the possibility of correctness 
or incorrectness with respect to some unspecific norm.58 I will also describe 
discourses as disciplined or not disciplined: a discourse is disciplined if and only if 
there is a correctness norm operating over the sentences that comprise it. 
 
This discipline emerges, at least in part, from the patterns of our practice of 
using the sentence in question. To accord with the pattern is correct, and to fail to 
accord with it is incorrect. In virtue of such correctness, sentences are rendered 
differentially evaluable: utterance of one sentence in certain conditions may be 
better, in some sense, than utterance of a different sentence (or of the same 
sentence in different conditions). Consider, for example, sentences of the form “x is 
delicious”. Given—as seems plausible—that it is incorrect to utter “Sand is 
delicious”, and correct to utter “Pizza is delicious”, such sentences, and the 
                                                        
56 See the following for discussion of the role of discipline for minimalism (and in Boghossian’s 
case, for deflationism): Paul A. Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” The Philosophical Review 99, no. 
2 (1990): 163, https://doi.org/10.2307/2185488; Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, “Minimalism and 
Truth Aptness,” 293; Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17, 74. 
57 Wright claims that it is warrant (or justification) that governs assertibility of those sentences that 
sustain that DS: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17. The bulk of my discussion concerns merely 
correctness, and nothing will turn on matters specific to warrant. 
58 See the following for discussion of norm types: Huw Price, “Three Norms of Assertibility, or How 
the Moa Became Extinct,” Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998): 241–54. 
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deliciousness discourse that they comprise, are disciplined.59 This discourse is 
regulated by a norm of utterance, and one ascription of deliciousness may thus be 
better or worse than another. On the other hand, it is no more or less correct to 
utter “Foom is foog” than it is to utter “Foob is foog”. Foogness discourse, such as it 
is, operates under no disciplinary norm; there is no standard with respect to which 
an ascription of foogness is better or worse than any other. Such discourse is, in 
effect, unregulated noise.  
 
I have said that a sentence will only sustain an instance of the DS if it has 
determinate content. The connection to be made, then, is that it is only disciplined 
sentences that have such content. Wright claims as much: 
Consider the practice of the sincere and literal use of the sentences in the 
range of the [truth predicate]. In order for these sentences to be determinate 
in content at all, there has to be a distinction, respected for the most part by 
participants in the practice, between proper and improper use of them. . .. 
[It is plausible that,] unless participants in the practice for the most part try 
to respect the norms of warranted assertion which govern it, it is not clear 
in what the fact could consist that its ingredient sentences have the content 
which they do.60 
That a sentence has determinate content depends on our use of that sentence being 
evaluable for correctness. Indeed, it may be our practice of uttering sentences in 
certain conditions—or, at least endorsing that utterance in those conditions—that 
generates their content. It is clear that satisfying the Discipline condition is 
necessary for a sentence to have content. There can be no fact such that “Foom is 
foog” says that foom is foog if there is no distinction between occasions on which 
utterance of that sentence is correct and occasions on which it is incorrect. And, 
indeed, Discipline can plausibly suffice for the necessary content; given adequate 
                                                        
59 Note that this correctness may be defeasible; the presence of a disciplinary pattern needn’t 
exclude the possibility that in some conditions a sentence is evaluated differently. Discourse about 
deliciousness may be disciplined even if, for example, utterance of the sentence “Pizza is delicious” 
is incorrect when the pizza in question is mouldy. It is also worthwhile to note, along these same 
lines, that we need assume little about the strength of the normativity of this discipline; and in 
particular, about the nature of the reasons for action that emerge. It is enough that there is a 
standard that may be met or not, and that—in at least some minimal sense—it proper to utter the 
former and not the latter. 
60 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17. 
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regulated use of “Foom is foog”, it could be determinate that it is foom is foog that 
is to occupy the right-hand side of an instance of the DS.61 
 
 The result, then, is that satisfaction of Syntax and Discipline is necessary 
and sufficient for a sentence to sustain an instance of the DS. Declarativity ensures 
that the sentence can appear in the biconditional, and the existence of recognised 
standards of warrant ensure that the sentence has determinate content.62 And 
then, as established, this suffices for the sentence to qualify as apt for minimal 
truth.63 The contribution of these conditions can be put in terms of the Aristotelian 
account of truth quoted in the General Introduction, to which the DS is closely 
related. If a sentence must say that something is the case to be true, then that 
sentence must both say something—it must have content—and what it says must 
be that something is the case—which is distinctive of declarative sentences.   
 
 Now consider some discourse D, comprised of sentences of the form “x is F”. 
Say that sentences in D meet the two conditions: they may appear in conditionals, 
disjunctions, and so on; and they exhibit conditions of warranted and unwarranted 
assertibility. D has the materials necessary for a property exhibiting DS to be 
attributed to its sentences, and those sentences are thus truth-apt. The important 
question for our pursuit of anti-realism is this: must D be a realist discourse? I 
think it quite clear that the answer is no. All that we have supposed about D is that 
its sentences have a certain syntactical form and that our practice of engaging in D 
is disciplined. It seems entirely consistent to conjoin these claims with the denial 
                                                        
61 The matter of how patterns of usage determine content deserves further discussion, that I cannot 
provide here. It is enough for now that the suggestion is at least plausible, and since the bulk of my 
later discussion in §2.7 turns primarily on the necessity of discipline, the matter is of little 
consequence. 
62 Another way to characterise the necessity of discipline for minimal truth aptitude is that, since 
the truth that emerges is meant to be a standard that regulates utterance of the sentence, if there 
are no such standards then there are a fortiori no such standards that qualify as truth. 
63 The sufficiency of Syntax and Discipline for truth-aptitude has been disputed. Jackson, Oppy, and 
Smith argue here that certain connections between truth-conditionality and belief refute Wright’s 
account: Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness.” There is an interesting 
intersection between the discussion in that paper and this one: Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “A 
Problem for Expressivism,” Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239–251, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8284.00128. In the first, Jackson (et al.) argues that truth-conditionality requires a connection to 
belief that is not ensured by discipline and syntax alone, while in the latter Jackson (et al.) seems to 
argue that the discipline incorporated by the expressivist about morality implies a connection to 
belief. I cannot investigate this matter further here.  
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that D has a real subject matter. Indeed, we haven’t had to say anything about the 
subject matter of D at all. 
 
As noted, the metaphysical neutrality of truth aptitude will not be enough; it 
must also be the case that a sentence can be true without having a real subject 
matter.64 Say, then, that a sentence in D is not merely truth-apt but qualifies as 
minimally true. Must this sentence state a mind-independent fact, and thereby 
belong to a realist discourse? The answer appears to again be no. All that it takes 
for a property to qualify as truth is that it exhibits the platitudes. And if sentences 
in D are apt for ascription of that truth, then all it takes for a sentence to be true is 
that it exhibits a property with the platitudinous characteristics. Like Syntax and 
Discipline, these platitudes make no reference to independent reality. If all we 
have said about some truth property is that satisfies the platitudes, then nothing 
mind-independent seems to be required for a sentence to meet the standard for 
possessing property. 
 
One platitude that may appear to give the game away to realism is 
Correspondence. The worry is whether it follows from the platitude that true 
sentences correspond to reality and reflect the facts that the subject matter of true 
sentences must be real. Does Correspondence not build this implication into truth? 
Wright claims that it does not.65 It was noted above that this platitude derives 
directly from the DS. Given that “P” is true if and only if P, it follows from any true 
sentence that it states a fact that obtains. We can interpret the necessary 
correspondence between truth and reality in a number of ways. Wright’s claim is 
that it is a perfectly acceptable reading of Correspondence that truth produces 
instances of the DS; that there will be a stated fact for every truth. The DS does, in a 
                                                        
64 If we considered only truth-aptitude, then it would remain possible that only the sentences in a 
realist discourse could actually achieve truth, and that the non-realist is limited to truth-apt but 
false sentences. This wouldn’t qualify as an anti-realist position as I am construing it; it would be an 
error-theory. I will discuss the intersection of error-theories with minimalism in §1.5. There, I will 
find that it is formally possible that a discourse is comprised of truth-apt sentences but none of 
those sentences are true. But since Wright’s approach to truth is meant to reflect the standards 
actually at work in a given discourse—and it would be odd for those standards to be uniformly 
unmet—that possibility is strongly constrained. For my discussion, I will simply assume that if a 
discourse can sustain a minimal truth norm then some of its sentences will be true; if that norm is 
what governs utterance, then is will occasionally be satisfied. 
65 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 25. 
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limited sense, ensure a certain relation between truth and reality. But this needn’t 
be a connection between truth and a mind-independent reality. We have had to 
make reference to facts to capture the concept of truth. But we have not needed to 
specify that those facts obtain independently of our thoughts about them, or that 
they are out there in the world. Instead, they may be minimal facts that emerge 
when a sentence satisfies a minimal truth norm. If “Torture is impermissible” is 
true, then it is certainly a fact that torture is impermissible (assuming, here, that 
“Torture is impermissible” says that torture is impermissible); and there need be 
no more to the truth of that sentence than what is laid out in the platitudes. 
Nothing unavailable to the non-realist need be supposed to maintain that facts of a 
minimal sort accompany true sentences. The appearance of realism that 
Correspondence builds truth, then, is no more than appearance.66 
  
 All that is necessary for minimal truth-aptitude is that a sentence exhibits 
Syntax and Discipline. And all that is necessary for a sentence to be minimally true 
is that has a property that meets the platitudinous constraints. We have found that 
a discourse needn’t have a real subject matter to be comprised of sentences that 
meet these requirements. If we consider what is undeniably part of the concept of 
truth, and then lower the bar to render these platitudinous characteristics 
sufficient, the truth of a sentence can be quite independent of whether it belongs to 
a realist or non-realist discourse. And since it is quite legitimate to claim that there 
is a fact whenever there is a true sentence, there are thus facts with the same 
metaphysical neutrality. If we adopt Wright’s minimalism, the realist does not 
have a monopoly on truth and facts.67 This was the first task for the anti-realist: to 
show that the distinction between realism and non-realism is not the presence of 
truth or facts in a discourse. The second task is to add a positive claim: a claim 
                                                        
66 As earlier noted, while this interpretation of the correspondence that truth exhibits is acceptable, 
there may yet be other interpretations, some of which may not be available to the non-realist. 
Wright incorporates this possibility into his metaphysical framework, in the cruces discussed in 
§1.4.3 and Appendix B: Cognitive Command and Width of Cosmological Role, respectively. 
67 It might be objected at this point that the neutrality of the platitudes alone is insufficient; the 
platitudes do not specify the nature of the standard that a sentence meets in being true, and this 
standard might not be consistent with the denial of realism. This is, indeed, an important part of 
Wright’s framework that I will introduce in the next section in discussing the realism-relevant 
cruces. But since the platitudes describe all that is necessary, the metaphysical neutrality of a 
property with those characterises suffices for the present claim. 
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about what does constitute the distinction. We have said that the anti-realist 
denies that the subject matter in question is mind-independent. What is it, then, 
for one subject to be more or less mind-independent than another?  
 
The mind-independence of a subject, in Wright’s framework, is constituted 
by the mind-independence of truth in discourse about that subject. Debates between 
realism and non-realism for some discourse are debates about the degree of 
objectivity exhibited by the truth norm that operates over the sentences in that 
discourse. Let us set aside the question of the determinants of mind-independence 
until the next section. There is a prior matter. This account requires a certain 
pluralism about truth. For truth to perform the role Wright assigns to it, it must be 
possible for there to be variation in the nature of different truth properties. I will 
briefly show how Wright’s minimalism facilitates this variation.  
 
 The platitudes mark constraints on the concept of truth such that no 
property could plausibly be a truth property unless it satisfies them. But although 
the minimalist holds that meeting the platitudinous requirements settles the 
matter about whether a property is a truth property, this doesn’t mean that we 
have exhausted discussion about the nature of that property. The platitudes mark 
out, as it were, a shape which is unmistakably that of a truth property; and having 
the shape suffices to be truth. But there is more that could be said about the 
property that takes this shape. Wright describes his approach thus:  
Let us call an analysis based on the accumulation and theoretical 
organisation of a set of platitudes concerning a particular concept an 
analytical theory of the concept in question. Then the provision of an 
analytical theory of truth in particular opens up possibilities for a principled 
pluralism in the following specific way: that in different regions of thought 
and discourse the theory may hold good, a priori of—may be satisfied by—
different properties. If this is so, then always provided the network of 
platitudes integrated into the theory were sufficiently comprehensive, we 
should not scruple to say that truth may consist in different things in 
different such areas: in the instantiation of one property in one area, and in 
that of a different property in another. . . .In brief: the unity in the concept of 
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truth will be supplied by the analytical theory; and the pluralism will be 
underwritten by the fact that the principles composing that theory admit of 
collective variable realisation.68 
Under Wright’s minimalism, then, there may be multiple truth properties. Φ, a 
property defined earlier as exhibiting the platitudinous characteristics, is one such 
property. But it needn’t be Φ that governs every assertoric discourse. There may 
be other truth properties, alike Φ in exhibiting the platitudes, but that differ with 
respect to mind-independence. In virtue of this pluralism, we may be differentially 
realist with respect the discourses in which those properties appear.69 But we 
need an account of mind-independence, and it is to this matter which we now turn. 
                                                        
68 Wright, “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed,” 273. 
69 It will be worthwhile to acknowledge an objection that has been made against this pluralism: 
Christine Tappolet, “Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates,” Analysis 
57, no. 3 (1997): 209–210, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/57.3.209; Timothy Williamson, 
“Critical Notices,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. 1 (March 1, 1994): 109–44, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570786. While Wright has an effective response, 
presenting the point will provide a useful clarification. The objector claims that Wright’s 
minimalism posits multiple senses of the predicate “is true” and that it is problematic to do so. We 
have said that the property a sentence in one discourse has in being true may be differ to the 
property a sentence in a different discourse has in being true. There are, then, a variety of 
properties of truth, and of predicates that pick them out. Here is one reason to think that this might 
be a problem (this characterisation is given by Tappolet). Consider the following argument: 
 
1. If x is F, then y is G. 
2. x is F. 
3. Therefore, y is G. 
 
Now say that truth for the discourse in which F is the predicate ascribed is constituted differently 
to truth for the discourse in which G is the predicate ascribed. A weaker version of the familiar 
Frege-Geach problem for non-factualism appears to arise. It is expected (and desired) that the 
argument is valid. If validity is due to truth being preserved from the premises to the conclusion, then, 
the following charge might be made: there can be no such preservation in this argument, because 
the two sentences “x is F” and “y is G” have two different properties when they are true. The 
pluralism about truth implemented in Wright’s minimalism thus fails, the objection concludes, to 
maintain the validity of a very plausibly valid form of argument. 
 The key response Wright makes to this objection is that it mistakes pluralism for 
ambiguity. (Crispin Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” in Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth 
and Objectivity. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 190.) The minimalist claims no 
ambiguity in “is true”. Any two properties or predicates of truth have enough in common for there 
to be a unified sense of the predicate. Each of the sentences in the above argument share aptitude 
for a property that satisfies the platitudinous requirements. Truth is multiply realizable, but this 
does not suffice for the argument above to equivocate on “is true”; the argument is valid, as hoped. 
And indeed, Wright marks its ability to render arguments of this sort valid as a key advantage of his 
framework over expressivist non-factualism: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 74. 
 Wright makes an illustrative comparison between truth and identity to assuage ambiguity 
concerns: Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” 189. The suggestion is that whenever two objects are identical, 
they have a property that satisfies certain platitudes: “that everything is self-identical and that all 
identicals share all their properties.” But the property that constitutes the identity of two identical 
numbers, for example, might be different to the property that constitutes the identity of two 
identical persons. It doesn’t seem likely that this difference is sufficient for there to be multiple 
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1.4 Realism-Relevant Cruces 
1.4.1 Mind-Independence 
We will now adopt Wright’s minimalism about truth. On this account, every 
assertoric discourse features a norm of truth. The distinction between the realist 
and their opponent is not whether any of the sentences in the discourse in 
question are true, but instead the nature of this truth. Since the realist claims that 
certain sentences are mind-independently true, for variation between truth 
properties to constitute a genuine distinction between realism and non-realism it 
must be the mind-independence of truth that is in question. In this section, I will 
present Wright’s account of mind-independence.70 
 
 One way to characterise mind-independence is to provide a simple analysis: 
to complete the sentence “A subject matter is mind-independent iff…”. Wright opts 
instead for a more complex account, on which the mind-independence of a subject 
matter is determined by how it fares with respect to four realism-relevant cruces. 
Each crux characterises one way that subject matters can be more or less mind-
independent, and thus offers a different debate that may arise between the realist 
and their opponent. I will discuss two of the cruces in following sections: 
Judgement-Dependence in §1.4.2, and Cognitive Command in §1.4.3. I include 
appendices concerning the remaining two: Potential Verification-Transcendence in 
                                                        
senses of “is identical to”. The claim of Wright’s minimalist is that truth, in this respect, is much like 
identity. 
 An attack along these lines does not appear to be damaging to Wright’s minimalism. But 
we have an opportunity to make a clarification. Truth, under Wright’s minimalism, must occupy a 
position between two problematic extremes. It must be sufficiently unified that the above argument 
is valid; that there is enough preserved between the premises and the conclusion. But it must be 
sufficiently plural that there is enough room for variation between different properties for there to 
be a distinction between a realist and non-realist discourse. The unification and plurality come 
from different places; satisfaction of the platitudes unifies all truth properties, and how the 
platitudes are satisfied provides plurality. So there doesn’t seem to be much reason for the 
minimalist to be concerned. I will set aside considerations of the tenability of truth pluralism at this 
point, but there may be further investigation to be done. Such investigation might pose the 
following questions: Can satisfaction of the platitudes provide enough unity, even when the 
property that constitutes truth may vary drastically between two discourses? And how is the truth 
property for which a sentence is apt determined, if that sentence has component sentences from 
more than one discourse, when those discourses feature different properties of truth? 
70 Recall, as noted in the General Introduction, firstly that I am construing mind-independence and 
objectivity as equivalent, and secondly that there are senses of both terms which are explicitly not 
what is meant in this discussion. It does not suffice for a chair to be mind-dependent, for example, 
that it has the empirical dependence that follows from being created by a human being with a mind. 
What is in question is a non-empirical, constitutive mind-independence and objectivity. 
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Appendix A, and Width of Cosmological Role in Appendix B.71 Each crux supplies a 
condition that, when satisfied by a discourse, renders it more mind-independent 
than it otherwise could be, and a corresponding condition the satisfaction of which 
renders that discourse less mind-independent than it otherwise would be.72 
 
 These conditions characterise the nature of truth in a discourse. As we saw 
in §1.3, minimalism facilitates a certain pluralism about truth: all assertoric 
discourses feature a truth norm, but there can be variation in the nature of this 
truth between different discourses. Some of this variation may be realism-
relevant—it may contribute to the realism-status of a discourse in which that truth 
operates. It is this variation that the cruces aim to capture. Truth in discourse D 
may differ from truth in D* in virtue of the former property qualifying, and the 
latter failing to qualify, as mind-independent with respect to a certain crux. In such 
a case, the truth property in D is to that extent more robust than that in D*; the fact 
stated by a true sentence in D is to that extent more mind-independent that an 
equivalent fact in D*; and the subject matter of D is to that extent more real than 
that of D*. The sentences in different assertoric discourses may have to meet a 
more or less objective standard to be true. Under Wright’s characterisation of 
debates about realism it is this that determines the realism-status of a discourse. 
Whether a discourse is realist or non-realist is a function of the constitution of 
truth in that discourse, and thus of which of the conditions in the cruces are 
satisfied by that truth. 
 
For each crux, my presentation will take the following form. First, I will 
establish the potential variation between truth properties and discourses that crux 
characterises. Each crux offers two or more positions that may be occupied by 
truth in a certain discourse. Since we have enshrined all that is essential to truth as 
the platitudes, one of the positions offered by each crux must be occupiable by a 
truth property merely on the basis of its satisfaction of those platitudes. One of the 
                                                        
71 The reason for distinguishing between the cruces in this way is that the latter two cruces do not 
seem to offer useful debates in the case of meaning, with which I am primarily concerned. I discuss 
this matter in the appendices themselves. 
72 As we will see, the matter is not always this straightforward: Judgement-Dependence features a 




positions must, in effect, be the default for a minimal truth property. And then, 
since the variation the cruces offer is meant to be realism-relevant, one of the 
positions should also constitute a genuine realist claim. That position, if occupied, 
to some extent strengthens the mind-independence of the subject matter of the 
discourse in question. This is not to say that a realist about a given discourse must 
make the realist claim for every crux. Each crux represents one way that truth can 
vary between discourses, and one axis along which the realism-status of a 
discourse can be debated.  
 
1.4.2 Judgement Dependence 
The truth properties in different discourses may differ with respect to judgement-
dependence. Take discourse about some property F, and consider the judgements 
that can be made about the extension of that property; that, for example, some 
object a is F. Say that some of these judgements—those made in cognitively ideal 
conditions—are such that they covary with the extension of F. That is, say that the 
best opinions about F ascribe F to all and only those objects that are F. For any fact 
such that x if F, the best opinion is that x is F—and vice versa.  
 
Given that this biconditional obtains for F, a distinction can be recognised 
between two possible explanations of the covariation. We can consider a certain 
conceptual priority: the covariation might arise because one of the covariants 
depends on the other. The first option is that the facts have priority over the 
judgements. Judgements about F at best reflect the independently determined 
extension of F, and the perfect correlation is due to the accuracy of this reflection. 
Judgements that satisfy the conditions of cognitive idealness—which we will call 
the C-conditions—are those that are of a sufficient quality to accurately capture 
independently constituted F-facts. Alternatively, it may be the judgements that 
have conceptual priority over the facts. The covariation is in this case explained as 
due to the relevant judgements determining the extension of F. The judgements 
that satisfy the C-conditions do not merely reflect independently-determined facts 
about F; an object that is F is so because the best opinion is that it is F.73 
                                                        





 It is clear how this would bear on the nature of truth in a certain discourse. 
The Disquotational Schema (DS), which is at the heart of any truth property, 
ensures that true sentences and facts coextend. So, while I have put this discussion 
in terms of facts, the point carries across to truth. We may ask the following of 
given discourse: which, of the extension of truth in that discourse or best 
judgements about that extension, is conceptually prior? The truth norm operating 
in a discourse may be such that whether a sentence in that discourse satisfies it is 
determined by the content of the best opinions. Such a truth property, and the 
discourse in which it operates, is judgement-dependent. On the other hand, a truth 
property and the discourse in which it appears may be judgement-independent. In 
this case, while cognitively ideal judgements do covary with whether the 
corresponding sentence is true, this is explained as due to those judgements 
reflecting that truth.  
 
 Wright dubs this distinction the Euthyphro Contrast, alluding to the 
dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro in which Socrates claims that the 
(perfectly accurate) opinions of the gods reflect the extension of piety, while 
Euthyphro claims in opposition that those opinions are extension-determining.74 It 
is intuitive that there is a distinction between a discourse that is judgement-
independent and one which is judgement-dependent. But we need to answer two 
questions. First, we need a formal account of the distinction that we can apply to a 
given discourse. And second, we need to make a case for the realism-relevance of 
the distinction. I will address these matters in turn. 
 
 Wright formalises the distinction as follows. Say that for the characteristic 
property F of a discourse we can establish a provisional equation (PE) of the 
following form: 
PE(F): For all x: if the C-conditions obtain then (a suitable subject judges that x is F 
⟺ x is F). 
                                                        
74 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 108. 
33 
 
PE(F) states that if a certain set of conditions are met, then the opinions of an 
appropriate subject will covary with the extension of F. This is, for the most part, 
equivalent to what we have already said.75 Wright formalises the intuitive 
distinction between extension-determination and reflection as consisting in 
whether the PE for a certain property can meet certain conditions. We may be able 
to establish a PE for both judgement-independent properties and judgement-
dependent properties. But only for properties with extensions that depend on best 
opinion will the PE satisfy the following four conditions: A Prioricity, 
Substantiality, Independence, and Extremal.76  
A Prioricity: It is necessary for F to be judgement-dependent that PE(F) is true a 
priori. Conceptual priority is an a priori matter, so if the covariation of best opinion 
and facts about F is at best empirically true then it cannot be due to the conceptual 
priority of the opinions over the facts.  
The truth, if it is true, that the extension of [F] is constrained by idealised 
human response—best opinion—ought to be accessible purely by analytic 
reflection on those concepts, and hence available as knowledge a priori.77 
Substantiality: It is necessary for F to be judgement-dependent that the C-
conditions in PE(F) can be specified in a non-trivial fashion. Say that we include 
among the C-conditions the condition that the relevant judgments are those made 
in whatever conditions will render them accurate. If such “whatever it takes” 
conditions are admissible, then an a priori PE can be established for any property. 
In such cases, it is clear that the covariation of best opinion and fact is not due to 
the extension-determining role of those opinions; it is merely a trivial result of the 
                                                        
75 The location of the C-conditions in the PE importantly differs to what might be a more intuitive 
equation: a biconditional between the extension of F and the judgements about F that satisfy the 
conditions. Wright justifies widening the scope of the C-conditions here: Wright, Truth and 
Objectivity, 117-119. He notes that one result of this formulation is that the provision of an 
equation meeting the conditions is sufficient only for truth in a discourse to be partially determined 
by best opinion. We may find that truth is determined by those opinions when the C-conditions are 
met, but if the biconditional itself is consequent to those conditions then we have said nothing 
about the relation between truth and opinion when the C-conditions are not met. Nothing much 
will turn on this point, and I will set the matter aside. 
76 Wright discusses these conditions here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 112-124. Also see Miller’s 
synopsis here: Alexander Miller, “Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and the Truth about 
Intention,” Synthese 171, no. 3 (2009): 433–442, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9316-8. 
77 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 117. 
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strength of the C-conditions. It is thus necessary for judgement-dependence that 
those conditions are specified substantially; “whatever it takes” conditions will not 
suffice. 
Independence: It is necessary for F to be judgement-dependent that whether the 
C-conditions obtain is independent of facts about F. Say that PE(F) is a priori true 
and features substantial C-conditions. The following might be the case for that PE: 
that whether or not the C-conditions obtain depends on the extension of F. F 
cannot be judgement-dependent in such a case. The PE specifies that the 
covariation of best opinion and fact is dependent on the obtaining of the C-
conditions, so if satisfaction of the C-conditions depends on the facts then the 
judgements are not conceptually prior to those facts. 
Extremal: It is necessary for F to be judgement-dependent that, when the previous 
three conditions are met, there is no better explanation of that fact than that best 
opinion about F determines its extension. There might be a PE established for a 
property F that, while a priori and including substantial and independent C-
conditions, can be explained as due to something other than the judgement-
dependence of F. Wright suggests pain as an example.78 We may establish a PE for 
pain that meets the prior conditions. But this is due not to the judgement-
dependence of pain but to subjects being infallible with respect to pain. We can be 
sure that a subject’s judgements about their pain covary with the facts without 
taking it that those facts are determined by (the best of) those judgements. The 
nature of pain itself can explain the accuracy of best opinion, and this nature can 
be (Wright suggests) specified without reference to judgements about it. To rule 
out such cases, the Extremal condition must be met by PE(F) for F to qualify as 
judgement-dependent.  
 
Wright’s claim is that satisfaction of these four conditions is necessary and 
collectively sufficient for the property F featuring in PE(F) to be judgement-
dependent. If we can be assured, in the manner laid out in these conditions, that, 
contingent on certain conditions obtaining, a subject’s opinions about F will be 
                                                        
78 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 122. 
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perfectly accurate, then it must be the case that the facts about F are determined by 
the best opinions about F. The truth of sentences ascribing F, and the discourse 
those sentences comprise, is thus judgement-dependent. If we cannot establish a 
PE within the confines of the four conditions, and need to deny one or more of 
them to ensure the accuracy of certain opinions about F, then F may instead be 
judgement-independent. For illustration, consider the following two cases: redness 
and squareness.79 
PE(redness): For all x: if (S knows which object x is, and knowingly observes it in 
plain view in normal perceptual conditions; S is fully attentive to this observation; 
S is perceptually normal and is prey to no other cognitive disfunction; S is free of 
doubt about the satisfaction of any of these conditions) then (S judges that x is red 
⟺ x is red).80 
PE(squareness): For all x: if (S knows which object x is, and knowingly observes it 
in plain view from a sufficient variety of positions in normal perceptual conditions; 
S is fully attentive to these observations; S is perceptually normal and is prey to no 
other cognitive disfunction; S is free of doubt about the satisfaction of any of these 
conditions) then (S judges that x is square ⟺ x is square).81 
I cannot give a full discussion of these two cases here. But it is quite plausible that 
PE(redness) is a priori true, that the conditions are independent and substantial, 
and that there is no better explanation of this being the case than that redness is 
judgement-dependent. PE(squareness), on the other hand, does not look to satisfy 
the conditions. The italicised necessary stipulation that a subject makes more than 
one observation renders the independence condition unmet. Judgements about 
squareness—on this account—cannot be conceptually prior to facts about 
squareness because to be sure of an object’s shape we need to perceive it from 
multiple angles. And the possibility of several perceptions contributing to a single 
judgement depends on the shape not changing between perceptions, and thus on 
                                                        
79 These are the examples that Wright uses here: Crispin Wright, “Moral Values, Projection and 
Secondary Qualities,” in Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 169. 
80 Ibid., 171. 
81 Ibid., 173. 
36 
 
facts about the shape of the object.82 The failure of this particular PE does not, of 
course, imply that no successful PE can be found for squareness. The claim is that 
the difficulty seems insurmountable—that adequate C-conditions cannot be found, 
and that squareness cannot be judgement-dependent.83  
 
 These examples are meant only to illustrate Wright’s account of judgement-
dependence; whether the results are correct is not of great concern. I have 
established, I hope, that there is a genuine distinction between a truth property 
being judgement-dependent and it being judgement-independent. The next task is 
to demonstrate that the distinction is relevant to the mind-independence of the 
property at hand, and thus that it should be included among the realism-relevant 
cruces. The case for this is clear. Judgements are made by minds. If truth in a 
discourse is judgement-dependent, then, it is to that extent mind-dependent. If, on 
the other hand, truth in a discourse is judgement-independent—if judgements at 
best track facts that are conceptually—then the truth that corresponds to those 
facts is to a certain extent independent of our mental activity. The Judgement-
Dependence (JD) crux thus offers these two positions for realism debates about 
some discourse D. 
 
JD Realism(D): Truth in D is judgement-independent. Opinions, at their best, 
merely reflect the independent facts that form the subject matter of D. 
 
JD Anti-Realism(D): Truth in D is judgment-dependent. Opinions, at their best, 
determine the facts that form the subject matter of D. 
 
There is an important matter to discuss before we move on. There is a third 
position available in debates about judgement-dependence. This option is not 
explicit in Wright’s work; it is an apparent consequence of his framework, and one 
that he does not directly address.84 A discourse may be such that covariation of 
                                                        
82 Ibid. 
83 These results seem generalisable to any colour or shape, and thus suggest that any ascription of 
colour is judgement-dependent, and that any ascription of shape (or, more cautiously, at least 
ascription of two-dimensional shape) is judgement-independent.  
84 Wright acknowledges the point here: Crispin Wright, “Realism, Pure and Simple? A Reply to 
Williamson,” in Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity. (Cambridge, 
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best opinion with fact cannot be explained as due to the either the priority of 
opinion or fact.  
 
JD Mere Minimalism(D): Truth in D is neither judgement-dependent nor 
judgement-independent. Opinions neither track nor determine the facts that form 
the subject matter of D. 
 
Judgement-independence and judgment-dependence offer characterisations of the 
epistemology of a discourse. The C-conditions are those in which a judgement is 
epistemically best, and the two accounts diverge as to what relation obtains 
between judgements and facts in those conditions. But an assertoric discourse may 
be such that an epistemology of this sort is out of the question. There may no 
explanatory account available of how judgements access the facts, or of which of 
those judgements are epistemically best. The assertoricity of a discourse ensures 
that the comprising sentences are truth-apt, and that some of them are true. But it 
doesn’t follow that there is anything substantial to be said about how our 
judgements about what is true relate to the extension of truth. 
 
 When truth in a discourse is of this third sort, a PE meeting the four 
conditions cannot be found—that would require an explanation of best judgments 
about truth as determining what is true. But from this failure it does not follow that 
an explanation can be given of those judgements as tracking what is independently 
true. We would need to suppose, in addition, that there is some means by which 
subjects who make the judgements in question access the facts.   
 
We can see that judgement-dependence and judgement-independence 
cannot exhaust the possibilities for truth in a discourse by noting that meeting the 
minimal requirements for being a truth property does not suffice for either 
relation to judgement. From merely the platitudinous characteristics of any truth 
                                                        
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 80. That judgement-dependence and judgement-
independence do not exhaust the options is suggested here, in relation to discourse about morality: 
Wright, “Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities,” 181. This matter is also well discussed 




property, we are not guaranteed any explanatory relation between judgement and 
what is true. We could put the point like this: if judgement-dependence and 
independence were the only two options, then one of them would be enshrined 
amongst the platitudes or derivable from them; and neither is. Or, at least, neither 
seems to be—the platitudes include no reference to judgement.85 A discourse may 
be what we will call merely minimal with respect to the Judgement-Dependence 
crux.86  
 
Debate about the realism-status of a certain discourse can thus be debate 
about which of three Judgement-Dependence positions is occupied by that 
discourse. If a PE meeting the four conditions can be established for the 
characteristic property of the discourse, then when a sentence in that discourse is 
true, it is so because it is judged to be so in conditions of idealisation. If there 
cannot be such a PE, then either an extension-tracking epistemology justifies the 
claim that the covariation of certain judgements and truth is due to the 
independence of truth from those judgements, or the absence of a sufficient 
epistemology prevents movement beyond the platitudes for truth in that 
discourse.  
 
1.4.3 Cognitive Command 
Cognitive Command concerns the nature of the correspondence afforded by the 
Correspondence platitude: 
 
                                                        
85 To avoid supposing that there is a third option, one may attempt to derive one of the first two 
options from the platitudes. It is worth noting a difficult constraint on this plan. The following 
seems to be a trilemma: (1) that judgement-independent truth is a genuine realist position, (2) that 
the minimal platitudes are neutral on the question of realism and non-realism, (3) that it follows 
from the platitudes that truth is judgement-independent. To maintain (1) and (2) one must deny 
(3). If we are to cohere with Wright’s framework as we have set it up, then, either judgement-
dependence or some third option is platitudinous. And then, noting the hoops through which one 
must jump to establish a sufficient provisional equation for judgement-dependence—conditions 
that are surely not satisfiable merely on the basis of the platitudes alone—it follows that it must be 
the third option that is platitudinous.   
86 One result of this possibility is that, unlike for the other cruces, what I have called the anti-realist 
option for Judgement-Dependence—that certain judgements determine what is true—is not a 
default feature of truth. Instead, the basic position is JD mere minimalism, and both the realist and 
the anti-realist must add to the platitudes to achieve their distinctive positions. 
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Correspondence: for a proposition to be true is for it to correspond to reality and 
accurately reflect how matters stand. 
 
Any truth property will exhibit Correspondence. But, as I have noted, there can be 
variation in the robustness of the correspondence between the truth of a sentence 
and the fact it states. Minimalism about truth entails a certain minimalism about 
facts; the Disquotational Schema (DS) is enough for there to be some kind of 
correspondence between a true sentence and a fact it states. But, for truth in some 
discourses, there may be more to correspondence than what is produced by the DS 
alone.87  
 
A discourse may be such that it exerts cognitive command: 
 
Cognitive Command: A discourse exerts cognitive command iff it is a priori that 
differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a 
result of vagueness, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a 
cognitive shortcoming.88  
 
Or a discourse may instead be such that it does not exert cognitive command. 
Consider the sentence “x is F” in some discourse D. Say that person A believes this 
sentence to be true and person B believes it to be false; A and B disagree. There are 
three possibilities given such a disagreement. Firstly, the disagreement may be due 
to the presence of vagueness. I will set this possibility aside; take it that when I 
refer to a disagreement in this discussion it is implicit that that disagreement is not 
attributable to vagueness. 89 It is the second two options which are of relevance to 
                                                        
87 Another crux, Width of Cosmological Role (WCR) also concerns this correspondence. Cognitive 
Command offers one way that the relation between true sentences and facts can be robust, while 
WCR offers one way that the facts themselves may be robust. I discuss WCR in Appendix 2. See: 
Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 84. 
88 Ibid., 144. 
89 Wright identifies (ibid.) several places in a disagreement that may involve some vagueness may 
occur in such scenarios. It might be the case, for example, that whether or not x is F is a vague 
matter, or that the standards under which A and B evaluate the sentences are such that it is a vague 
matter whether the standards are met. If the disagreement is due to such vagueness, then the 
question of cognitive command does not apply. Vagueness among the facts, standards, or whatever 
else does not imply anything about the metaphysical nature of the subject matter in question—at 
least, it does not appear to. And disagreements that are due to this vagueness will not, then, be 
realism-relevant either. Note, also, that I am primarily concerned with the application of this 
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debates about realism. The disagreement may occur because one of A or B exhibits 
a cognitive shortcoming. The divergence of their opinions, in this case, is 
attributable to one or both of them committing some error in arriving at the belief 
in question. It might be the case, for example, that B believes that x is not F because 
they are poorly informed. Or, it could be that their belief-forming processes 
malfunctioned and produced a belief that does not follow from the available 
evidence.90 The third possibility in the face of a difference of opinion is that there 
no shortcoming. In this case, A and B arrive at their conflicting beliefs without any 
error. 
 
 A discourse exerts cognitive command when it is a priori that any 
disagreement is of the second variety; that some cognitive fault must have 
occurred.91 The standard of truth that operates over such a discourse is sufficiently 
strict that two subjects cannot form conflicting opinions without one or both of 
them having made some kind of error. Discourses that exert cognitive command 
are those for which it is inconceivable that two subjects can faultlessly disagree 
about what is true.  
 
 The positions of the realist and the anti-realist in debates about Cognitive 
Command (CC) are as follows: 
 
CC Realism(D): D exerts cognitive command. It is a priori that differences of 
opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness, 
will involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive 
shortcoming. 
 
                                                        
framework to meaning (in the case of this crux, in §2.7.3). Since there seems to be no particular 
reason to suspect that vagueness will happily explain away disagreements about the truth of 
meaning ascriptions, we will simply set matters of vagueness aside.  
90 Ibid., 93.  
91 The condition of a priority on discourse that exert cognitive command is included because we are 
concerned with a characteristic of a discourse that is built-in to our practice of it; it would not be 




CC Anti-Realism(D): D does not exert cognitive command. It is not a priori that 
differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a 
result of vagueness, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a 
cognitive shortcoming. 
 
To see that these positions mark a realism-relevant distinction, consider the nature 
of the relation between truth and fact. In virtue of the DS, a minimal sense of 
representation arises even for merely minimal truth properties; a sentence can be 
true only if it states a fact, and thus in a sense only if it accurately reflects reality.92 
But if the sentences in a discourse cannot be faultlessly incompatible, then there is 
a more robust representation at work in that discourse.  
The thought of a realist … is that responsibly to practise in that region is to 
enter into a kind of representational mode of cognitive function, comparable 
in relevant respects to, say, taking a photograph or making a wax impression 
of a key. Certain matters stand thus and so independently of use—compare 
the photographed scene and the contours of the key. We engage in a certain 
process, to wit, we put ourselves at the mercy, so to speak, of the standards 
of appraisal appropriate to the discourse in question—compare taking the 
snapshot or impressing the key on the wax—and the result is to leave an 
imprint in our minds which, in the best case, appropriately matches the 
independently standing state of affairs.93 
There is a notion of representation, Wright claims, such that a discourse that 
involves that representation deals with mind-independent matters. A discourse 
can be such that the comprising sentences are attempts to capture the nature of an 
independent reality, as a photograph captures a landscape. The connection to be 
made, then, is between cognitive command and this robust representation. The 
claim must be that the impossibility of faultless disagreement is sufficient for 
representationality of this robust sort. And it is quite plausibly so. What else, other 
than that the sentences in question are meant to capture independent facts, could a 
priori ensure that disagreement in a discourse implies that one or both of the 
conflicting beliefs is faulty? It must be that those sentences are robustly 
                                                        
92 This point was made in §1.3, and derives from here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 25. 
93 Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” 197. 
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representational—that there is a strict correspondence relation that rules out the 
possibility of two subjects faultlessly arriving at conflicting beliefs. We can put the 
point like this: given that only one of P or not-P obtains, and that the function of the 
sentences “P” and “not-P” is to accurately represent what is the case with respect 
to P, it cannot be that both sentences successful perform their function. The 
exertion of cognitive command, then, suffices for a discourse to be robustly 
representational. And it is clear that this representationality is realism-relevant. If 
a sentence must accurately represent a mind-independent fact to be true, then that 
truth is to that extent mind-independent.  
 
 That a discourse exerts cognitive command does not follow merely from 
the aptitude of the sentences in that discourse for minimal truth.94 If, for a certain 
truth property, we commit only to the satisfaction of the platitudes and nothing 
more, the third possibility in the face of a disagreement is available: 
It is consistent with the minimal truth aptitude of a discourse that the 
relevant standards are highly tolerant, or underdetermine a substantial 
class of potential disagreements, or otherwise allow a degree of 
idiosyncrasy in their application, and so permit divergences of opinion in 
which, judged purely by those standards, no shortcoming need be 
involved.95 
A discourse can be disciplined without there being error in holding conflicting 
opinions about whether a sentence meets the disciplinary standard. And as earlier 
established, this discipline (and an appropriate syntax) is all that is necessary to 
establish a minimal truth norm in a discourse. If truth in a discourse does not 
extend beyond the platitudes, then correspondence to fact need be no more than 
the casting of an ontic shadow: when a sentence meets the standard for truth the 
fact it states obtains. For it to be a priori that disagreement implies error, a more 
robust correspondence is necessary. We must go beyond what is granted by the 
platitudes and hold that true sentences are those that map the facts, and not 
merely those that the DS ensures are everywhere accompanied by the facts. It is 
                                                        




this quality that a discourse exhibits when it exerts cognitive command. Cognitive 
Command thus offers a genuine realism debate. The default position, ensured on 
the basis of the assertoricity of a discourse alone, is that truth does not exert 
cognitive command. The realist may seek to establish that truth does exert 
cognitive command, and that the discourse in question thus involves a robustly 
representational correspondence to reality. 
 
1.5 The Metaphysical Landscape 
This exposition of Truth and Objectivity is far from comprehensive. But we are now 
in a position to specify the basics of Wright’s framework for debates about realism. 
We set out, at the start of this chapter, to formulate an anti-realist approach to 
non-realism. The first task was to find an account of truth and facts on which they 
are metaphysically neutral: on which they are not available only to the realist. 
Wright’s minimalism provides such an account. The second task was to provide an 
account of what does suffice for realism. This is provided by the variable 
constitution of truth characterised in the four cruces. The realist argues that the 
truth property at work in the discourse in question is mind-independent in one or 
more of these respects. We have thus produced a workable model of opposition to 
realism along anti-realist lines: an assertoric discourse may operate under a truth 
norm that involves little or no mind-independence. I conclude this chapter with a 
brief general suggestion of how to apply Wright’s model of realism debate to a 
given discourse. In §2.7 I will apply the framework to discourse about meaning. 
For now, I will use a made-up example, to render the discussion as neutral as 
possible.  
 
 Say that a group of people engage in discourse comprised of sentences of 
the form “x is foog”. Assume, for now, nothing whatsoever about the nature of 
foogness. All we know is that people appear to talk about which things are foog. In 
seeking to evaluate the realism-status of foogness within Wright’s framework, the 
first step is to determine whether discourse about foogness is assertoric. 
Minimalism about truth is such that all that is necessary for sentences to be truth-
apt is that they exhibit a certain syntax and discipline. The metaphysician first 
considers whether sentences like “If this is foog, then it’s edible,” and “Roxanne 
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believes that this is foog” are grammatically correct—let us say that they are.96 The 
metaphysician then considers whether discourse about foogness is disciplined. 
There must be a norm or norms of correct assertion operating over sentences that 
ascribe foogness, such that there is a distinction between ascriptions that are 
correct and those that are incorrect. Let’s say that there is such a norm, and that 
the patterns of regulated use are sufficient for foogness ascriptions to have 
determinate content. From these syntactical and disciplinary considerations, it 
follows that the sentences “x is foog” are apt for ascription of a property Φ that be 
substituted for truth in the Disquotational Schema (DS): “P” is true iff P. Given that 
Φ also satisfies the three platitudes that do not follow directly from the DS, it is a 
truth property.97 We have thus found that foogness discourse features a norm of 
truth under which each comprising sentence is evaluated as either true or false. 
And any foogness ascription which meets the standard will be true.  
 
So, having assumed nothing of any metaphysical import about foogness, we 
have found that there can be true foogness ascriptions. Recalling the 
Correspondence platitude, then, it follows that there are foogness facts. We next 
consider how truth in foogness discourse fares with respect to the cruces. It is the 
cruces that may imbue a truth property with mind-independence, and it is this 
mind-independence that determines the realism-status of the discourse in which 
that truth appears. So, we next ask the following questions: 
 
1. Is truth in this discourse judgement-dependent, judgement-independent, or 
neither? Debates in this area concern, first, whether an a priori true 
provisional equation with substantial, independent C-conditions, for which 
we have no better explanation than judgement-dependence, can be 
established. If such an equation can be established for foogness, then the 
anti-realist wins the debate. If it cannot, then either the discourse features 
                                                        
96 To see the point of this test, imagine that foog-talk was instead comprised of sentences like 
“Foog!” and “No foog!”. Such a discourse wouldn’t qualify as assertoric or as apt for minimal truth. 
It may be norm-governed; there may be quite specific conditions in which it is proper to utter these 
sentences. But that norm cannot be truth, because it is essential to our concept of truth that 
sentences that are true or false can be embedded into certain contexts. 




an epistemology in which judgements track the facts—a win for the 
realist—or, with no such epistemology, the discourse is merely minimal 
with respect to this crux. 
 
2. Does this discourse exert cognitive command? When there is disagreement 
about what is foog that is not due to vagueness, is it a priori that one or 
more of the disagreeing parties exhibit some cognitive shortcoming? If it is, 
then the robust representationality that follows constitutes a win for the 
realist. If it is not, then there is no robust representationality, which is a win 
for the non-realist. 
 
Two other cruces, Potential Verification Transcendence and Width of Cosmological 
Role are described in Appendices A and B. They offer the following questions, 
which I will include here without further discussion: 
 
3. Is truth in this discourse potentially verification transcendent? We may 
commit to every foogness ascription being true or false even when that 
ascription is beyond the bounds of our standards of justification, and grant 
the realist this victory. Or, for any foogness ascription for which we have no 
guarantee that it (or its negation) is knowable, we may withhold 
commitment to it having a truth-value. This latter option constitutes a 
victory for the non-realist. 
 
4. What is the width of the cosmological role of the facts in this discourse? Can 
facts about foogness explain anything other than, or other than via, 
propositional attitudes about those facts? If so, then truth in the discourse 
corresponds to facts that are independent of our minds, which is a victory 
for the realist. If not, then truth in the discourse may correspond only to 
facts as ontic shadows, and the victory goes to the non-realist.  
 
Effectively, there are four debates about the realism-status of any discourse. A 
consequence of this structure is that there is a diversity of positions available. 
Realism debates as construed by Wright are not simply debates about which of 
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two positions—realism or non-realism—is occupied by a certain subject. The four 
distinct cruces, and the possibility that they might be differentially satisfied by a 
certain subject, multiply the available positions. There are three options for 
Judgement-Dependence, two options for Cognitive Command, two options for 
Potential Verification Transcendence, and at least two options for Width of 
Cosmological Role. An additional, non-multiplying option is to deny that the 
discourse is assertoric. We have, then, 25 or more debatable positions on the 
realism-status of any subject.98 I have not considered whether certain 
combinations of positions across multiple cruces might be incoherent, so it is 
possible that this number is lower. Regardless, it is clear that this framework 
establishes a more complex landscape than that which arises for realism debates 
for which there is a singular question. We will not always, for example, be able to 
straightforwardly compare the realism-status of two discourses.99 This may pose a 
difficulty, but I don’t think it a very serious one. What reason is there to think that 
something like mind-independence must boil down to a single question? 
 
This diversity of positions also produces terminological difficulties. Given 
Wright’s framework, labelling a certain metaphysical view of a certain subject 
“realist”, “anti-realist” or “non-realist” will leave the metaphysical status of that 
subject largely unspecified.100 These terms are for the most part clear in the 
context of an individual debate. More generally, I think it clearest to use “full 
realism” for a discourse that falls on the realist side of every debate, and “anti-
realism” for a discourse that falls on the non-realist side once or more—as long as 
it is remembered that a discourse may be anti-realist yet still operate under a truth 
norm that is mind-independent in one or more respects. “Mere minimalism” will 
be used for any discourse in which truth satisfies the platitudes but fails to be 
objective with respect to any of the cruces. Nothing turns on the specifics of this 
                                                        
98 That is, the combinations offered in the four cruces produce at least 24 options (3 x 2 x 2 x 2), 
and the denial of assertoricity is one additional option. 
99 If some truth, for example, is PVT, judgement-independent, does not exert CC, and corresponds to 
facts with narrow cosmological role, then it is unclear how to determine whether the discourse in 
which that truth operates is more or less realist than another discourse the truth of which is not 
PVT, is judgment-dependent, does exert CC, and corresponds to fact with a wide cosmological role. 
100 Wright says that “the epithets “realism” and “anti-realism” come to seem less and less happy 
from a pluralistic perspective.” Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 142. 
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terminology, but it is of course advantageous to make metaphysics clearer 
whenever possible.101 
 
It is important to recognise that, in a certain sense, anti-realism becomes the 
default position under Wright’s framework.102 We start by establishing that the 
targeted discourse meets the minimal constraints for truth. All assertoric 
discourses feature a truth norm that is at least minimal. The cruces mark four 
ways that truth in a discourse can go beyond this minimal level; four ways that the 
standard a sentence must meet to be true can gain some objective requirement, 
over and above the kind of evaluation internal to the discourse. It is sufficient for a 
kind of anti-realism about a certain subject that it is comprised of syntactically 
appropriate sentences, the use of which is disciplined.103 Realism, on the other 
hand, is a more demanding position, one that must be earned by demonstration 
that truth in the discourse imposes mind-independent requirements on the 
sentences. 
It is realism which must try to make good its case, by showing that 
minimalism about the relevant discourse is wrong—showing that the 
minimal platitudes leave out features of the local truth predicate which 
substantially justify the rhetoric of independence, autonomy and full-
fledged cognitive interaction by which realism pretheoretically defines 
itself.104 
                                                        
101 Another terminological point concerns “truth”. Wright’s framework involves a certain pluralism 
about truth, in which all truth properties share fundamental properties yet may vary widely in 
others. There may be certain advantages to restricting the term “truth” to only some of these 
properties. In one discussion, for example, Wright imposes a distinction between “correctness” and 
“truth”, where both are strictly speaking truth properties but the former is merely minimal. (Ibid., 
215.) Such variation in terminology is an option, and may be quite useful, but it remains essential to 
Wright’s framework that all assertoric discourses feature a norm with the platitudinous 
characteristics, and that differences in realism-status between those discourses is constituted not 
by whether there is such a norm, or whether that norm is ever achieved, but by the nature of that 
norm beyond its platitudinous shape. 
102 Ibid., 174. 
103 As noted in §1.4.2, Judgement-Dependence is an exception. To arrive what I have called the anti-
realist option—that best opinions determine the facts—it is necessary to add an appropriate 
epistemology to what is granted by the minimal truth platitudes; an epistemology that has the 
resources to establish that, in certain conditions, best opinion covaries with the facts (and that the 
four conditions on this provisional equation can be satisfied). See, again: Miller, “Differences with 
Wright.” 
104 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 174. 
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The anti-realist must, of course, defend against arguments made by the realist. But 
all positions in realism debate for an assertoric discourse will accept that that 
discourse traffics in truth and fact, and the onus is on the realist to argue that this 
truth and fact is more than the product of the form and discipline of the discourse 
itself. 
 
Finally, let us look again at non-factualism and error-theory. These irrealist 
accounts of non-realist discourse oppose realism by denying that there are any 
facts about the relevant subject, and thus by denying that there are any true 
sentences that state those facts. If we have adopted Wright’s framework, these 
positions remain formal options but become constrained. Once we adopt 
minimalism about truth (in place of an account on which truth is characterised as 
more robust), the space occupied by the non-factualist shrinks, and may for many 
subject matters disappear. The moral non-factualist, for example, claims that 
sentences like “Torture is impermissible” are not truth-apt. But Wright sets the bar 
for truth-aptitude very low. “Torture is impermissible” can qualify as truth-apt 
simply by sustaining an instance of the DS, for which all that is necessary is 
declarative syntax and the presence of some acknowledged standard of warrant. 
The moral non-factualist must deny either that moral ascriptions have the 
necessary syntax or the necessary discipline—both of which seem unappealing—
or reject Wright’s account.105  
 
The error-theoretic route fares moderately better, but is constrained by 
Wright’s minimalism nonetheless.106 The issue arises when we consider how 
error-theorists typically defend against eliminativism. Having accepted that the 
sentences in a discourse are systematically false, the error-theorist might contend 
                                                        
105 The sufficiency of declarative syntax and discipline for truth aptitude—and, in particular, the 
intersection of this possibility with non-factualism—has received much discussion. See, for 
example: John Divers and Alexander Miller, “Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love 
Minimalism about Truth,” Analysis 54, no. 1 (1994): 12–19, https://doi.org/10.2307/3328097; 
John Divers and Alexander Miller, “Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist Conception of Belief,” 
Analysis 55 (1995): 37; Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness”; Michael Smith, 
“Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth,” Analysis 54, no. 1 (1994): 1–
11, https://doi.org/10.2307/3328096. This matter is important for the discussion in §2.7. 
106 Wright discusses the intersection of minimalism and error-theory here: Wright, Truth and 
Objectivity, 35, 86. 
49 
 
that practicing that discourse is still worthwhile because it is governed by a 
subsidiary norm. The comprising sentences are correct or incorrect with respect to 
a norm, despite being universally incorrect (false) with respect to the truth norm. 
But given Wright’s minimalism, truth can take different forms. If the subsidiary 
norm satisfies the minimal platitudes—which, as we have established, is quite 
consistent with non-realism about the discourse in question—it may be that norm 
which constitutes truth in the discourse. There is a choice, in such a case, between 
characterising truth as a standard that no sentences in the discourse achieve, or 
characterising truth as a different standard—one that is actually satisfiable, and 
that we may actually use to evaluate some sentences as correct and others as 
incorrect.107 When a non-eliminative error-theorist charges the discourse in 
question as committing a grand error, they may in fact simply be misconstruing the 
nature of truth in that discourse. The difficulty posed for the error-theorist by 
minimalism, then, is this. Say that minimalism is right, and that we have accepted a 
non-realist argument to the effect that the sentences of a certain discourse are 
systematically false with respect to some robust standard of truth. Say also that we 
have taken the non-eliminativist route and maintained that some other 
pragmatically valuable standard or standards are present. It will often, in such a 
situation, be more appealing to investigate the standards at work in that discourse 
and identify a less robust and satisfiable norm of truth than to stick to the robust 
account and characterise practice of the discourse as pragmatically useful error. 
An error-theorist might respond by providing reason for thinking that we should 
characterise truth as robust in the relevant discourse.108 Or, they might respond by 
claiming that, in the relevant discourse, the only norms that could qualify as truth 
are systematically unmet. I will not investigate these thoughts here.109 The point is 
                                                        
107 The error-theorist need only claim that the atomic and positive sentences in a discourse are 
false. 
108 Wright suggests this here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 87. 
109 One thing to note, regarding the second response, is that arguments that the sentences in a 
discourse fail to achieve some robust truth standard may not apply with respect to less robust 
standards. It seems, for example, that Mackie’s ontological claim (Mackie, Ethics.) that there are no 
objective moral facts would have no effect on whether moral ascriptions can satisfy a truth 
standard that doesn’t exert cognitive command or on which true sentences correspond to facts 
with narrow cosmological role. Truth, given minimalism, does not rely on the statement of any 
objective fact. Denying that there are objective moral facts is insufficient to motivate a moral error-




that an error-theoretic approach to non-realism is less appealing having adopted 
Wright’s account of realism debates. But, in virtue of such possibilities as the two I 
have noted, an error-theory within Wright’s framework remains a formal option. 
 
As for non-factualism, then, once we have adopted minimalism the error-
theoretic approach to non-realism is significantly constrained. If truth is as diverse 
and promiscuous across assertoric discourses as the minimalist claims, then 
opposing realism about an assertoric discourse D by denying that there are true 
sentences (or facts) in D—either by claiming that they are false or not truth-apt at 
all—seems to be the wrong approach.  
 
We have thus developed a workable model of the metaphysical framework 
Wright presents in Truth and Objectivity. We enter into debates about whether to 
be realists or non-realists about a certain discourse by investigating the 
characteristics of the standards for utterance at work in that discourse. In some 
discourses, correctness is merely a product of the shape of our talk, and simply 
reflects our practice of following norms in engaging with a certain subject. In other 
discourses, correctness is largely constituted by the structure of our thought about 
that subject, but there are certain respects in which assertion is regulated by mind-
independent matters. In other discourses, sentences must meet a highly mind-
independent standard to qualify as true. To engage in such a discourse is to seek to 
accord with a norm that is strongly beholden to objective reality. In all of these 
discourses, this correctness properly qualifies as truth; every comprising sentence 
is truth-apt, and many of them may be true. It is the nature of this truth—the 
objectivity of the regulatory standard—that determines whether a certain body of 






MEANING IRREALISM AND  
MEANING DISCOURSE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
It is worthwhile to distinguish between motivations and destinations for opposition 
to realism. The strongest motivations for meaning non-realism are arguments in 
its favour, and such arguments may be compelling. But the tenability of the 
destinations to which such argument leads are, to a certain extent, independent of 
the strength of the motivation. In this chapter, I will develop one prominent 
motivation for meaning non-realism, and investigate the destinations to which it 
might lead. This is the sceptical argument drawn by Saul Kripke from 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which Kripke presents in Wittgenstein 
on Rules and Private Language.110 
 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) argues against the existence of meaning facts, 
and thus against meaning realism. While realism has been denied for many things, 
opposition to realism about meaning has particularly severe consequences—so 
severe, in fact, that it may fail to be coherent. My plan is to investigate some of 
these consequences, in the hope of shedding some light on the tenability of 
meaning non-realism. The strategy of this chapter is to consider what we might 
make of discourse about meaning once we have denied that there are meaning 
facts to which it answers. The thought, in doing so, is that the tenability of meaning 
non-realism depends on provision of an acceptable account of meaning discourse. 
I will first, in §2.2, give a synopsis of KW’s argument. Since I am primarily 
concerned with the consequences of opposition to meaning realism, I will simply 
assume that this argument is sound. In §2.3, I will note some important 
consequences of KW meaning non-realism, to indicate the scope of the argument. 
                                                        
110 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
It is not of great concern whether Kripke’s book is representative of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I 
will attribute the arguments made to Kripke’s Wittgenstein; Kripke’s work is an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein and may be representative of the thoughts of neither Kripke nor Wittgenstein. For 
argument that Kripke gets Wittgenstein wrong, see: Crispin Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the 
Argument against Private Language” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 114. 
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§2.4 – §2.7 are investigations into three types of account that we might make of 
meaning discourse having opposed meaning realism: meaning error-theory, 
meaning non-factualism, and meaning mere minimalism. In §2.8, I will attempt to 
generalise from the results of the previous sections, and determine the severity of 
the situation for meaning non-realism as motivated by KW.   
 
2.2 The Kripke-Wittgenstein Sceptical Argument 
In Chapter 2 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (WRPL), KW makes a 
sceptical challenge against meaning. If the challenge is successful, then there are 
no meaning facts; no facts in virtue of which sentences that ascribe meaning—such 
as “Hemi means addition by ‘+’”—are true. I will follow Kripke in beginning this 
exposition with an illustration of the role required of meaning facts: a dialogue 
between a sceptic and their interlocutor Hemi, concerning what Hemi means by 
‘+’.111 
 
 Say that Hemi has used the expression ‘+’ many times in the past. They 
have, for example, said that “42 + 22 = 64”, and that “11 + 17 = 28”, and many more 
such sentences. This use is consistent with it being the case that Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’, and Hemi may testify that this is indeed what they mean. Now 
reflect that Hemi’s usage of ‘+’ must be limited in the following way: there will 
always be some possible use of ‘+’ which is novel. Let’s say, for example, that Hemi 
has only used ‘+’ with numbers less than 57. (Since there are infinitely many 
numbers, even if Hemi is prolific in their use of ‘+’ there will always be some such 
limitation.) The sceptic asks Hemi a question: “What is 68 + 57?”. Hemi computes 
the sum of the two numbers, answers “125”, and claims that this answer is correct 
and justified because what they mean by ‘+’ is the function addition. But the sceptic 
objects, and suggests instead that Hemi should answer “5” because what they 
mean by ‘+’ is in fact quaddition, a function defined as follows: 
 
 
                                                        
111 It is worth noting from the outset that the sceptic character in KW’s discussion is independent of 
KW’s own position. The dialogue is a device KW uses to illustrate the problem, and the argument 
against meaning realism itself is a distinct matter. But KW does, to a certain extent, end up 
accepting the sceptic’s claims. I will return to this point in §2.4.  
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x quus y = x plus y, if x, y < 57 
     = 5, otherwise 
 
The sceptic does not deny the mathematical fact that the number 125 is the sum of 
the numbers 68 and 57. Their claim is against the semantic fact that what Hemi 
means by ‘+’ is addition, and thus against the fact that “125” is the correct answer 
to the question. The sceptic doesn’t think that Hemi might actually mean 
quaddition. Their point is that, while there is clearly a distinction between addition 
and quaddition, if there is to be a distinction between Hemi meaning addition and 
meaning quaddition by ‘+’ then there must be a fact in virtue of which this is the 
case. Hemi’s past usage of ‘+’ is consistent with both addition and quaddition being 
what they mean by the expression, so if there is to be a fact of the matter about 
what they mean by ‘+’, that fact cannot be constituted by their past usage alone. 
 
 Hemi is unlikely to be convinced, at this point, that they do not mean 
anything by ‘+’. They will likely feel that they do mean addition by ‘+’, and that 
even though their practice with the sign is finite, there is nevertheless a fact in 
virtue of which it is semantically correct to answer questions like “What is 68 + 
57?” with the sum of the two numbers. The challenge made by the sceptic is to 
provide an account of such facts. KW imposes two conditions on a satisfactory 
response. Firstly, that the fact supplied must make it the case that it is correct to 
use ‘+’ in sentences of the form “x + y = z” when, and only when, z is the sum of x 
and y (and incorrect otherwise). That is, the fact must have something to say about 
every possible use of ‘+’. And secondly, that the fact supplied must make it the case 
that Hemi ought to use, or is justified in using, ‘+’ correctly.112 I will call these 
conditions the constitution and normativity requirements.  
 
                                                        
112 There is much debate about whether KW’s account of the normativity of meaning is accurate. 
See, for example: Anandi Hattiangadi, Oughts and Thoughts Rule-Following and the Normativity of 
Content (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007). It is quite plausible that KW overstates the strength of the 
normativity which must be imposed by meaning. But nothing for my discussion will turn on this, so 
I will set the matter aside. 
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The case of Hemi and ‘+’ is quite generalisable; quus-like possibilities 
threaten for any sign and any putative meaning.113 The sceptic denies that there 
are any facts, for any sign, which satisfy the constitution and normativity 
requirements. To justify this claim, the search for candidates must be 
comprehensive. To that end, the sceptic allows idealised epistemic access to any of 
the areas in which the facts might be found; to Hemi’s behaviour, mental history, 
and to the behaviour and mental history of some linguistic community to which 
Hemi belongs.114 If there are no facts found in these areas that satisfy the 
requirements even when our fact-finding abilities are perfect, the sceptic suggests, 
then there are no facts to be found. The remainder of the second chapter of WRPL 
is a survey of several candidates that KW motivates and rejects in turn (I indicate 
in parentheses the numbers of the pages in which KW deals with each). That Hemi 
means addition by ‘+’ could be constituted by: Hemi’s past usage of ‘+’ (7-15); a 
general thought, e.g. that the correct z in “x + y = z” is found by counting x and y 
together (15-17); a disposition, such that Hemi is disposed to use ‘+’ in a manner in 
accordance with addition and not with quaddition (22-38); the simplicity of 
candidate meanings, such that meaning addition is simpler than meaning 
quaddition (38-40); qualitative, introspectible mental states, either akin to mental 
images or of a unique sort of their own, such that Hemi has such a state that is 
associated with addition and not quaddition (41-51); sui generis, irreducible, non-
qualitative mental states, such that Hemi has some mental state of meaning 
addition by ‘+’ (51-53); a Fregean objective sense, such that Hemi relates to an 
objective sense of addition, and not of quaddition (53-54).115 
 
                                                        
113 One quick way to establish a quus-like variation on any finite set is to claim that the rule should 
be followed this way, and not this other way, in any situation that occurs from the present moment 
onwards. The sceptic demands a fact, for example, in virtue of which ‘sunfish’ means sunfish and 
not quunfish—where quunfish has precisely the same extension as sunfish on every occasion before 
January 1, 2019, but diverges from that day onwards. On the sceptic’s claim, then, on January 2, 
2019 it would be semantically incorrect for their interlocutor to refer to a sunfish with the word 
“sunfish”. This model for generating quus-like interpretations is used by Wright: Wright, “Kripke’s 
Account of the Argument against Private Language,” 97. 
114 KW addresses facts about communities here: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language, 111. For discussion of communitarian responses to KW’s argument, see: Alexander 
Miller, “What Is the Sceptical Solution?,” forthcoming. 
115 This summary is drawn from the synopsis of KW’s argument here: Alexander Miller and Ali 
Saboohi, “Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?,” Acta Analytica 30, no. 2 
(2015): 171–178, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0237-5. 
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 KW considers each candidate, and finds in every case that the sceptic’s 
challenge is unmet; that the candidate cannot satisfy the two conditions the sceptic 
imposes, and thus cannot constitute meaning. I will not discuss the fate of each 
candidate in detail.116 As noted, my focus is on the effects of the sceptical argument 
if it is sound, so I will make do with a brief description of one central thread of 
KW’s argument. 
 
Say that a candidate fact has something to say about only some of the 
possible uses of ‘+’. This incompleteness allows the sceptic to ascribe a quus-like 
meaning to Hemi and ‘+’; one that diverges from addition over the cases about 
which the fact says nothing. Such a candidate fails to make it addition that Hemi 
means by ‘+’, because there are numbers z that are the sum of x and y, yet there are 
sentences “x + y = z” that have not been made semantically correct. The sceptic’s 
constitution requirement is unsatisfied. This criterion seems, then, to exclude 
candidates that offer only a finite amount of content; the set of correct applications 
of ‘+’ that must be generated is indefinitely large.  
 
We are thus led to consider candidates that have general content: those that 
are not limited in their coverage to some subclass of the possible applications of an 
expression.117 Say, for example, that we attempt to go beyond the finitude of 
Hemi’s past usage of ‘+’ by supposing that the meaning of the expression is 
constituted by their association of the sign with a certain process: when faced with 
a question of the form “x + y = ?”, the correct answer is what is found in taking x 
pebbles and y pebbles and counting them together.118 When x is 68 and y is 57, 
Hemi arrives at 125 and not 5, so it is addition and not quaddition that they mean 
by ‘+’. But the sceptic will be unconvinced. In order to generate this general 
content, it is necessary for this process to be interpreted. The rule must be applied 
in a certain way to a given novel case. The sceptic can thus make an alternative 
interpretation of the (putative) rule that Hemi has just appeared to follow: that 
                                                        
116 I gave the argument a more thorough discussion here: Finn Butler, “Kripke-Wittgenstein 
Meaning Scepticism and the Sceptical Solution,” University of Otago Honours Dissertation, 2017. 
Honours Dissertation, 2017. 
117 Crispin Wright, “Kripke on the Argument against Private Language” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 98. 
118 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 15. 
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what is actually correct for Hemi to do is to count the piles of pebbles together 
unless one of the piles is equal to or larger than 57. And they will demand a fact in 
virtue of which this is not the correct interpretation of the general thought with 
which Hemi intends to accord. Wherever interpretation is required, another 
quaddition-like possibility will arise. In such cases, there must be some fact in 
virtue of which this interpretation of the fact is correct, and not that interpretation. 
We are revealed to have made no progress: the search for a fact that constitutes 
the correctness of an interpretation is simply the search for a fact that constitutes 
meaning, and will fall prey to precisely the same sceptical attack to which we are 
attempting to respond. The problem, in essence, is that a rule for following a rule is 
itself a rule. 
 
In the face of the fruitlessness of any response to the sceptic that involves 
interpretation, the suggestion might be made that we can satisfy the sceptic by 
identifying a candidate that has unlimited content yet requires no interpretation 
between this fact and a particular correct usage. There is no interpretative 
distance between the fact that Hemi means addition by ‘+’ and the fact that Hemi 
should answer “240553” to the question “234987 + 5566 = ?” that the sceptic 
could exploit. KW rejects this suggestion on the following grounds: 
It seems desperate . . . such a state would have to be a finite object, contained 
in our finite minds. It does not consist in my explicitly thinking of each case 
of the addition table, nor even of my encoding each separate case in the 
brain: we lack the capacity for that. Yet “in a queer way” each such case 
already is “in some sense present” [Here Kripke is quoting Wittgenstein] . . . 
What can this sense be? Can we conceive of a finite state which could not be 
interpreted in a quus-like way? How could that be?119 
For there to be a fact about Hemi that constitutes the correctness of every 
putatively correct use of ‘+’, then, KW finds that we either invoke interpretation 
and thus make no progress, or simply leave the matter quite unexplained.120 
Neither option is satisfactory. This line of reasoning does not represent KW’s 
                                                        
119 Kripke, 51. 
120 KW’s treatment of the non-interpretative suggestion is relevant to the response that Crispin 
Wright makes to the problem, which I note and discuss in §2.7.2.   
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treatment of every candidate meaning fact, but it is at least the central thread in 
the sceptic’s attack.121 
 
 At the culmination of the survey, KW finds that no candidate meets the 
sceptic’s requirements. Given, then, that the survey is comprehensive, there is no 
fact such that Hemi means addition by ‘+’. The claim to comprehensiveness may 
strictly be unwarranted—could there not be some as yet unconsidered 
candidate?—but this is not a concern. The claim can simply be that it is not a fact 
that Hemi means addition by ‘+’, barring the revelation of some heretofore 
unconsidered fact. The result, of course, is quite generalisable. We have not relied 
upon anything specific to Hemi, addition, or ‘+’.122 The claim is that, for any subject 
S, any putative meaning M, and any expression E, there is no fact such that S means 
M by E. We have thus arrived at the sceptical conclusion: there are no meaning 
facts. Meaning appears to have “vanished into thin air”.123  
 
This surely amounts to some form of non-realism about meaning. The 
meaning realist must contend that there are facts about meaning: existing states of 
affairs such that subjects mean something by an expression. To argue that there 
are no such facts, then, is to oppose meaning realism. To follow the terminology 
that I adopted in the previous chapter, the claim that there are no meaning facts 
suffices for meaning irrealism: a form of non-realism that denies the component of 
realism that claims that some set of facts exist.  
 
Meaning Irrealism: There are no facts such that anyone means anything by an 
expression.124 
                                                        
121 In particular, this account does not quite represent the dispositionalist response to the sceptic, 
which turns primarily on the normative characteristics of meaning facts. 
122 I did incorporate the infinite size of the addition series into the discussion in order to make clear 
the possibility of quus-like interpretations. But I do not mean for this infinity to be taken as 
necessary for such interpretation. See fn.113 for an example of how the sceptic’s attack can arise 
for seemingly any expression. 
123 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 22. Note that this claim is best considered 
the position of KW’s sceptic, not KW himself. KW’s sceptical solution, which I will introduce in §2.6, is 
an attempt to deny that meaning so vanishes, while denying that there are meaning facts. 
124 It is worth noting that there may be certain kinds of fact that are not within the scope of the 
meaning irrealist claim. On some accounts of facts—such as those which accompany deflationism 
and minimalism about truth, which I discussed in the previous chapter—all it takes for there to be a 




KW argues that there are no meaning facts, and thus argues for meaning irrealism. 
I will not spend time evaluating the strength of this argument. I will instead simply 
assume that its conclusion has been proven, and focus on where it may take us. I 
do claim, however, that the issues raised in the second chapter of KW’s book are at 
least not obviously implausible. We have found good reason to investigate 
opposition to meaning realism, even if that opposition turns out, at the end, to be 
undue.125 For the remainder of this discussion, I will use the term “KW’s sceptical 
argument” to refer to the argument made in this section that there are no meaning 
facts: the argument for meaning irrealism. And I will now assume that this 
argument is sound, so that we can investigate the destinations to which it leads.126 
 
2.3 Casualties of Kripke-Wittgenstein Meaning Scepticism 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the metaphysics of linguistic meaning. It is 
necessary to impose this priority so that the discussion is not spread too thin. But 
it is important to acknowledge that limiting the discussion in this way undersells 
the scope of the sceptical attack. There are additional considerations both 
downstream and upstream of meaning irrealism, in the wake of KW’s sceptical 
argument. Downstream, there are matters which likely depend on the reality of 
meaning, and thus that are consequently threatened by the KW sceptical argument. 
Upstream, there are matters which are antecedently threatened by the general 
“rule-following considerations” of which the attack on meaning is one part.127 
These are things that, while they may not be threatened by the meaning irrealist 
thesis taken in isolation, are certainly threatened by that thesis given that we 
                                                        
presently characterising it, is not yet concerned with the possibility of meaning facts of this type. 
This point will return in §2.7. But until then, for ease of presentation I will simply reject the 
deflationary and minimalist accounts of facts: the propriety of calling some state of affairs a fact 
will not be taken to be sufficient for that state of affairs to be a fact. 
125 Indeed, I think it possible that there would be such reason even without a plausible attack on 
realism. If it is found for some subject that we cannot tenably deny that it is real, even without any 
compelling argument to motivate that denial, does this not have interesting implications for that 
subject? But the question is beside the point in our present case, because KW’s argument does 
provide such an argument—at least, I will assume as much. 
126 I will also, on occasion, use “KW meaning irrealism” to stress that it is KW’s argument which 
motivates the irrealist position. 
127 For explanation of the origin of this term, see: Crispin Wright, Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes 
from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 5.  
59 
 
arrived at it by accepting the strategy of the KW sceptic. In this section, I will briefly 
note considerations of both types, prioritising those that will have a bearing on 
discussion elsewhere in this thesis.  
 
 We will first attend to downstream matters. KW’s sceptical argument, as it 
has been presented here, initially targets facts such that a subject means something 
by an expression. One quite plausible consequence is that there cannot then be 
facts such that an expression has a meaning. The connecting thought is this: for 
there to be such a thing as correct or incorrect use of an expression there must 
such a thing as a subject correctly or incorrectly using an expression. Or 
alternatively, that for there to be such thing as meaning it is necessary for there to 
be such thing as grasping meaning. Wright puts it thus: 
[KW concludes that] there are no facts about what anyone presently means. 
. . . But the, as it were, impersonal meaning of an expression must supervene 
upon what individuals mean by it: so it follows, finally, that there are no facts 
about what any expression means or meant.128  
I think that investigation into this distinction and the ramifications it might have 
on the metaphysics of meaning is potentially fruitful. But I won’t pursue the thread 
here, and will instead assume that the irrealist position we have adopted is that 
there are no facts such that a subject means anything by an expression or any facts 
such that an expression has a meaning. 
 
 The exposition given in §2.2 concerned the expression ‘+’. We have noted 
that the conclusion is meant to be general to any expression, but it is worthwhile 
to make special mention of sentences. It will be an implication that looms large in 
this thesis that, if no sentences have a meaning, then no sentences have a truth 
condition or propositional content. This is not to say that the truth condition of a 
sentence is its meaning.129 But surely having a truth condition would suffice for 
                                                        
128 Crispin Wright, “On Making Up One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention,” in Rails to Infinity: Essays 
on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 117. 
129 Heather Dyke argues that it is a mistake to conflate truth conditions with meaning: Heather 
Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, Routledge Studies in Contemporary 
Philosophy ; 13 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 73. 
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being meaningful—in which case it follows from meaning irrealism that no 
sentences have truth conditions. The sceptic demands a fact in virtue of which 
“Sunfish are the largest bony fish” says that sunfish are the largest bony fish (or 
anything at all), and we have assumed that their demands are unmet. I will note 
two further consequences of this result. Firstly, that it is hard to see how language 
can perform a descriptive function given meaning irrealism. For a sentence to 
describe a certain state of affairs S it is surely necessary that it has the 
propositional content: S obtains. And secondly that if no sentence has a truth 
condition then, quite plausibly, it follows that no sentence has a truth-value. If the 
sceptic succeeds in showing that expressions have no meaning then no sentence 
has a truth condition that is either satisfied or unsatisfied, and thus no sentence is 
true or false.  
 
 Those are the downstream matters of central concern. As I said, there are 
also consequences that, while they may not follow from meaning irrealism, they 
will likely emerge whenever the KW sceptical argument is accepted as sound. 
There is no reason, of course, to think that meaning non-realism must take 
precisely the form motivated by KW’s argument. It might be motivated by other 
arguments—for example, by Quine’s indeterminacy of translation130—and thus 
involve different upstream commitments. My discussion cannot, unfortunately, be 
so comprehensive that all such possibilities are examined. I will focus on meaning 
non-realism as it is motivated by KW, and note where the ramifications might be 
specific to this motivation. 
 
 There is a connection between meaning and mental content. Just as a 
sentence might say that sunfish are the largest bony fish, a subject might believe 
that sunfish are the largest bony fish. There are various ways that the relation 
between linguistic and mental content can be construed. It might be that one 
depends on the other, or that the two are interdependent.131 The important point 
                                                        
130 W. V. Quine, Word and Object., Studies in Communication (Cambridge: Technology Press of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960); W. V. Quine, “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of 
Translation,” The Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 6 (1970): 178–183, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2023887. 
131 For argument that meaning depends on mental content, see: H. P. Grice, “Meaning.,” The 
Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377. For argument that mental content depends on meaning, see: 
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for present purposes is that if we have accepted KW’s argument then we must deny 
that there are contentful mental states—or at least, it is hard to see how we could 
avoid doing so. This implication is immediate if mental content depends on 
meaning. If the belief that sunfish are the largest bony fish has its content (at least 
partly) in virtue of the meaning of “sunfish are the largest bony fish”, for example, 
then the denial that there are meaning facts will of course imply that there is no 
such belief.132 This covers both the case on which mental content has the relevant 
dependence on meaning, and on which they are in some way interdependent. But 
even on an account on which mental states have priority over meaning, our 
meaning irrealism will enjoin some non-realism about mental content. Paul 
Boghossian puts it thus: 
The real difficulty with the suggestion that one may sustain differential 
attitudes towards mental and linguistic content stems from the fact that the 
best arguments for the claim that nothing mental possesses content would 
count as equally good arguments for the claim that nothing linguistic does. 
For these arguments have nothing much to do with the items being mental 
and everything to do with their being contentful: they are considerations, of 
a wholly general character, against the existence of items individuated by 
content.133  
If we have conceded to KW’s sceptic in the case of what Hemi means by some sign, 
then we must likely also concede to a sceptical attack against what Hemi thinks by 
some thought. Where is the fact of the matter, the sceptic asks, in virtue of which 
Hemi’s belief is that this is the case, rather than this? I won’t rehearse the KW 
argument in these terms, but it is quite plausible that we will arrive at the same 
irrealist conclusion as in the meaning case—and that we will do so regardless of 
how the relation between meaning and mental content is construed. My 
                                                        
Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). For argument that meaning and mental content are 
interdependent, see: Donald Davidson, “Thought and Talk,” in Mind and Language, ed. Samuel D. 
Guttenplan (Clarendon Press, 1975), 1975–7; Donald Davidson, “Rational Animals,” Dialectica 36, 
no. 4 (1982): 317–28. 
132 Paul A. Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations,” Mind 98, no. 392 (1989): 510, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.392.507. 
133 In this passage, Boghossian claims specifically that irrealism about mental content implies 
irrealism about linguistic content, whereas I am concerned with the reverse implication. But it is 
clear that the point applies just as well in our case; attacks against content will threaten both. 
Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 171.  
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investigation will remain specific to meaning, but it is important to note that it is 
unlikely that the meaning irrealist can avoid adopting a non-realist account of 
contentful mental states.  
 
 The second upstream matter that I will note is that KW’s sceptical 
argument can be construed as one part of the Wittgensteinian rule-following 
considerations. The treatment of meaning in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is—in 
some important respects—at least analogous to the treatment of rules. I will 
characterise the point in the following way. It is in virtue of the meaning that a 
subject attributes to a sign, the sceptic and their opponent agree, that it is correct 
or incorrect for that subject to use that sign a certain way. The sceptic then exploits 
this characteristic of meaning to deny that there is such a thing as meaning. There 
are no facts that offer the necessary correctness and incorrectness to render 
correct, for example, all and only the occasions where Hemi uses ‘+’ in accordance 
with addition. We can see the connection between meaning and rule-following by 
noting that according or failing to accord with what one means by a sign is 
analogous to following or failing to follow a rule. In both cases, the actions available 
to a subject are (putatively) evaluated as correct or incorrect with respect to some 
commitment they have made. It is this rule-like characteristic of meaning that 
enables the sceptic’s attack. But linguistic meaning is not the only notion with such 
a feature. If we have accepted that the sceptic’s attack on the possibility of rule-
following in the case of what one means by a sign is successful, then we are likely 
thereby forced to accept it for any other facts with this rule-like form.  
 
Let’s illustrate the point with a non-linguistic example. Say that Hemi has, in 
the past, smiled precisely when they are in the presence of a waterfall. And say 
that Hemi is under the impression that this behaviour is correct with respect to 
some norm with which they intend to accord—a norm, say, of waterfall 
appreciation. Putatively, Hemi intends to smile when and only when they are in 
the presence of a waterfall. Hemi visits Haruru Falls, in the North Island of New 
Zealand, and smiles. The shape of the sceptical attack is this. There must be a fact 
in virtue of which smiling—and not frowning—is correct with respect to the norm 
of waterfall appreciation. That fact must render correct every instance of smiling 
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by a waterfall, and incorrect every other instance of smiling, and every other 
instance of being by a waterfall. These are indefinitely large sets, and Hemi’s mind 
is finite. The fact, then, must be interpreted; there must be a process by which the 
correctness of a particular action is derived from something that can be contained 
in Hemi’s mind.134 Some such interpretation may be compelling to Hemi. But the 
sceptic, of course, will not be swayed: they will demand a fact in virtue of which 
this interpretation rather than that interpretation is correct. Hemi may claim, for 
example, that smiling at Haruru Falls is correct because they have previously 
thought “I should smile when and only when I am by a waterfall”. But this move 
will not work unless there are facts that rule out alternative interpretations of that 
thought. The sceptic might suggest that ‘waterfall’ means quaterfall, or that “I 
should smile when and only when I am by a waterfall” means I should smile when 
and only when I am by a waterfall unless that waterfall is Haruru Falls. There must 
be facts in virtue of which a certain interpretation of these expressions is correct. 
And it is precisely facts of this sort that we have ruled out in accepting KW’s 
sceptical argument. We can put the point like this: if there was such a fact about 
the correct interpretation of Hemi’s waterfall appreciation rule, then it is hard to 
see how there could fail to be an analogous fact available in the case of what Hemi 
means by ‘+’. To adopt KW meaning irrealism, then, is to deny that there is such a 
thing as an action being correct or incorrect with respect to the waterfall 
appreciation norm. And then, given for there to be such a norm is for there to be 
actions that are correct or incorrect with respect to it—just as for there to be such 
thing as meaning is for there to be uses of an expression that accord or fail to 
accord with that meaning—we have found that there can be no norm of waterfall 
appreciation at all. And this example is meant, of course, to be generalisable. The 
sceptic’s attack appears to arise wherever we might suppose that our actions are 
evaluable for correctness with respect to some norm. To accept the soundness of 
that attack is to deny that there are any such norms.  
 
                                                        
134 As noted in §2.2, there is also the option of non-interpreted general facts. KW rejects such facts 




This is a matter that deserves more discussion. But for now, my point is 
simply that it is unlikely that the KW meaning irrealist can rely on the possibility of 
correctness-governed action at all. This will be an important constraint on the 
meaning irrealist, and it will re-emerge in later sections.  
 
 Having accepted that KW’s sceptical argument is sound and that there are 
no meaning facts, we have thus (1) denied that any sentences are descriptive and 
have truth conditions, (2) denied that there are mental states with content, and (3) 
denied that there can be norm-governed actions. The tenability of meaning 
irrealism may be threatened by these matters. But I don’t think it obvious that the 
bullets cannot simply be bitten. To investigate the severity of the consequences of 
meaning irrealism more rigorously, I now turn to a consideration that is often 
made in discussion of the realism-status of a subject: the status of discourse about 
meaning. Sometimes, the question of the metaphysical status of a subject and the 
question of the nature of discourse about that subject are addressed as one. I have 
decided to impose a degree of separation—although it may be a merely superficial 
one—because meaning is a somewhat peculiar case.135 I have represented 
meaning irrealism as a metaphysical claim: a claim about what facts there are. The 
discussion in the next three sections is specifically concerned with our talk about 
meaning; with what we might say about such talk given KW meaning irrealism.136  
 
2.4 Meaning Discourse: Introduction 
There are no meaning facts; no existing states of affairs such that anyone means 
anything by any expression. Consider discourse about meaning, comprised of every 
sentence which ascribes meaning to subjects and signs.137 We do engage in such 
                                                        
135 The peculiarities will emerge throughout the remainder of the chapter, but in brief the point is 
this: seeking an account of the nature of the meaning of sentences that appear to be about a certain 
type of fact is difficult when the facts in question are meaning facts.  
136 Note that it is distinctive of non-realism about meaning that it has implications not only for 
discourse about meaning but for discourse about anything. There is a sense in which meaning 
irrealism globalises. This is an important consequence, but I will set it aside until the next chapter. 
137 By “sentences that ascribe meaning” or “meaning ascriptions” I mean sentences that apply the 
predicate ‘means’ to some subject and sign—not sentences that actually state that some meaning 
state of affairs attains. Meaning ascriptions appear to be attributions of meaning to signs and 
subjects, but it is important that we are at this moment neutral on whether this is more than 
appearance. The same point applies to ”discourse about meaning”: I mean this to pick out our 
discourse that purports to be about meaning, which may or may not actually be about meaning. 
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discourse. We utter sentences like “Hemi means addition by ‘+’”, and seem to do so 
with sincerity and purpose. But Hemi does not mean addition—or anything at 
all—by ‘+’. It is an immediate consequence of meaning irrealism that no meaning 
ascriptions are statements of fact; there are no meaning facts to state. And if no 
meaning ascriptions are statements of fact then no meaning ascriptions are true. 
We can establish the connection to truth by considering the Disquotational Schema 
(DS): 
 
The Disquotational Schema: “P” is true iff P 
 
In §1.3 I noted Wright’s claim that it is part of the concept of truth that it exhibits 
this property. If this is so, then on any plausible account of truth, it follows from 
the truth of a sentence “P” that its propositional content P is the case. When a 
sentence is true, the fact it states obtains. If there are no meaning facts, then, it 
follows that there cannot be any true meaning ascriptions.138 The question that we 
will seek to answer in the next three sections is this: how are we to characterise 
the nature of sentences that ascribe meaning when we have found that there are 
no meaning facts and no true meaning ascriptions?  
 
Before canvassing answers to this question, it will be worthwhile to point 
out an important distinction. In fact, there are two distinctions to be made—
though I will claim that they can be mapped onto one another. Firstly, we must 
make a distinction between the position for which KW’s sceptic argues and that for 
which KW argues. And secondly, we must make a distinction between eliminative 
and non-eliminative non-realism for some discourse. Let us start with the first 
distinction. After making the sceptical argument in Chapter 2 of his book, Kripke 
has this to say in Chapter 3: 
                                                        
138 Note here that this characterisation ignores the possibility that meaning ascriptions could be 
true in virtue of stating a non-meaning fact. I have said that sentences must state a fact to be true. 
But for it to follow from meaning irrealism (in the way I have noted) that no meaning ascriptions 
are true, we must assume that meaning ascriptions state meaning facts if they state facts at all. See 
the following for exploration of this possibility (but note that it is not applied to discourse about 
meaning in particular): Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. I will set this 
consideration aside, primarily because it is not an option in our case. As we will see, the meaning 
irrealist cannot suppose that meaning ascriptions are statements of any fact, meaning or otherwise.    
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I have said that Wittgenstein’s solution to his problem is a sceptical one. He 
does not give a ‘straight’ solution, pointing out to the silly sceptic a hidden 
fact he overlooked, a condition in the world which constitutes my meaning 
addition by ‘plus’. In fact, he agrees with his own hypothetical sceptic that 
there is no such fact, no such condition in either the ‘internal’ or the 
‘external’ world. Admittedly, I am expressing Wittgenstein’s view more 
straightforwardly than he would ordinarily allow himself to do. For in 
denying that there is any such fact, might we not be expressing a 
philosophical thesis that doubts or denies something everyone admits? We 
do not wish to doubt or deny that when people speak of themselves and 
others as meaning something by their words, as following rules, they do so 
with perfect right. We do not even wish to deny the propriety of an ordinary 
use of the phrase ‘the fact that Jones meant addition by such-and-such a 
symbol’, and indeed such expressions do have perfectly ordinary uses. We 
merely wish to deny the existence of the ‘superlative fact’ that philosophers 
misleadingly attach to such ordinary forms of words, not the propriety of 
the words themselves.139 
The point is this. In Chapter 2, KW engages with his sceptical character, and 
conducts an unsuccessful search for meaning facts. But we must distinguish what 
is claimed by KW and what is claimed by his sceptic.140 At the culmination of the 
survey of candidate meaning facts, KW and his sceptic agree that there are no 
successful candidates, and thus that there are no meaning facts. The conclusion of 
the KW sceptical argument, as I have construed it, is meaning irrealism, and both 
KW and the sceptic accept this argument as sound. The distinction between the 
two emerges in Chapter 3. KW proposes a sceptical solution: a response to the 
sceptical argument such that, while there are no “superlative facts” about meaning, 
it may yet be worthwhile to continue practicing meaning discourse.141 KW presents 
an account of our meaning talk that is meant to be consistent with meaning 
                                                        
139 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 69. 
140 This point is well made here: George M. Wilson, “Kripke on Wittgenstein and Normativity,” 
Midwest Studies In Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1994): 366–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-
4975.1994.tb00295.x. 
141 A sceptical solution is here distinguished from a straight solution, which is a response to the 
sceptical argument that denies that it is sound, and thus avoids meaning irrealism. I am, for 
purposes of this investigation, simply assuming that there are no straight solutions to the KW 
sceptical argument. KW derives the distinction between straight and sceptical solutions from 
Hume: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 66. 
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irrealism.142 In doing so, he diverges from the position occupied by the sceptic, 
who offers no consolatory account. When KW notes—in the quote given above—his 
opposition to the denial that it can be right to ascribe meaning to subjects and 
signs, it is the sceptic’s position he is opposing. Elsewhere, he rejects the sceptic’s 
position as “insane and intolerable” and “incredible and self-defeating”.143 KW and 
KW’s sceptic are both meaning irrealists, but KW seeks to soften the sceptical blow 
with a sceptical solution, and the sceptic does not. 
 
 One distinction that emerges in many realism debates is that between 
eliminativism and non-eliminativism. It is useful to characterise KW’s position as a 
kind of non-eliminativism about meaning discourse and the sceptic’s position as a 
kind of eliminativism.144 Let’s briefly describe the eliminativist distinction in 
general terms.  
 
Take the discourse D, comprised of D-sentences. We engage in D, and 
frequently utter D-sentences. Say that we had assumed that, when we utter D-
sentences, we occasionally state D-facts; that D is concerned with states of affairs, 
and some of these states of affairs exist. Part of the reason to utter D-sentences, we 
had thought, was that those sentences bear this relation to reality. But a 
philosopher now presents an argument for irrealism about D: that there are no D-
facts. If we are convinced by such an argument, then there are two broad 
categories of available responses. We might think that, having accepted that there 
are, after all, no D-facts to state—and thus that our D-sentences are never true—it 
is no longer worthwhile to say those sentences. The point of engaging with D, if there 
is a point at all, is to engage with D-facts, and having found that there are no such 
facts it follows that there is nothing lost by simply abandoning D altogether.145 It is 
                                                        
142 I will discuss the form of the sceptical solution offered by KW in §2.6. 
143 The quotes appear here: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 60, 71.  
144 These characterisations are, to a certain extent, suggested by Alex Miller here: Alexander Miller, 
“Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23, 
no. 3 (May 27, 2015): 323–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1042004. Miller is here 
concerned specifically with error-theoretic accounts of meaning discourse, whereas I mean to 
characterise the sceptic’s position as simply eliminativism, which may or may not be accompanied 
by an error-theory.  
145 It is worthwhile to clarify the nature of this loss. A discourse may have theoretical value: it may 
offer true sentences, and thus contribute to our description of reality. A discourse may also have 
pragmatic value: it may offer sentences that, while non-true, contribute to some worthwhile 
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this approach for which the eliminativist advocates. I mean for this 
characterisation to be somewhat unspecific, and there are eliminativist theories 
that may not consent to it.146 The eliminativist is opposed by the non-eliminativist, 
who does not take irrealism about D to be sufficient for its abandonment. The non-
eliminativist provides a picture of the discourse in question that is consistent with 
the denial that there are any facts stated by the comprising sentences. We have 
reason to continue using D-sentences even though those sentences are never true: 
it has a function that does not rely on the possibility of truth. There are, again, 
many ways that this approach can be fleshed out. Generally, the non-eliminativist 
project will include argument that D-sentences can still be correct or incorrect 
despite the absence of D-facts; that some sentences in D are better than others 
with respect to performance of the function of D.147 I characterise these categories 
as follows.  
 
Eliminativism (D): The utterance of D-sentences lacks a function, and there is no 
value to be lost in abandoning the practice. 
 
Non-Eliminativism (D): The utterance of D-sentences has a function, and there is 
value that would be lost in abandoning the practice. 
 
                                                        
activity other than description of reality—it be may useful to talk of moral impermissibility, for 
example, even if none of that talk is true. The eliminativist claim, as I am characterising it, denies 
that the discourse in question has value of either sort, and thus—given that there are no other 
kinds of value—that in abandoning that discourse nothing of value is lost. 
146 Miller notes (Ibid., 326), for example, that the model of eliminativist error-theory proposed by 
Paul Churchland for ordinary mental states advocates abandoning discourse about those states 
only in principle. Once other discourses have become sufficiently advanced we will have no reason to 
continue engaging with the discourse in question—but before that point we may still have some 
reason. I mean for eliminativism to be a broader category than views of this sort alone. 
147 Mackie’s moral error-theory and Field’s arithmetic error-theory offer prominent examples of 
non-eliminativism. Both theories deny that the discourse in question contains any true sentences. 
But they deny that the discourse can be abandoned without loss, because it suffices for there to be 
pragmatic value that the sentences in those discourse play a useful non-descriptive role. Mackie 
claims that moral ascriptions can have desirable effects on agents, and Field claims that 
arithmetical statements can secure inferential advantages—despite all of the sentences in both 
cases being false. Miller contrasts these positions with what Churchland claims of ordinary 
psychology—that, eventually, the relevant sentences will be superseded even in such non-
descriptive capacities by the sentences of some future science. Mackie, Ethics; Field, Science without 
Numbers; Miller, “Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.” 
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(Note that my characterisation of these positions does not incorporate irrealism 
about D. I assumed D-irrealism to introduce the distinction, but I do not mean to 
suggest that the debate between the eliminativist and the non-eliminativist can 
arise only given a metaphysical non-realist claim.148) 
 
The idea, then, is that KW is a non-eliminative meaning irrealist, while KW’s 
sceptic is an eliminative meaning irrealist.149 Both deny that there are any 
meaning facts. But the sceptic goes further and denies that there is any point in 
continuing to ascribe meaning, while KW instead offers a consolatory picture of 
meaning discourse that justifies (some of) those ascriptions.  
 
Eliminative Meaning Irrealism: There are no meaning facts. We may abandon 
meaning discourse without loss.  
 
Non-Eliminative Meaning Irrealism: There are no meaning facts. We cannot 
abandon meaning discourse without loss. 
  
There will be more discussion of these two approaches later.150 But it will be 
worthwhile to make one general remark.151 I noted earlier that KW describes the 
sceptic’s position as “insane and intolerable”. If we take this position to be a form 
of eliminativism then it is clear how this judgement could be apt. For discourses 
that are pervasive in human activity—which is certainly the case for meaning 
                                                        
148 This point will be important in Chapter 3, where the distinction will emerge for sentences about 
which we have no sceptical concerns about the existence of the facts they appear to state. 
149 I find this characterisation compelling, but there are some textual reasons to doubt that KW and 
his sceptic differ only on the eliminativist question. On page 71 of WRPL for example, KW says this: 
“What can be said on behalf of our ordinary attributions of meaningful language to ourselves and to 
others? Has not the incredible and self-defeating conclusion, that all language is meaningless, 
already been drawn?” The first of these questions aligns with my characterisation, but in decrying 
the claim that all language is meaningless KW seems to me to be departing from the claim that 
there are no meaning facts. But I have little concern for these exegetical matters: the distinction 
between non-eliminativism and eliminativism is an important one for the meaning irrealist, 
independently of whether that distinction neatly aligns with that between KW and the sceptic. (And 
it may, anyway, be an appropriate reading of “all language is meaningless” that no meaning 
ascriptions are even justified; in which case KW would not consent to the claim.) 
150 In particular, this distinction will arise for each of the models of non-realist meaning discourse 
presented in §2.5, §2.6, and §2.7, and then again in general in the next chapter. 
151 A remark drawn primarily from here: Miller, “Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism,” 
329; Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language,” 101. 
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discourse—eliminativism is an uncomfortable position. We seem to be doing 
something worthwhile in saying what we or others mean by certain signs. To take 
the eliminativist approach to meaning discourse, as I have characterised it here, is 
to deny that we have been doing anything of value at all. This is not by itself, of 
course, a convincing argument against eliminativism. But it is, I think, sufficient to 
motivate pursuit of a non-eliminative account of meaning—an account that seeks 
to explain and justify our practice of ascribing meaning, rather than to advocate its 
abandonment.152 And it is sufficient to show that it would be a problem for 
meaning irrealism if it implies eliminativism, and is thus forced into this corner.153 
Much of my discussion about meaning discourse amounts to the search for a non-
eliminativism that can successfully stave off the eliminativist. It would be a boon to 
the tenability of meaning irrealism if an account of meaning discourse could be 
found that retains the propriety of meaning talk despite the absence of meaning 
facts.  
 
 KW’s argument is incorporated into this chapter in the following way. 
Chapter 2 of WRPL features the KW sceptical argument, the conclusion of which is 
meaning irrealism: there are no meaning facts. KW, his sceptic—and I, for the sake 
of this investigation—all accept this argument as sound, and thus accept the 
irrealist conclusion. The discussion in the remainder of this chapter concerns the 
nature of meaning talk. KW’s sceptic takes the conclusion of the sceptical 
argument to amount to a rejection of all such talk. This represents the eliminativist 
option. KW seeks, with his sceptical solution, to establish a form of non-
eliminativism: an account on which meaning discourse can still be worthwhile 
despite meaning irrealism. KW’s sceptical solution will appear in §2.6. In §2.5 and 
§2.7, I will introduce and evaluate models of meaning discourse not considered 
explicitly by KW. These models may offer alternative sceptical solutions, and may 
thereby offer defence against eliminativism. 
                                                        
152 Another way to characterise the unpalatability of eliminativism is that, having found no 
satisfactory philosophical account of what we are achieving in a widespread activity, it may be 
more desirable to reject the philosophy than to abandon the activity. If we adopt eliminativism, we 
may be overestimating the degree to which philosophical matters should impinge on ordinary 
human behaviour. This is again, of course, not a knockdown argument.  
153 Miller makes an argument along these lines, localized to an error-theory about meaning, here: 




2.5 Meaning Discourse: Error-Theory 
There are no meaning facts. Given, then, that for a sentence to be true there must 
be a fact that it states, there are no true meaning ascriptions. Meaning discourse is 
a body of sentences devoid of truth. There are two ways to account for this 
absence of truth. We could characterise meaning ascriptions as systematically false, 
or we could characterise them as neither true nor false.154 In this section, I will 
consider the first option: meaning error-theory. The second option—meaning non-
factualism—will be discussed in the next section. 
 
An error-theory about meaning characterises the atomic and positive 
sentences of meaning discourse as attempted statements of fact that systematically 
fail.155 “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” says that Hemi means addition by ‘+’, but it is 
not the case that Hemi means addition by ‘+’. Our ascriptions of meaning pick out 
states of affairs that uniformly fail to obtain. In talking about meaning we try to 
describe reality, but we never get it right.  
 
 It will be worthwhile to immediately recall the distinction between 
eliminativism and non-eliminativism. There may be some advantages to 
continuing to practice ascription of meaning even when, as the error-theorist 
claims, those ascriptions are attempted statements of fact that always fail. Even 
given the absence of meaning facts, there may be some subsidiary norm under 
which meaning ascriptions are evaluable. Certain meaning ascriptions may still be 
correct with respect to this alternative norm, even though the fail to accord with 
the norm of truth. If there is such a norm, and if engaging in the discourse in a 
manner governed by that norm is worthwhile, then we have a non-eliminative 
error-theory for that discourse. The eliminativist alternative is that there is no such 
                                                        
154 I suppose it is a formal possibility that, for some discourse in which none of the sentences are 
true, some of them are false and some are neither true nor false. But this would provide a less 
plausible picture than each ascription falling into the same camp, and since we will find that falsity 
is not an option for the meaning irrealist anyway, I will set this possibility aside. 
155 It is sentences that can only be true if some meaning fact obtains that are characterised as false 
by the error-theory. The sentences “Either Hemi means addition by ‘+’ or it is a lovely day” and 
“Hemi does not mean addition by ‘+’”, for example, may still be true. This is why the error-theorist’s 
claim is limited to atomic and positive meaning ascriptions. 
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subsidiary norm, and that the practice of meaning ascription could be abandoned 
without pragmatic loss. If all we are doing when we talk of meaning is falsely 
describing, it is hard to imagine what point there would be in continuing to engage 
with that talk. The following two positions, then, are potential irrealist 
characterisations of meaning discourse:  
 
Meaning Eliminative Error-Theory: There are no meaning facts. (Atomic and 
positive) meaning ascriptions are false. Meaning discourse can be abandoned 
without loss.  
 
Meaning Non-Eliminative Error-Theory: There are no meaning facts. (Atomic 
and positive) meaning ascriptions are false. Meaning discourse features a non-
truth norm and cannot be abandoned without loss. 
  
The task, then, is to evaluate the tenability of these positions. I will raise three 
objections that show—conclusively, I think—that an error-theory is not a live 
option for the meaning irrealist.  
 
 The eliminative error-theorist will face the general worry noted above for 
any eliminativist approach. It is uncomfortable to advocate the abandonment of a 
seemingly worthwhile practice that is pervasive among humans. Let’s be more 
specific, now that we have added the error-theory to the picture. If every (atomic 
and positive) meaning ascription is false, and as the eliminativist claims there is no 
other norm under which those ascriptions are evaluated, then no meaning 
ascription is more or less justified than another. Meaning ascriptions are 
systematically equivalent with respect to how well they describe the facts, but they 
are also systematically equivalent with respect to whether they should be uttered. 
In adopting this account, we construe any appearance of differential correctness 
between such sentences as “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” and “Hemi means 
quaddition by ‘+’” as mere appearance. We decry a widespread human activity as 
worthless. As earlier noted, such considerations do not provide a convincing 





Perhaps, then, we should pursue a non-eliminativist error-theory about 
meaning. There is still something worthwhile about ascribing meaning, even 
though all such ascriptions are also failed description. Such a position would be 
akin to what J.L. Mackie suggests for morality.156 “Torture is morally 
impermissible”, and not “Charity is morally impermissible”, might satisfy some 
subsidiary norm—perhaps of possessing a certain utility—even when there is no 
such thing as moral impermissibility and both sentences are false. Likewise, there 
might be some norm satisfied by “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” that isn’t satisfied 
by “Hemi means quaddition by ‘+’”, even though there is no such thing as meaning 
and both sentences are false. The thought, in essence, is that while all meaning 
ascriptions are false, some of them might yet be correct with respect to something 
other than truth.  
 
It is clear that such an account—if it is stable—would oppose eliminativism. 
Meaning ascriptions are correct or incorrect with respect to this norm, and it is 
quite possible that the practice of meaning discourse conducted in these terms 
could be worthwhile.157 We would seek to characterise the function of our 
meaning talk, rather than to deny that there is any such function. But a serious 
problem arises when we consider what is required for there to be a non-truth 
norm operating in meaning discourse. The problematic consideration arose at the 
end of §2.3: KW’s meaning irrealism implies that there are no norms governing 
human action. Miller argues against taking a non-eliminative error-theory to be the 
upshot of meaning irrealism on this basis.158 The key idea is that to accept the 
sceptic’s strategy in the case of meaning is to accept that strategy wherever it is 
supposed that there is such a thing as rule-following. And for there to be a 
subsidiary norm governing meaning discourse there must be a fact about whether 
we accord with that norm in making a particular ascription of meaning. There must 
be some fact in virtue of which meaning ascriptions in any number of novel 
situations are evaluated as correct or incorrect. And if our practice is to be 
                                                        
156 Mackie, Ethics. 
157 Further discussion of the potential role and utility of meaning ascription given meaning 
irrealism will be given in the next section, when I describe KW’s sceptical solution. 
158 Miller, “Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.” 
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governed by such a norm, this fact must be graspable by our finite minds. It 
needn’t matter whether the norm is truth or something else. The KW meaning 
irrealist must deny that there are any facts in virtue of which an ascription is 
correct or incorrect with respect to any norm. The non-eliminative error-theorist 
about meaning, then, appears to rely on resources that are unavailable once we 
have accepted meaning irrealism. Subsidiary norms may be available to the moral 
error-theorist. But meaning irrealists face special constraints. 
  
 The final nail in the coffin of an error-theory about meaning—whether 
eliminative or non-eliminative—is the following problem, raised by Paul 
Boghossian.159 The issue is straightforward, and has likely been clear given my 
comment in §2.3 that meaning irrealism implies that no sentences have truth 
conditions. The error-theorist marks their opposition to realism as a systematic 
failure on the part of the subject discourse to achieve the description for which it 
aims. Every sentence in an error-theoretic discourse is truth-apt and has a truth 
condition; each of those sentences, therefore, has a meaning. This general error-
theoretic position immediately fails in the present case, because the possibility of 
sentences being meaningful is within the scope of the irrealist claim. An error-
theory about meaning is an error-theory, and thus implies that some sentences are 
false. But it follows from meaning irrealism that no sentences are false. If we are to 
find a way to account for the nature of meaning ascription after denying that there 
are meaning facts, relying on certain sentences having truth conditions will not be 
a coherent (let alone tenable) option.  
 
I think this problem to be an immediate and fundamental blow to any 
error-theory about meaning, and I therefore reject an error-theoretic account of 
meaning discourse given meaning irrealism. Failed description is a characterisation 
of meaning discourse that relies on something we have explicitly denied: that 
sentences can have the meaning necessary to pick out a state of affairs. And even 
given a solution to this problem, an error-theory about meaning faces a 
challenging dilemma between eliminativism and non-eliminativism. The error-
                                                        
159 Boghossian makes this argument here: Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations,” 523; 
Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 174. 
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theorist about meaning must either endorse the abandonment of a seemingly 
worthwhile discourse or rely on resources unavailable to the meaning irrealist by 
claiming that there is a non-truth norm operating over meaning discourse.  
 
2.6 Meaning Discourse: Non-Factualism 
KW, whether for the reasons I have described or otherwise, does not consider an 
error-theoretic response to the sceptical problem. Instead, in Chapter 3 of WRPL, 
he presents a form of non-factualism about meaning.160 There are no meaning 
facts, and therefore no true meaning sentences that state them. But meaning 
discourse does not involve a grand error. It is no problem that there are no facts 
for meaning ascriptions to state, because those ascriptions are not attempts at fact-
stating.161 The basic non-factualist claim is this: 
 
Meaning Non-Factualism: Meaning ascriptions are not truth-conditional and are 
neither true nor false.162 
 
We may accommodate the impossibility of true meaning ascription by denying 
that they are in the market for truth at all. This is, in a sense, a more severe 
response to irrealism than an error-theory. Both the error-theorist and the non-
factualist deny that any meaning ascriptions state existing states of affairs, but the 
non-factualist goes further and denies that those ascriptions state even non-
existing states of affairs. But in the light of the fundamental problem for a meaning 
error-theory described at the end of the previous section, it is clear that the 
                                                        
160 The interpretation of KW’s characterisation as a form of non-factualism has been disputed. See, 
for example: Wilson, “Kripke on Wittgenstein and Normativity”; Alexander Miller, Philosophy of 
Language (Florence, UNITED STATES: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 191, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/otago/detail.action?docID=324938. I will construe KW’s 
account as non-factualist, but as I have said for other exegetical considerations, this will have little 
bearing on the discussion; it is worthwhile to consider meaning non-factualism either way. 
161 To reiterate an earlier note: by “meaning ascriptions” I mean sentences of a certain form, that 
appear to attribute meaning to signs and subjects. The term is consistent with the contention that 
those ascriptions do not really serve to state states of affairs at all—the claim made by the non-
factualist. 
162 Non-cognitivism is a related position, on which the relevant sentences are not used to express 
beliefs. I mean for non-factualism to be distinct from non-cognitivism, and won’t discuss whether 
meaning ascriptions are used to express beliefs. But I do not mean this to imply that the meaning 
non-factualist could avoid meaning non-cognitivism. See the following for a brief note comparing 
the two positions: Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 160.  
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meaning irrealist must adopt a position of this severity. We cannot characterise 
meaning ascriptions as having truth conditions while denying that there are any 
facts in virtue of which those ascriptions could have truth conditions at all.  
 
The basic non-factualist claim, as I have characterised it, is purely negative. 
The question of providing a positive account of the targeted discourse is an 
important one for the non-factualist. I distinguish two kinds of responses to this 
question: 
 
Eliminative Meaning Non-Factualism: Meaning ascriptions are not truth-
conditional, and meaning ascription has no function. Meaning discourse can be 
abandoned without loss. 
 
Non-Eliminative Meaning Non-Factualism: Meaning ascriptions are not truth-
conditional, and meaning ascription has a function that is not description. Meaning 
discourse cannot be abandoned without loss. 
 
For a sentence to serve as a description of some state of affairs, it must state that 
that state of affairs obtains. Since meaning ascriptions are not statements, the 
function of meaning discourse cannot be description. But after making this 
negative claim we may either vindicate our continued practice of meaning 
ascription by positing some alternative function, or we may instead simply deny 
that there is any function at all. It is hard to imagine what reason there would be to 
continue ascribing meaning if doing so is without function, so the latter option 
amounts to advocating for elimination. 
 
 Let us start with a consideration of eliminative non-factualism. On such a 
view, there are no meaning facts, and meaning discourse does not involve the 
attempted statement of such facts. What’s more, that discourse involves nothing 
worthwhile at all—there is no other function fulfilled by talking of meaning. 
Eliminative non-factualism does seem to be an improvement on eliminative error-
theory: it avoids the implied contradiction that there are no meaning facts yet false 
sentences. But it will inherit all the eliminativist difficulties acknowledged in §2.4. 
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There seems to be something worthwhile in meaning talk, and to advocate for the 
abandonment of a widespread practice on the basis that we cannot satisfactorily 
account for it in philosophy is not a promising plan. And indeed, things seem in 
this respect worse for the eliminativist non-factualist than for the eliminativist 
error-theorist. The error-theorist can, at least, offer an account of one thing we are 
doing when we talk of meaning: we are trying but failing to state meaning facts. 
But the eliminative non-factualist explicitly rejects that account, and does not 
replace it. The position amounts to the denial that there is anything going on when 
we talk about meaning. These considerations, again, do not seem to decisively rule 
out the eliminativist option. But they do show that it is undesirable, and that we 
should pursue non-eliminativism. 
 
We will, then, consider the shape that a non-eliminative non-factualism 
about meaning may take. A lead can again be taken from metaethics: moral 
expressivists occupy a position of this kind. In the paradigmatic case of A.J. Ayer’s 
emotivism, for example, the sentence “Torture is wrong” does not state that torture 
is wrong, but is instead used to express a certain emotional attitude towards 
torture.163 The meaning non-factualist may make a similar move. The function of 
“Hemi means addition by ‘+’” is not to state that Hemi means addition by ‘+’. 
Instead, meaning ascription serves some non-descriptive role; a role that renders it 
worthwhile to continue ascribing meaning, and thus prevents eliminativism. 
 
 KW’s sceptical solution—as I will interpret it—is a form of non-eliminative 
non-factualism. I will give a brief description of the sceptical solution as an 
illustration of this approach to meaning discourse, but I won’t go into much depth; 
the issues with which I am concerned are not specific to KW’s account.164 The basic 
structure of KW’s sceptical solution is as follows.165 Meaning ascriptions have no 
truth conditions. But they may nonetheless have assertibility conditions. That there 
are certain conditions in which the assertion of a sentence is considered to be 
                                                        
163 A. J. Ayer (Alfred Jules), Language, Truth, and Logic, 110. 
164 I went into more depth about KW’s sceptical solution here: Butler, “Kripke-Wittgenstein 
Meaning Scepticism and the Sceptical Solution.” For comprehensive discussion, see: Miller, “What Is 
the Sceptical Solution?”. 
165 The sceptical solution is found in Chapter 3 of KW’s book: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language, 55–113. 
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justified—and conditions when it is not—does not imply that the sentence is a 
statement of fact. Take “Hemi means addition by ‘+’”. There are many 
characterisations we could make of the conditions in which utterance of this 
sentence is considered to be justified. For example: if Hemi’s use of ‘+’ corresponds 
to how some linguistic community uses ‘+’, uttering that sentence may serve to 
accept Hemi into that community. Whatever the specifics of the account, it seems 
plausible that meaning ascription could have a role independent of the statement 
of meaning facts: 
All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is 
that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are 
legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such 
conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that ‘facts correspond’ to 
those assertions is needed.166 
It is easy to see how this could amount to non-eliminativism. On the above 
account, uttering “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” in certain conditions is useful: it 
indicates to others that Hemi is to be trusted in their use of ‘+’. There is pragmatic 
value in ascribing meaning. On a non-eliminative non-factualist account—of the 
kind suggested by KW or otherwise—there would be value lost in abandoning 
meaning discourse. 
 
We now turn to objections and worries for meaning non-factualism. First, I 
will set aside any such concerns that arise quite in general for any non-factualist 
position. The Frege-Geach problem is a prominent example.167 I won’t spend time 
                                                        
166 Kripke, 77. 
167 This problem, in our present case, would be as follows. We may identify some function 
performed by asserting “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” that is consistent with meaning irrealism. But 
it will prove difficult to accommodate the apparent embeddability of that sentence as the 
antecedent of the conditional “If Hemi means addition by ‘+’, then they know what they’re talking 
about”, and to do so in a way that renders the sentence “They know what they’re talking about” a 
valid inference from the previous two sentences. It may be difficult for the meaning non-factualist 
to respond to this problem. But, for two reasons, I won’t investigate this problem here. Firstly, 
because it arises in general for any non-factualist, and I am concerned with difficulties particular to 
non-realism about meaning. And secondly, that preserving the apparent validity of the meaning 
modus ponens argument will likely seem comparatively less pressing once we have seen the extent 
of the difficulties for the meaning irrealist. Meaning irrealism threatens our ordinary conception of 
language quite generally, and concerns about the argument described here are, I think, just a drop 
in the bucket. For Geach’s presentation of the problem see: P. T. Geach, “Ascriptivism,” The 
Philosophical Review 69, no. 2 (1960): 221–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/2183506; P. T. Geach, 
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on such concerns here. It is more important to consider the worries that are 
specific to non-factualism about meaning. The task, in a sense, is to determine 
whether meaning non-factualism is at least as tenable as non-factualism for other 
subject matters. I have already noted the undesirability of an eliminative non-
factualism. The two objections that I will raise both primarily concern non-
eliminativism. The first—an argument that derives contradictory results about the 
nature of truth from meaning non-factualism—comes from Paul Boghossian. My 
contention will be that this argument is unsuccessful. The second objection I will 
consider is an analogue of that raised for non-eliminative error-theory: that the 
consolatory account meant as a defence against eliminativism relies on resources 
unavailable to the KW meaning irrealist. This argument I will find to be successful. 
In the end, then, the meaning non-factualist appears forced to adopt an 
unpalatable eliminativism.168 
 
Boghossian’s argument appears in “The Status of Content” and “The Rule-
Following Considerations”.169 He contends that meaning non-factualism implies a 
contradiction and is thus incoherent. The attack is analogous to Boghossian’s 
objection to meaning error-theory that I noted in §2.5: the traditional non-
factualist mechanisms fail in the case of meaning. To generate the purported 
contradiction, let us start by adopting the two key non-factualist claims: there are 
no meaning facts, and meaning ascriptions have no truth conditions.  
 
Boghossian’s first claim is that no non-factualism is consistent with a 
deflationary account of truth.170 The argument for this claim touches on similar 
points to those I raised in §1.5, for the intersection of non-factualism and 
minimalism about truth. I won’t repeat the description of deflationism that I gave 
in §1.2. The two key deflationist contentions will suffice: there is no property of 
                                                        
“Assertion,” The Philosophical Review 74, no. 4 (1965): 449–465, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2183123. 
168 It is worthwhile to note here that one prominent point of discussion for meaning non-
factualism—that it globalises—will not appear in this chapter. I have set aside any globalisation 
considerations for the next chapter: see §3.2. 
169 Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations,” 525; Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 
164, 173. 
170 Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 165. 
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truth, but truth predication can serve as a device for the endorsement of 
sentences. In §1.3 I showed how, for the minimalist, it is sufficient for a sentence to 
be apt for minimal truth that it exhibits declarative syntax and that its use is 
disciplined. Boghossian makes an analogous point for deflationism: 
Any proposed requirement on candidacy for truth must be grounded in the 
preferred account of the nature of truth. On a deflationary account of truth, 
there is no substantive property—truth—that sentences or thoughts may 
enjoy … Any meaningful, declarative sentence would be (at a minimum) a 
candidate for assertion; it would be, thereby, a candidate for the compliment 
we pay sentences we are prepared to assert, or, as the alternative would 
have it, a candidate for semantic ascent. Any such sentence would count, 
therefore, as truth-conditional in a deflationary sense.171 
Deflationists claim that to ascribe truth to a sentence is just to assert that sentence. 
Truth predication—and thus truth-aptness—will therefore inherit whatever 
conditions there are on a sentence being a candidate for assertion. A sentence may 
be asserted when it is declarative and disciplined by utterance norms. Given 
deflationism, then, it is sufficient for a sentence to be apt for truth that it has 
declarative syntax and is governed by norms of correct utterance. 
 
The difficulty posed by this contention for the non-factualist is that the 
sentences they target appear to meet these requirements. It will be most practical 
to use meaning ascriptions as an illustrative example, although the point is meant 
to be general. The syntactical matter for meaning ascriptions is straightforward. 
“Hemi means addition by ‘+’” has declarative syntax: the sentences “If Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’ then they are a good mathematician” and “Either Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’ or Hemi means quaddition by ‘+’”, for example, are grammatically 
correct. The matter of the discipline that may be exhibited by meaning ascriptions 
is a somewhat more complicated matter. For now, it will be enough to note that 
any non-eliminative non-factualist will surely accept that there are standards at 
work in meaning discourse such that certain ascriptions are correct and others are 
                                                        
171 Boghossian, 165. 
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not.172 Indeed, accounting for this discipline is a central part of KW’s sceptical 
solution. If meaning discourse features assertibility conditions such that we 
consider it correct to utter “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” only when the speaker 
intends to accept Hemi into their linguistic community with respect to their use of 
‘+’, then that discourse is disciplined.173 
 
If truth is construed as the deflationist suggests, then, a non-eliminative 
non-factualist about meaning appears forced to concede that meaning ascriptions 
are apt for truth: they can be asserted, and the truth predicate is just a device for 
endorsed assertion. Boghossian’s point is that, if there is to be space for non-
factualism about such sentences, deflationism must be rejected. It cannot be as easy 
as deflationism suggests to qualify as truth-apt; the requirements must be 
sufficiently demanding that significant and declarative sentences can fail to meet 
them. This is the result of the first half of Boghossian’s argument: 
A non-factualism about any subject matter presupposes a conception of 
truth richer than the deflationary: it is committed to holding that the 
predicate “true” stands for some sort of real, language-independent 
property, eligibility for which will not be certified solely by the fact that a 
sentence is declarative and significant.174 
This claim targets any non-eliminative non-factualism. But it may not in itself be a 
problem for any such theory.175 It is when we direct the non-factualist approach 
towards meaning that the apparent inconsistency with deflationism becomes 
problematic. 
                                                        
172 It is an interesting question whether any eliminative non-factualist would agree that meaning 
ascriptions are disciplined. Boghossian does claim that any non-factualism will imply that truth is 
more than deflationary, but it is unclear whether he would include eliminative non-factualism, as I 
have included it, within the scope of this claim. Regardless, I mean to include versions of non-
factualism that deny that the target sentences exhibit the discipline necessary for even deflationary 
truth, so I deny that all non-factualist accounts are inconsistent with deflationary truth. We will 
proceed with Boghossian’s argument as targeting specifically non-eliminative non-factualism, with 
the acknowledgement that it may also apply to certain eliminative non-factualist accounts; those 
that admit that the sentences in question exhibit the necessary discipline. 
173 The detail of the account of assertibility conditions needn’t matter for this point to be sustained. 
I will return to the matter of whether meaning discourse meets the disciplinary requirement in 
§2.7.1 and §2.7.4. 
174 “The Status of Content”, 165. 
175 Boghossian points out that this result may be a problem for Ayer, who explicitly advocates for 
both deflationary truth and non-eliminative non-factualism about morality. Boghossian, “The 




Deflationists deny that truth is a genuine property, and thus that the 
predicate “is true” refers to such a property. Boghossian takes the result of the first 
half of his argument to imply that the meaning non-factualist must claim that truth 
is robust, by which we need only mean non-deflationary: truth is a genuine 
property, and the predicate “is true” may thus refer to that property. Boghossian 
next argues that meaning non-factualism also implies that truth is not robust. 
There are two steps to this contradictory result. Firstly, Boghossian argues that if 
truth is robust, then it must be a factual matter. And secondly, he argues that 
meaning non-factualism implies that truth is not a factual matter. Since I am going 
to argue that this half of Boghossian’s argument fails, I will quote the relevant 
passages in full. 
So we have it that any non-factualist thesis presupposes that truth is, as I 
shall henceforth put it, robust. But, now, notice that judgements about 
whether an object possesses a robust property could hardly fail to be factual. 
If P is some genuinely robust property, then it is hard to see how there could 
fail to be a fact of the matter about whether an object has P . . . If truth is a 
robust property, then judgements about a sentence’s truth must themselves 
be factual. But . . . a non-factualist thesis about meaning implies that 
judgements about a sentence’s truth cannot be factual: whether a certain 
sentence is true cannot be a factual matter if its meaning is not.176 
Notice, however, that [the claim that the predicate “has truth condition P” 
does not refer to a property] entails [that “true” does not refer to a 
property]. For the truth value of a sentence is fully determined by its truth 
condition and the relevant worldly facts. There is no way, then, that a 
sentence’s possessing a truth value could be a thoroughly factual matter 
(“true” does express a property) if there is non-factuality in one of its 
determinants (“has truth condition p” does not express a property). A non-
factualism about content amounts, therefore, to [the claims that “S has truth 
condition p” is not truth-conditional and that “true” does not refer to a 
property]. But now here too a contradiction seems apparent. . . . The idea of 
a significant declarative sentence failing to possess truth conditions is an 
                                                        
176 Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations,” 526. 
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idea that presupposes that “true” does refer to a property: it presupposes a 
robust, as opposed to a deflationary, conception of truth.177 
The first part of the argument is clearest seen in the first quote. Having denied 
deflationism, we have denied that truth predication is merely a device for 
endorsement, and we have posited that there is a property of truth. There is a 
property that a sentence possesses when it is true and does not possess when it is 
not true, and there are thus facts about whether or not a sentence has that 
property. Boghossian puts the point in terms of the nature of talk about truth: 
from robust truth is follows that judgements about whether a sentence is true or 
false are truth-apt, and that the predicate “is true” refers to the property of truth. 
The denial of deflationism appears to imply that truth is in this sense factual. 
 
 The second part of the argument is clearest seen in the second quote. I have 
acknowledged the connection between meaning and truth elsewhere in this 
chapter. Boghossian exploits this connection to argue that, in a sense, non-
factualism poisons the well. Whether a sentence is true is determined, in part, by its 
meaning: as I earlier put it, a sentence is true when what it says is the case is the 
case, and a sentence says what it says in virtue of its meaning. To hold that the 
truth-value of a sentence is a factual matter, then, is to hold that factual matters 
can be determined by non-factual matters. And this, the argument maintains, is not 
possible. Boghossian, again, puts the point in terms of truth-talk: if no sentences of 
the form “S means that P” are statements of fact, and meaning partly determines 
truth, then how could any sentences of the form “S is true” be statements of fact? 
Wright puts it like this: 
One immediate difficulty [for the meaning non-factualist] is presented by 
the meaning-truth platitude. If the truth value of S is determined by its 
meaning and the state of the world in relevant respects, then non-factuality 
in one of the determinants can be expected to induce non-factuality in the 
outcome. (A rough parallel: If among the determinants of whether it is 
worthwhile going to see a certain exhibition is how well presented the 
leading exhibits are, then, if questions of good presentation are not 
                                                        
177 Boghossian, “The Status of Content,” 175. 
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considered to be entirely factual, neither is the matter of whether it is 
worthwhile going to see the exhibition.) A [non-factualist] view of meaning 
is thus, it appears, going to enjoin a [non-factualist] view of what is for a 
statement to be true.178 
Non-factualism about meaning, then, implies non-factualism about whether 
sentences are true. But in the first half of Boghossian’s argument, we found that 
there must be facts of the matter about whether a sentence is true—otherwise, 
truth could not be sufficiently substantial to leave space for the denial that some 
declarative and disciplined sentence is truth-apt. Meaning non-factualism appears 
to imply a contradiction: truth is both non-factual and factual.  
 
 I will argue that this argument fails.179 Let us accept—at least to a certain 
extent—the half of Boghossian’s argument that is concerned with non-factualism 
for any subject. We reject deflationism and accept that there is a property of truth. 
And I will accept, further, that there are thus facts about whether or not a sentence 
is true. But I will deny that this commitment is at all a problem for the meaning 
non-factualist. To do this, I will present two characterisations of the supposed 
conflict, and find in both cases that a consistent option is available to the meaning 
non-factualist.   
 
 One way to represent the purported factuality and non-factuality of truth is 
in terms of ascriptions of truth; we can examine the nature of judgements of the 
form “S is true”, or of the truth predicate “is true”. I will focus on judgements, but I 
think that the discussion applies mutatis mutandis to predicates. Truth is factual, 
on this interpretation, if sentences of the form “S is true” are truth-conditional—
and non-factual if they are not. Boghossian argues that the denial of deflationism 
implies that truth is in this sense factual. There is a property of truth, and facts 
about whether or not a sentence is true. Judgements about those facts, then, 
cannot fail to have truth conditions: there are facts they are attempting to state. 
But truth is non-factual, on this interpretation, because we have denied that 
                                                        
178 Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language,” 104. I have replaced 
Wright’s usage of the term “projectivist” with “non-factualist”, to cohere with my present 
terminology. 
179 My argument is similar to that given by Wright here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 231–36. 
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judgements about what a sentence means are truth-conditional. “S means that P” 
has no truth conditions, and is thus never true. But for a sentence of the form “S is 
true” to be true or false it is surely necessary that a sentence of the form “S means 
that P” is true: a sentence must say that something is the case to be a candidate for 
a truth-value. Meaning non-factualism, then, appears to imply that “S is true” both 
is and is not truth-conditional; that truth is both factual and non-factual.  
 
 On this characterisation of the problem, I do not think that there is any 
difficulty for the meaning non-factualist. The question of whether the sentence “S 
is true” is truth-conditional is settled quickly by the observation, which I have 
made several times, that no sentence can be truth-conditional given meaning 
irrealism. No sentence has the meaning necessary to state that something is the 
case. On the present interpretation of Boghossian’s problem, it was the denial of 
deflationism that implied that judgements about truth are factual: “If truth is a 
robust property, then judgements about a sentence’s truth must themselves be 
factual.” I think that the meaning irrealist must deny this claim, and that they are 
quite justified in doing so. The absence of a sentence that states a fact does not, it 
seems to me, imply the absence of the fact itself.180 If this implication did obtain, 
then in denying that any sentence has content, the meaning irrealist would be 
forced to maintain that nothing is the case. It is a central upshot of meaning 
irrealism, I think, that we must deny that sentences map neatly onto the world; 
and, indeed, perhaps that they can map onto anything at all. To return to the 
present point, then, the idea is this: the denial of deflationism may imply that truth 
is a property, and that there are facts about whether sentences have that property. 
But the meaning irrealist will deny that this implies that there are truth-
conditional statements that a sentence is true. (Or, to put it in terms of the truth 
predicate, they will deny that “is true” refers to the property of truth, even though 
there is such a property.) On this interpretation of the conflict, then, I think it clear 
that the meaning non-factualist can consistently claim that truth is non-factual: 
truth ascriptions are not truth-conditional.  
                                                        
180 Note that I have assumed here that “judgements about a sentence’s truth” refers to sentences 
that appear to be about a sentence’s truth. If the term instead refers to sentences that actually have 




  Let us now consider a second interpretation of the factuality conflict. It may 
be unfair to reject Boghossian’s argument on the previous grounds alone: it might 
succeed if limited to a characterisation of factuality in terms purely of facts. That is, 
perhaps non-factualism implies both that truth is factual in that there are facts of 
the matter about whether a sentence is true, and that truth is non-factual in that 
there are no such facts. Such a characterisation would, I think, preserve the spirit 
of the Boghossian attack—and it would do so without relying on assumptions 
about the possibility of truth-conditional sentences that the meaning non-
factualist will deny. The contradiction, then, would be this. Truth is factual in that, 
since truth is a property, the matter of whether a sentence is true is a matter 
determined by facts. For any sentence there is a fact such that that sentence does 
or does not have the property of truth. But meaning non-factualists deny that there 
are any facts such that a sentence has a meaning. And since whether a sentence 
has the truth property is determined, in part, by what it means, there are thus no 
facts such that a sentence is true. Meaning non-factualism, then, implies that there 
are both facts of the matter and no facts of the matter about truth.  
 
  We can express the result like this: meaning non-factualism implies (1) 
that the matter of whether a sentence is true is a matter of facts, and (2) that there 
are no facts such that a sentence is true. Once it is put this way, the meaning non-
factualist’s escape is clear. (1) and (2) are, I think, quite consistent. Truth is, as the 
denial of deflationism implies, a matter of facts. But none of those facts need be that 
a sentence is true. When a sentence is true, it has a certain property. But since it is a 
necessary condition on being true that a sentence is equipped with truth 
conditions, and since meaning non-factualism implies that no sentences are so 
equipped, no sentence is true. The denial of deflationism implies only that there 
are facts such that a sentence is or is not true. There would only be a problem for 
meaning non-factualism if the implication was instead simply that there are facts 
such that a sentence is true.  
  
 On the second characterisation of the factuality of truth that follows from 
its robustness, the meaning non-factualist can happily suppose that truth is factual. 
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All that needs to be supposed is that all of the facts about truth are, in a sense, 
negative: no sentences are true. We found above, on the prior characterisation of 
factuality, that meaning non-factualism also implies that truth is non-factual: 
ascriptions of truth are not truth-conditional. But two characterisations of 
factuality seem quite distinct. My response to Boghossian’s argument, then, is that 
even granting the claim that no non-factualism is consistent with truth 
deflationism, the meaning non-factualist needn’t be concerned. It seems to me 
quite consistent to claim that truth is robust and is a matter of facts, while denying 
that sentences of the form “S is true” are truth-conditional, and denying that there 
are any facts such that a sentence is true. These matters are problematic for the 
meaning non-factualist only if it is assumed that to every fact there corresponds a 
sentence stating that fact, or that if truth is a property then there are facts such 
that a sentence has that property. Boghossian’s argument is successful only given a 
certain equivocation on ”non-factual”, and once we explicate the notion, there is a 
quite consistent position for the meaning non-factualist to occupy.181 
 
 Much of this discussion has concerned characterisation of Boghossian’s 
argument, and it may be prudent to put the result modestly: on this interpretation 
of the argument, it fails to derive a contradiction from meaning non-factualism. It 
is possible that I have misinterpreted it, and that on a better characterisation the 
argument would be sound. But I will take it henceforth that Boghossian’s argument 
against the coherence of meaning non-factualism fails.182  
                                                        
181 The position may be consistent. But consistency does not suffice for the position to be attractive. 
The meaning non-factualist, on this account, claims that truth is a property, but that (1) no 
sentence has that property, and (2) that there can be no statement of the fact that a sentence does 
not have that property. This is a difficult position to maintain. Indeed, on one reading of (1) and (2), 
they seem to contradict: is (1) not precisely the kind of statement ruled out by (2)? While I cannot 
here investigate these considerations in-depth, the central thought is this: meaning non-factualism 
seems to rely on a certain separation between facts and truth. There must be things that are the 
case despite there being no statements that they are the case. On such an account, the sentence “no 
sentence is true” is not true, despite it being the case that no sentence is true. Such considerations 
have metaphysical consequences along broadly Kantian lines: much of reality may be simply 
beyond our semantic capabilities. I will return to such thoughts in Chapter 3 (see fn. 223), and for 
now will simply set them aside as posing a difficulty that, while serious, is not obviously 
insurmountable. 
182 Other objections to Boghossian’s argument can be found here: Divers and Miller, “Why 
Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth”; Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, 
“Minimalism and Truth Aptness”; Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 231. One prominent objection is 
that Boghossian relies on there being no distance between what is necessary for truth under 




We now turn to the second objection. We have seen that, given meaning 
irrealism, the sentences that comprise meaning discourse cannot be in the 
business of describing meaning facts, and they are not apt for any kind of truth 
that involves such description. But the threat from the rule-following 
considerations runs deeper. As I have acknowledged in §2.3 and §2.5, KW meaning 
irrealism appears to rule out the possibility of correct or incorrect utterance.183 
 
 To see the concern for non-eliminative non-factualism, let us pick a rough 
example of such a theory. The function of sentences that ascribe meaning to signs 
and subjects—we will say—is to express the acceptance of that subject into the 
speaker’s linguistic community with respect to that sign. So, when Aroha says “Hemi 
means addition by ‘+’”, she is expressing acceptance of Hemi to her community for 
the use of ‘+’. If there is this function, then there must be occasions on which a 
certain meaning ascription fulfils or fails to fulfil it. And then, if this function is to 
characterise what we are doing when we ascribe meaning, it must be correct to 
utter when doing so fulfils the function, and incorrect when it does not. Say that 
Aroha intends to accept Hemi into her ‘+’ linguistic community. If the function of 
meaning ascription is as presently construed, then it will be correct for her to say 
“Hemi means addition by ‘+’”. If she did not have that intention, then the utterance 
does not fulfil this function, and it would be incorrect. Correctness emerges from 
the function—Aroha ascribes correctly when doing so performs the role of that 
ascription.  
 
The opportunity for the sceptic is clear. There must be some fact in virtue of 
which the function is fulfilled or not—and the utterance correct or not—in a 
particular case. That fact must rule out quus-like alternative interpretations. The 
sceptic may claim, for example, that what is correct for Aroha to say in the above 
case is instead “Hemi does not mean addition by ‘+’”. The facts necessary for this 
non-eliminative non-factualist account to work are precisely of the kind ruled out 
                                                        
183 This argument for the dependence of non-eliminative non-factualism on rule-following can be 
found here: Alexander Miller, “Rule-Following Skepticism,” in The Routledge Companion to 
Epistemology, Routledge Philosophy Companions (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011); Miller, 
“What Is the Sceptical Solution?” 
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by KW’s sceptical argument: those such that a subject’s utterance of an expression 
accords or fail to accord with the standards for using that expression. Such facts 
are necessary even when the function of an expression is not to describe reality—
they will follow wherever it is supposed that the utterances of a subject may be 
correct or incorrect. Given, then, that this sample non-eliminative non-factualist 
account of meaning is representative of any such account, we have found that non-
eliminative non-factualism is not an option for the KW meaning irrealist. It relies 
on materials that are explicitly ruled-out. 
 
 This, then, is our ultimate evaluation of meaning non-factualism. The basic 
negative contention—that meaning ascriptions are not truth-conditional—was not 
found to be problematic. And indeed, the denial of truth-conditionality seems to 
follow directly from meaning irrealism, which is why a meaning error-theory is 
incoherent. Furthermore, I rejected Boghossian’s argument that this negative 
meaning non-factualist claim implies a contradiction about the factuality of truth. 
But having found that non-eliminativist accounts rely on meaning ascriptions 
being correct or incorrect with respect to some standard, we end up in an 
analogous situation to that found for meaning error-theory. The non-
eliminativist’s attempt to retain the legitimacy of meaning ascription appears 
inconsistent with KW meaning irrealism. If meaning discourse is characterised as 
non-factualism it must advocate for eliminativism. And this, as I have noted, is a 
quite unpalatable result. We have denied that there is value in a pervasive human 
activity in response to philosophical difficulties. 
 
If KW is a non-eliminative non-factualist, and KW’s sceptic is an 
eliminativist, it looks as though we must side with the sceptic. In contrast with the 
meaning error-theory, consideration of meaning non-factualism has produced an 
apparently consistent option. But mere consistency is unlikely to be enough for 
tenability. We are quite clearly motivated to seek an alternative non-realist 







2.7 Meaning Discourse: Mere Minimalism 
2.7.1 Meaning Discourse and Minimal Truth 
It is distinctive of the prior two non-realist models of discourse that opposition to 
realism about meaning manifests as the absence of true meaning ascription; 
systematic falsity in the case of error-theory, or non-truth conditional semantics in 
the case of non-factualism. Crispin Wright’s metaphysical framework, presented in 
Truth and Objectivity and described in Chapter 1 of this thesis, offers an alternative 
approach. The realism-status of a discourse on Wright’s account—at least for 
assertoric discourses—turns on the nature of truth available in that discourse, 
rather than the possibility of truth at all. It is helpful to think of this distinction in 
terms of the two generic components of realism: existence and independence.184 
The approach made in the previous sections was to deny the existence of meaning 
facts, and thus of true meaning ascriptions—what I have called an irrealist 
approach. In this section, I will instead make what I have called an anti-realist 
approach, and deny the realist’s claim that meaning is a mind-independent 
matter.185 In §2.7.1 – §2.7.3 I will apply the strategy outlined in §1.5 to meaning, 
and investigate which positions in Wright’s metaphysical landscape might be 
motivated by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW). I will first find that KW’s position—at 
least, given the non-eliminative opposition to the sceptic—may be characterised as 
mere minimalism about meaning: the claim that, while there is truth in meaning 
discourse, that truth is nothing more than the product of the assertoric form of 
that discourse. Then, in §2.7.4, I will raise against this position analogous concerns 
to those raised against the error-theoretic and non-factualist approaches to 
meaning discourse, and find that we seem to be no better-off. 
 
                                                        
184 See the General Introduction and Devitt, Realism and Truth. 
185 I have characterised KW’s sceptical argument as concluding in meaning irrealism, and it may 
thus seem odd to suggest an anti-realist destination for that argument. But this is simply a quirk of 
the terminology that results from adopting Wright’s minimalism. The position which we will 
initially find KW’s sceptical argument to motivate is, effectively, the irrealist position that Wright’s 
framework offers. But since it does posit meaning facts, it is also, in the terms I adopted in the 
General Introduction, a form of anti-realism. This terminological dispute will, I hope, be cleared up 
once we have fully applied KW’s sceptical argument to meaning from within Wright’s framework.  
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A metaphysical inquiry of the form suggested by Wright has two stages. 
First, we must determine whether meaning discourse is assertoric, and thus 
whether meaning ascriptions are apt for a truth property that exhibits at least the 
essential characteristics: those I listed as the platitudes in §1.3. Second, we must 
consider the further, non-essential, features that property may have—we must 
determine how truth in meaning discourse fares with respect to the four realism-
relevant cruces. I will address these matters in turn. And since the present concern 
is to find an account of meaning discourse that is consistent with KW meaning 
irrealism, the inquiry will assume that KW’s sceptical argument is sound. The 
question is this: what follows from this assumption for the nature of truth in 
meaning discourse? 
 
All that it takes for the sentences of a discourse to be apt for minimal truth 
is that they meet a minimum standard of assertoricity.186 They must have a certain 
syntactical form, characteristic of declarative sentences. And they must exhibit a 
certain discipline in being governed by a recognised standard of warranted 
assertibility. Satisfaction of these two conditions is necessary and sufficient for 
sentences to appear as “P” in instances of the Disquotational Schema (DS): “P” is 
true iff P. Such sentences are thus truth-apt; and some of them, it is likely, will 
meet the standard and qualify as true.187 The question, then, is whether meaning 
discourse features the necessary syntax and discipline.188 Consider the following 
sentences: 
 
Conditional: “If Hemi means addition by ‘+’, then he is no friend of the sceptic.” 
Negation: “It is not the case that Hemi means addition by ‘+’.” 
                                                        
186 This section relies on the discussion of Wright’s minimalism given in §1.3. 
187 The implication from there being a truth norm operating over a discourse to some of the 
sentences in that discourse being true relies on the rejection of an error-theoretic option: that the 
truth norm is systematically unmet. I discussed the intersection of minimalism and error-theory at 
the end of §1.5—and see Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 86. The point there is that taking the 
discourse in question to uniformly fail to meet a certain standard is undesirable in contrast with 
using minimalism to select a different standard that the sentences do meet (a standard which must 
be present if eliminativism is to be prevented). For present purposes, I will simply set aside the 
possibility of an error-theory, and take it that the presence of a minimal truth norm implies that the 
norm is at least occasionally met. 
188 I have already touched on this matter in §2.6, in discussion of Boghossian’s argument against 
meaning non-factualism—and I will return to it in §2.7.4. 
92 
 
Propositional Attitude: “Aroha believes that Hemi means addition by ‘+’.” 
 
These are grammatically acceptable sentences. Taking this sample to be 
representative, we conclude that meaning ascriptions have the right syntactical 
form for ascription of a truth property. The discipline question is a more 
complicated matter, and will prove problematic. For “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” 
to be substitutable for “P” in an instance of the DS, there must be conditions in 
which that ascription is correct and incorrect. Are there such standards at work in 
meaning discourse? This question has been important in discussion of the 
tenability of forms of non-eliminativism. For now, let the claim simply be that at 
least on KW’s own account meaning discourse has sufficient discipline. KW’s 
assertibility conditions, which I briefly described in §2.6, characterise the occasions 
on which it is considered justified to ascribe meaning—roughly, doing so is 
justified when the speaker intends to accept another speaker into their community 
with respect to their use of a certain expression, and when that use has 
corresponded with communal use in the relevant respects. Our talk of meaning is 
disciplined when it is characterised as such, because that talk is not mere noise. 
There is function to that talk that may or may not be fulfilled by any particular 
utterance. Without committing to the letter of KW’s sceptical solution, then, we 
will assume that KW characterises meaning discourse as disciplined.  
 
 On KW’s account, then, meaning ascriptions meet the conditions of syntax 
and discipline. And then, given Wright’s minimalism, all meaning ascriptions are 
truth-apt and those that meet the standard are true. Recalling Wright’s discussion 
of the Correspondence platitude, it also follows that for every true meaning 
ascription there is a meaning fact.189 That fact emerges from the copermissibility of 
““Hemi means addition by ‘+’” is true” and “It is a fact that Hemi means addition by 
‘+’”; if an ascription meets the standard of truth then there seems to be nothing 
that prevents us from saying that that ascription states a fact. Even given linguistic 
acrobatics like “Is it really a fact that Hemi means addition by ‘+’?”, the truth of the 
ascriptive sentence still seems sufficient for an affirmative answer.  
                                                        




This result may seem immediately problematic for the KW meaning 
irrealist: I have characterised meaning irrealism as precisely the denial that there 
are meaning facts. But there is no conflict here—at least, not immediately. Having 
adopted Wright’s account of truth and facts we must look again at the 
characterisation of the meaning irrealism that follows from KW’s sceptical 
argument. It is unlikely that KW would have any qualms about admitting minimal 
meaning facts, and it seems that his meaning irrealist claim need only be that there 
are no non-minimal meaning facts. 
 
To see this, first note that Wright intends a truth property about which we 
have accepted only the platitudinous characteristics to be metaphysically neutral 
ground between the realist and their opponent. There is nothing in the platitudes 
inconsistent with the denial that a sentence with a property satisfying those 
platitudes has a real subject matter. Aptitude for truth in Wright’s minimalism 
emerges solely from the shape of our talk about the relevant subject, and it needn’t 
be the case that the facts comprising that subject matter exist independently of 
that talk. It is not necessary, in opposing realism about meaning, to deny that there 
are such truths and facts. We could put it like this: it is unlikely that the sceptic 
would be satisfied by the provision of a meaning fact that is merely an artefact of 
the acceptability, with respect to some minimal truth norm, of the claim that that 
fact obtains.  
 
KW needn’t deny the possibility of minimal meaning facts to oppose 
meaning realism. And there is good evidence, too, to suggest that he doesn’t deny 
this possibility. KW admits that it may be correct to ascribe truth to meaning 
ascriptions, if truth is construed a certain way: 
Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution concedes to the sceptic that no ‘truth 
conditions’ or ‘corresponding facts’ in the world exist that make a statement 
like “Jones, like many of us, means addition by ‘+’” true . . . Do we not call 
assertions like the one just quoted ‘true’ or ‘false’? Can we not with propriety 
precede such assertions with ‘It is a fact that’ or ‘It is not a fact that’? 
Wittgenstein’s way with such objections is short. Like many others, 
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Wittgenstein accepts the ‘redundancy’ theory of truth: to affirm that a 
statement is true (or presumably, to precede it with ‘It is a fact that…’) is 
simply to affirm the statement itself, and to say it is not truth is to deny it: 
(‘p’ is true = p).190 
Wright’s minimal truth shares much with this deflationary approach to truth, as I 
noted in §1.2 and §1.3. In this passage it is clear that KW concedes to the propriety 
of calling meaning ascriptions true, and calling meaning states of affairs facts. 
While minimalism, contra deflationism, posits a property of truth, there need be 
little more required for a sentence to have that property than to meet the 
standards for assertion at work in the discourse to which that sentence belongs.  
 
Given minimalism, then, KW’s discussion implies that there are true 
meaning ascriptions, as well as meaning facts that they state. But this is not a 
problem. The divergence between this result and the characterisation of the 
sceptical argument in §2.2 emerges not from a disagreement about the status of 
meaning facts, but from a disagreement about what is necessary for truth and 
facthood. To accommodate the adoption of minimalism we must reformulate 
meaning irrealism as follows:  
 
Meaning Irrealism*: There are no more than minimal facts such that anyone 
means anything by an expression. 
 
The prior characterisation of Meaning Irrealism (MI) was that there are no 
meaning facts. If we limit facts to those available only to the meaning realist, and 
ignore the possibility of the minimal facts that, on Wright’s account, emerge merely 
from the assertoricity of the discourse in question, Meaning Irrealism* (MI*) is 
equivalent to MI. That is, MI follows from MI*, and vice versa, if we suppose that 
(necessarily) all facts are more than minimal. In subscribing to Wright’s 
framework we consent to the possibility of merely minimal facts, and so we must 
                                                        
190 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 86. Note that KW here refers to the 
redundancy theory of truth rather than deflationism. This theory differs from deflationism in 
denying the pragmatic value of truth predication that I described in §1.2, but shares what is 
important for the present point: that since ascribing truth is simply asserting, it is correct to ascribe 
truth whenever it is correct to assert. The difference, then, is inconsequential. 
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reject a literal reading of MI if we take meaning discourse to qualify for minimal 
truth and thus minimal facts. What I claim is that MI* expresses the sentiment of 
the conclusion of KW’s sceptical argument from our adopted perspective of 
Wright’s metaphysical framework. 
 
We now turn to the second stage of the inquiry, in which we investigate the 
non-essential properties that truth in meaning discourse might have. So far, we 
have established only that meaning discourse features a truth with the essential 
characteristics: those laid out in the list of platitudes given in §1.3. There is little to 
be said about the nature of this truth from its satisfaction of the platitudes alone. 
And indeed, Wright’s four cruces—to which we now turn—do not offer a complete 
picture either. Many questions will be left unanswered: questions, for example, 
about which meaning ascriptions qualify as true, and about why it is these that 
qualify. Truth in meaning discourse may, indeed, come to bear some resemblance 
to the assertibility norm invoked by KW in the sceptical solution. But Wright’s 
cruces do offer characterisations of the features of this truth that are realism-
relevant—those features about which the realist and the non-realist disagree. 
More specifically, they characterise the ways in which truth may be mind-
independent. The realism-status of meaning is determined by the mind-
independence of the truth for which meaning ascriptions are apt, and thus by how 
truth in meaning discourse fares in the four debates. 
 
Note that to accept MI* is to presume an outcome of the four debates in 
favour of the non-realist: if the realist is at all victorious then truth is not merely 
minimal. In a sense, then, the point of applying the cruces to meaning is to test the 
claim that MI* follows from KW’s argument. It may yet work out to be consistent 
with the soundness of that argument that truth in meaning discourse is mind-
independent in some respect, and it is important to investigate this possibility. 
Wright thinks that it will not: 
The irrealism established by Kripke’s sceptical paradox, if it is sustained, 
comes to the contention that discourse about rules, meanings and what 
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complies with them is at most minimally truth-apt—that nothing about such 
discourse merits movement away from minimalist anti-realism about it.191 
Wright suggests that, if the KW sceptical argument is sound, then truth in meaning 
discourse falls on the non-realist side of every crux. If Wright is right, then nothing 
motivates a move beyond minimal truth in meaning discourse unless KW’s 
sceptical argument is denied. In this case, while KW may admit that there are 
merely minimal meaning facts, his argument would rule out the possibility of more 
than minimal meaning facts. Let us turn to the cruces, to confirm this 
hypothesis.192 
 
2.7.2 Meaning Discourse and Judgement Dependence 
This crux offers three options for truth in meaning: judgement-independence, 
judgement-dependence, and neither. Our talk of meaning involves many 
judgements; judgements which share the form of “Hemi means addition by ‘+’”. Say 
that some such judgements—those made in cognitively ideal conditions—are 
epistemically best. And say, of these judgements, that they covary with true 
meaning ascriptions. A meaning ascription is true—and the fact it states obtains—
when and only when it agrees with best opinion. We have a choice, when faced 
with this biconditional, between granting a certain explanatory priority to either 
the judgements or the facts. It may be that the perfect covariation between these 
judgements and the facts arises because those judgements track the facts; that the 
best judgements are those that are of a sufficient epistemic quality to capture the 
truth. This is the realist’s option. The second option is that best opinion covaries 
with truth because those opinions determine which sentences are true. The true 
sentences in a discourse are those that agree with the best opinions. This is the 
anti-realist’s option. Wright formalises this distinction as the question of whether 
a provisional equation satisfying four conditions—a priority, substantiality, 
independence, and extremal—can be established for the relevant discourse. In the 
case of meaning, such an equation would take this form: 
                                                        
191 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 212. 
192 As in §1.4, my discussion in the next two sections will concern just two of Wright’s cruces: those 
for which there is a legitimate realist option for meaning. For the application of Potential 
Verification Transcendence and Width of Cosmological Role to meaning, and justification for setting 
them aside in this discussion, see Appendices A and B. 
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PE(Meaning): For any S, M, and E: if the C-conditions obtain then (a suitable 
subject judges that S means M by E ⟺ S means M by E). 
 
(Where the “C-conditions” are the conditions of cognitive idealisation that suffice 
for a judgement to be best.) And, as noted, for this crux there is a third option. 
Truth in meaning discourse may be neither judgement-dependent nor independent. 
Let’s consider these three options in turn. 
 
 On Wright’s account, meaning is judgement-independent if, firstly, no 
satisfactory provisional equation can be found, and secondly, an account of the 
epistemology of meaning is given that can explain the best judgements of meaning 
as tracking independently-constituted truth. KW’s sceptical argument, if sound, 
seems to quickly rule out satisfaction of the latter of these conditions. Judgement-
independence implies that there are specifiable C-conditions in which judgements 
are perfectly accurate. But the interlocutor of the sceptic’s attack in Chapter 2 of 
WRPL is granted idealised epistemic access to all relevant facts and—we have 
assumed—finds none that can constitute meaning. Since that access surely 
includes satisfaction of the C-conditions, there can be no tracking of independent 
meaning facts if the sceptic is right. We have seen that KW would likely concede 
that there are minimal meaning facts, but it is clear that he would not concede the 
additional tracking epistemology necessary for judgement-independence. 
 
 Secondly, consider whether there may be judgement-dependent truth in 
meaning discourse: whether the relation between meaning facts and judgements 
about those facts is that the best of those judgements determine the facts. This 
would be the case, on Wright’s account, if a provisional equation can be produced 
for meaning that satisfies the four conditions. As for judgement-independence, this 
position relies on an account of what makes for a better or worse judgement about 
meaning—it relies, that is, on there being a certain story about how our 
judgements might capture the facts. But unlike judgement-independence, the 
epistemological account necessary for judgement-dependence does not seem to be 
directly ruled out by the sceptical argument. The relevant parts of the sceptic’s 
attack concern the possibility of correct interpretation—the possibility, in a sense, 
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of accurate mediated contact with meaning facts across some distance. Judgement-
independence relies on such contact, and is thus ruled out. But under the 
judgement-dependence account, the best judgements of meaning are not those 
that best traverse the gap to the facts with which they covary. There is no gap at 
all—the facts simply are whatever is claimed by those judgements. 
 
 Judgement-dependence about meaning may, then, be consistent with the 
KW sceptical attack. And indeed, Wright’s own account of the KW sceptical 
considerations characterises meaning and related notions as judgement-
dependent.193 But, for two reasons, I will not spend much time on this idea. Firstly, 
                                                        
193 Since we are at present concerned with the application of Wright’s framework to meaning, it is 
important to acknowledge the position that Wright himself takes to be the upshot of this 
application. Wright argues in the following articles that KW’s argument can be construed as 
motivating a judgement-dependent account of meaning: Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the Argument 
against Private Language”; Wright, “On Making Up One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention”; Crispin 
Wright, “Excerpts from a Critical Study of Colin McGinn’s Wittgenstein on Meaning,” in Rails to 
Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 143–69; Crispin Wright, “Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following 
Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics,” in Rails to Infinity: Essays on 
Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 170–213.  
First, recall KW’s argument. Wright argues (with McGinn: Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on 
Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation, Aristotelian Society Series ; v. 1 (Oxford ; New York, NY, 
USA: B. Blackwell, 1984)) that this argument relies on an assumed reductionism, such that no 
candidate meaning fact will satisfactorily meet the sceptic’s requirements unless that fact can be 
characterised independently of meaning itself. I noted in §2.2 that KW rejects a non-reductionist 
response to the sceptic as “desperate” and “mysterious”. Wright and McGinn claim that KW’s 
rejection is too hasty. A non-reductive account, on which we may access what we mean without 
inferring that meaning from non-semantic facts, is not desperate: the ordinary notion of intention 
has precisely these characteristics, and meaning may share them. We need simply suppose that 
Hemi can access what he means by ‘+’ without interpreting anything, with just the authority that 
they have in accessing their intention to eat cereal for breakfast. 
But Wright maintains this account of meaning facts remains mysterious, and that a serious 
puzzle persists. The apparent epistemic authority seems at odds with the requirement that what 
one presently means by an expression renders correct or incorrect any number of unconsidered 
possible uses of that sign (meaning has a “disposition-like theoreticity”). We seem to be very sure 
how we intend to use an expression—how is this possible when that intention must answer to an 
infinity of cases? It is here that judgement-dependence enters the fray. Wright argues that this 
puzzle may be solved for intention—and, if the analogy works, for meaning—by supposing that 
certain judgements about what one means are extension-determining, in the sense characterised in 
the Judgement-Dependence crux. Wright proposes C-conditions for a provisional equation for 
intention that seem to meet the requirements. The conflict between disposition-like theoreticity 
and epistemic authority dissolves: what one intends to do in some distant scenario may be easily 
grasped, because that intention is determined by what one would judge about it in the C-conditions. 
Such an account, for meaning, would offer a drastically different picture of meaning 
discourse than that towards which we are working. There may be no mind-independent standard 
under which ascriptions of meaning are regulated. But there is a serious standard, nonetheless. It is 
correct to ascribe meaning only in accordance with the content of the best opinions about meaning. 
But there are compelling reasons to doubt that a judgement-dependent account of meaning will 
work. Recall, from the introduction of Judgement-Dependence in §1.4.2, the Independence condition 
99 
 
because my goal at present is to identify the characterisations of meaning 
discourse to which KW’s argument may lead, and KW’s argument alone offers little 
motivation for judgement-dependence. And secondly, because—as I noted in fn. 
193—there are compelling independent reasons to doubt that an account of 
meaning as judgment-dependence can be sustained. 
 
 Truth in meaning discourse, then, is neither judgement-independent nor 
dependent, and we are led by elimination to the third option. Such a position 
seems well motivated. If we lack a sufficiently robust account of the epistemology 
of meaning, then we cannot explain any covariation between judgements about 
meaning and meaning facts. KW’s argument militates against the possibility of 
such an account—or, at the very least, offers nothing that motivates one. KW’s 
sceptic, after all, grants their interlocutor idealised epistemic access to any relevant 
facts. Even given such access, the interlocutor (we have assumed) finds nothing 
that justifies one meaning ascription over another. KW may admit that there are 
the kinds of meaning facts that emerge from merely minimal truth. But there is 
nothing in the platitudes which ensures that the relation between judgements and 
facts can be explained. I conclude, then, that if KW is right then truth in meaning 
discourse is merely minimal with respect to Judgement-Dependence. Truth in 
meaning discourse is not judgement-independent as the realist would claim, and it 
is not judgement-dependent as the anti-realist would claim. 
 
 
                                                        
necessary for judgement-dependence. For meaning to be judgement-dependent, judgements about 
meaning must be conceptually prior to meaning facts. Boghossian (Boghossian, “The Rule-
Following Considerations,” 547) points out that this cannot be the case. For there to be judgements 
about what one means there must be facts about the content of those judgements: there must be a 
fact about what that judgement means. Judgement-dependence does not seem to be an option for 
meaning. 
This matter is certainly worthy of further discussion, and there may be interesting 
intersections of Wright’s account of KW with considerations raised elsewhere in this thesis. But for 
now I will set this possibility aside, and characterise truth in meaning as neither judgement-
independent nor dependent. For clear discussion of Wright’s judgement-dependent account on 
which I have relied here, see: Miller, Philosophy of Language, 226–34. For a more flat-footed 
objection regarding the independence condition, see: Alexander Miller, “An Objection to Wright’s 
Treatment of Intention,” Analysis 49, no. 4 (1989): 169–173, https://doi.org/10.2307/3328551. 
For a more sophisticated line of objection, see Mark Johnston’s discussion here: John Haldane and 
Crispin Wright, Reality, Representation, and Projection, Mind Association Occasional Series (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 121–30. 
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2.7.3 Meaning Discourse and Cognitive Command 
When a discourse exerts cognitive command it is a priori that any disagreement 
about which of the sentences in that discourse are true must be due to some 
cognitive shortcoming on the part of one or more of the disagreeing parties—
unless it is excusable as due to vagueness in either the facts or formation of the 
beliefs. For a sentence comprising such a discourse to achieve truth is for that 
sentence to robustly represent some independently existing state of affairs. When a 
discourse is representational in this way, Wright suggests, we cannot accept that 
two incompatible judgements have both been faultlessly produced. It is the 
exertion of cognitive command for which the realist argues in this debate; the anti-
realist argues that the relevant discourse does not exert cognitive command. 
 
Let’s see how this would work in the case of meaning. Say that two subjects 
disagree over whether the sentence “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” is true. We can 
first set aside the explanation of this disagreement as due to vagueness. Whether 
Hemi accords with what they mean when they answer “125” and not “5” to the 
question “57 + 68 = ?” does not seem to be a vague matter. There are thus at least 
some meaning ascriptions for which the question of cognitive shortcoming will 
arise. Is it a priori, then, that when Hemi believes that they mean addition by ‘+’, 
and Aroha believes that Hemi does not mean addition, that one of them must be 
guilty of some cognitive fault? 
 
It is quickly seen that if KW’s sceptical argument is sound then there need 
be no such fault. And indeed, this point has much in common with the conclusion 
of KW’s illustrative dialogue. Hemi is granted total access to any available fact that 
could rule out the sceptic’s suggestion that they mean quaddition by ‘+’. No such 
facts are found, and the ascription that they mean quaddition is on just the same 
footing as the ascription that they mean addition. Put conversely: if it was a priori 
that either Hemi or the sceptic made an error in arriving at their judgement about 
what Hemi means by ‘+’, then surely pointing out that error would constitute a 
response to the sceptic. As we have accepted that there is no such response, we 




This debate, then, is one about which KW’s sceptical argument has much to 
say. If the sceptical argument is sound, truth in meaning discourse cannot involve 
the robust representationality for which the exertion of Cognitive Command is 
necessary and sufficient. There is no relation between true meaning ascriptions 
and meaning facts strong enough to ensure that there can only be conflicting 
ascriptions if one of those ascriptions was made in error. There may be a norm of 
truth in meaning, but it is not so strict that two opinions cannot faultlessly 
disagree. This much follows from the acceptance of KW’s sceptical argument, and 
truth in meaning discourse falls again on the non-realist side.194 
 
2.7.4 Mere Minimalism about Meaning 
The application of Wright’s framework to meaning is as follows. If meaning 
discourse is assertoric, and is thus apt for minimal truth, there are three available 
moves that take us towards meaning realism. Firstly, we may produce a 
provisional equation meeting the four conditions on judgement-dependence, and 
contend that certain judgements about meaning determine the meaning facts. This 
is a step away from mere minimalism, but it will not suffice for realism—I have 
characterised such a position as anti-realist. Regardless, as I noted in §2.7.2, it is 
doubtful that a provisional equation meeting the conditions on judgement-
dependence can be found for meaning. The second option is to argue that the best 
meaning judgements may track meaning facts that are independent of those 
judgements. And thirdly, the realist may argue that meaning discourse exerts 
cognitive command: that the correspondence between true meaning ascriptions 
and meaning facts is such that there cannot be faultless disagreement about 
meaning.195 True meaning ascriptions represent the facts, and there is no way for 
there to be a divergence in the output of two properly functioning representational 
mechanisms unless there is divergence in the input. If these are the three 
                                                        
194 KW often claims that, on his account, meaning ascriptions do not correspond to meaning facts. 
See, for example: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 79. Once the move has been 
made that KW’s claim is limited to the robust correspondence that implies realism—which seems 
plausible, given that the discipline KW invokes suffices for a minimal correspondence on Wright’s 
account—that claim seems to amount precisely to the denial that meaning discourse exerts 
cognitive command. 
195 Or, more precisely: that it is a priori that any disagreement about what someone means by an 
expression is either attributable to cognitive shortcoming or excusable as due to vagueness. 
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battlegrounds on which debate about the metaphysical status of meaning is 
performed, then KW’s sceptical argument may be construed as the argument that 
meaning facts are neither judgement-independent nor judgement-dependent, and 
that there may be faultless disagreement about what someone means by an 
expression. 
 
What we have found, then, is that it follows from KW’s sceptical argument 
that there can be no truth in meaning discourse that has any of the mind-
independence represented in the cruces. There can be no truth in meaning 
discourse that is judgement-dependent or independent or that exerts cognitive 
command. And in appendices I argue that truth in meaning discourse also fails to 
be potentially verification transcendent and to correspond to facts with wide 
cosmological role.196 We have confirmed the earlier hypothesis that to accept KW’s 
sceptical argument is to deny that there are any more than minimal meaning facts. 
It is the existence of such facts that would give ground to the realist, and it is thus 
clear that KW’s argument opposes meaning realism when realism debates are 
conducted within Wright’s metaphysical framework. 
 
But there may yet, of course, be minimal meaning facts, and minimally true 
meaning ascriptions; the features of truth thus far found to be ruled out by KW’s 
argument are not essential. And, as noted in §2.7.1, by KW’s own account it seems 
as though meaning discourse has the resources for what is essential: meaning 
ascriptions appear to have the right syntax, and the assertibility conditions that KW 
proposes are sufficient for those ascriptions to exhibit the necessary discipline. 
The upshot is that, if we accept both the sceptical argument and something like 
KW’s sceptical solution, the following position emerges:   
 
Mere Minimalism about Meaning (MMM): Sentences that ascribe meaning are 
truth-apt. Some of them are true, and there are meaning facts to which those 
sentences correspond. But this truth, and these facts, are merely minimal: they fail 
to be mind-independent with respect to any of the four realism-relevant cruces.  
                                                        




 It will be important to contextualise this position within the two 
overlapping dichotomies described in §2.4: non-eliminativism and eliminativism, 
and KW and KW’s sceptic. I have said that MMM can be construed as part of KW’s 
sceptical solution—as playing an equivalent role to what I earlier defined as non-
eliminative non-factualism, or non-eliminative error-theory. Like those other 
positions, MMM characterises meaning ascriptions as correct or incorrect with 
respect to some standard; and indeed, for MMM this standard is truth. But the 
strength of the defence against eliminativism offered by this position is not entirely 
clear. In particular, there may be concerns about the degree to which it is 
worthwhile to continue engaging in talk about meaning. After all, that talk is 
regulated by a standard that does not exert cognitive command. Why ascribe 
meaning if two parties may disagree about that ascription without fault?197   
 
 Let us set such considerations aside. It is clear, regardless, that MMM is an 
appropriate characterisation of KW’s position, and a compelling defence against 
the eliminativist threat may be given once that characterisation has been 
supplemented with KW’s account of the role and utility of meaning talk. But what is 
this eliminativist threat? We need a characterisation, analogous to eliminative 
non-factualism or an eliminative error-theory, of the account that KW’s sceptic 
would make of meaning discourse from within Wright’s framework. The task is to 
identify where in Wright’s landscape we are led if we accept the sceptical 
argument but oppose a consolatory account of meaning discourse that retains its 
propriety. In §2.7.1, I noted that it is such a consolatory account which motivates 
the claim that meaning discourse qualifies as sufficiently disciplined to sustain 
                                                        
197 One thought along these lines can be found here: Crispin Wright, “What Could Anti-Realism 
about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be?,” in Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth 
and Objectivity. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 438. Wright claims that “to 
regard a statement as failing to exert cognitive command is to be committed to regarding it as one 
for which one has no cogent a priori grounds.”. This result derives from the consideration that, if 
there were such grounds, then failing to be convinced by them would constitute a cognitive 
shortcoming; there can be no faultless disagreement for a matter for which there are a priori 
grounds. This suggests that if a discourse does not exert cognitive command then there is a 
significant constraint on the nature of reasoning in that discourse; what point could there be to 
reasoning a priori if any of the reasons produced can be rejected without fault? 
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minimal truth. If KW’s sceptic offers no consolatory account, and denies this claim 
to discipline, it leads to the following position: 
 
Sub-Minimalism about Meaning: Meaning discourse is not assertoric. Meaning 
ascriptions are not apt for even minimal truth, and there are no meaning facts, 
minimal or otherwise. 
 
It is quite clear that this position would amount to eliminativism, as I have 
characterised it. If meaning discourse does not exhibit discipline, and there are no 
conditions of correct utterance governing meaning ascription, then it is hard to 
imagine what function could be fulfilled by that discourse. This position faces the 
same concerns as the eliminativist accounts considered earlier. It supposes that 
there is no difference in correctness between “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” and 
“Hemi means quaddition by ‘+’”, and that we achieve nothing of value by talking of 
meaning. This is an undesirable result. In the face of philosophical difficulties 
accounting for the nature of a pervasive human practice, I think it generally 
preferable not to settle for an account of that practice as without value. 
 
The question, then, is whether MMM can succeed where non-eliminative 
error-theory and non-eliminative non-factualism have failed. Can we consistently 
accept the KW sceptical argument while claiming that meaning discourse is 
governed by a minimal truth norm that staves off the eliminativist? I will argue 
that the answer to this question is no, and that we have no choice but to concede 
sub-minimalism about meaning. There are at least two respects in which mere 
minimalism appears to rely on resources that are ruled out by the KW sceptical 
argument. For any other subject, a sceptical argument of the kind given by KW may 
allow minimal truth. But as we have seen elsewhere, the consequences of such an 
argument for meaning run deeper.  
 
 Let’s reiterate what is necessary, in Wright’s framework, for minimal truth-
aptitude. There are two necessary and sufficient conditions for a sentence to 




Syntax: the sentence is of the appropriate form to be situated within negations, 
conditionals, conjunctions, disjunctions, and propositional attitudes. 
 
Discipline: the sentence is subject to recognised standards of warrant.  
 
If a sentence meets these conditions, then there is nothing to prevent it from 
appearing as “P” in instances of the Disquotational Schema (DS): 
 
The Disquotational Schema: “P” is true iff P 
 
The sentence “P” is a candidate for truth. Exhibiting a suitable syntax and 
discipline to sustain an instance of the DS is necessary and (largely) sufficient for a 
sentence to be truth-apt.198  
 
Since MMM characterises meaning ascriptions as apt for minimal truth, 
those sentences must satisfy the conditions of syntax and discipline and sustain 
instances of the DS. I will argue that the condition of discipline cannot be met.199 I 
will present two problems that seem to rule out the necessary discipline—
problems that are closely related but sufficiently distinct to warrant separate 
treatment. The first is analogous to that faced by non-eliminative error-theory and 
non-factualism: KW’s sceptical argument militates against the possibility of norms 
of correctness in linguistic activity. The second is broadly analogous to 
Boghossian’s problem for meaning error-theories: for a sentence to sustain an 
instance of the DS it must have content, and we cannot consistently suppose that 
meaning ascriptions are contentful while accepting KW’s sceptical argument.  
 
                                                        
198 Recalling that any property Φ will qualify as truth if it (1) can appear in the schema “P” is Φ iff P, 
and (2) satisfies the three additional platitudes that do not follow from the prior claim.  
199 Similar concerns to those that I will raise may apply to the syntactical requirement. Roughly, the 
idea here would be, firstly, that for it to be the case that a sentence has declarative form there must 
be facts about in which contexts it is grammatically correct to embed that sentence. And secondly, 
that KW’s sceptical argument rules out the possibility of such facts: no mind can grasp an 
indefinitely large set of correctness-evaluations for the embedding of a sentence into various 
contexts. I will set this matter aside and focus on discipline. 
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 The difficulty for MMM posed by the generalisation of KW’s sceptical 
strategy to any norm-governed utterance may have been obvious since the 
beginning of §2.7. MMM contends that there is a norm of truth governing meaning 
discourse. Our talk of meaning is comprised of assertions that are correct in 
certain conditions, and this is sufficient—Wright claims—for there to be truth 
governing that talk. Wright’s framework, in a sense, builds truth out of the 
standards at work in a body of talk. But, as we have seen, to accept the KW 
sceptical strategy in the case of meaning is to accept an analogous attack against 
correctness with respect to a standard. Minimal truth need not involve relation to 
any mind-independent facts; it is no problem for MMM that there are no such 
meaning facts to state. But the recognised standards of warrant out of which MMM 
means to build truth in meaning discourse surely face the broader sceptical attack 
against norm-governed utterance. For “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” to be 
regulated by a disciplinary norm at all, it must be correct for Aroha to utter that 
sentence in certain conditions. And if it is correct for Aroha to utter that sentence 
in those conditions, there must be some fact about Aroha or her community that 
rules out any quus-like interpretation of that correctness; an interpretation, for 
example, that simply diverges from what we might expect from the present day 
onwards. It is the very possibility of such facts that we have denied by accepting 
the KW sceptical strategy. If the sceptic is right that there are no facts such that 
someone accords or fails to accord with what they mean when they use an 
expression, then there are no facts such that someone accords or fails to accord 
with a norm when they utter a sentence. 
 
It certainly seems as though there are patterns of disciplined utterance in 
meaning discourse; it is quite intuitive that “Hemi means addition by ‘+’” is a better 
ascription than “Hemi means quaddition by ‘+’”. KW’s assertibility conditions—on 
which correctness is determined by what the speaker intends to express with 
regards to Hemi’s use of ‘+’, and whether that use agrees with that of the relevant 
linguistic community—are meant to characterise this discipline. But on KW’s 
sceptical argument the appearance of this discipline seems no more than illusion: 
there are no rules of utterance to follow at all. An irrealist about an unrelated 
subject may be able to rely on such warranted assertion. But it seems that the KW 
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meaning irrealist cannot. And since the presence of a norm of warranted 
assertibility is necessary for a discourse to qualify as apt for minimal truth, the 
irrealist must likewise deny this aptitude.200 
 
 The second problem I will raise is closely related. Wright says, of any 
sentence that appears in the DS, that it will be determinate in content.201 The point 
is made particularly clearly in the following passage:  
The Disquotational Schema is merely another way of articulating the 
[platitude that the truth of a statement depends on whether what it says is 
so, is so], made possible by the unstated schematic assumption that ‘P’ says 
that P.202 
Take some sentence S. What does it take to establish an instance of the DS for S, 
and to thus ensure that S is minimally truth-apt? Among other things, there must 
be some content C such that S is true iff C. The DS represents the property of truth 
in virtue of which a sentence is true if and only if what it says is the case is the case. 
If S is to qualify as truth-apt, C cannot be just anything. There must be a specific 
relation between S and C—a relation that I will represent as the Content Schema 
(CS): 
 
The Content Schema: S says that C 
 
                                                        
200 Wright’s commitment to there being standards of correctness governing any sentence which 
sustains the DS is clearly expressed in the following passage, which I quoted when introducing 
minimalism in §1.3 (Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17.): 
 
Consider the practice of the sincere and literal use of the sentences in the range of the 
[truth predicate]. In order for these sentences to be determinate in content at all, there 
has to be a distinction, respected for the most part by participants in the practice, 
between proper and improper use of them. … [It is plausible that,] unless participants 
in the practice for the most part try to respect the norms of warranted assertion which 
govern it, it is not clear in what the fact could consist that its ingredient sentences 
have the content which they do. 
 
201 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 17. 
202 Wright, “What Could Anti-Realism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be?,” 420. The point 
appears in many other places, for example: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 34.  
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Only with the assumption that the sentence says what would appear on the right-
hand-side of an instance of the DS can we conclude that that sentence can appear 
in such an instance at all. The claim, then, is this: 
 
If (S is true iff C) then S says that C 
 
The point, in effect, is that one way of characterising the discipline condition is that 
there must be an instance of the CS for the sentence in question.203 Since MMM 
characterises meaning ascriptions as truth-apt, it follows from MMM that those 
ascriptions sustain instances of the CS. If “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” is apt 
for minimal truth, then there is something that it says. Ordinarily, we would 
suppose that that content is that Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’.204 
 
  For mere minimalism about other discourses, motivated independently of 
KW’s argument, such an implication might be happily accepted. But facts about 
what sentences say are within the scope of the sceptical argument. The sceptic 
may suggest that the content of “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” is that Hemi 
means quunfish by ‘sunfish’, and we have conceded that we are unable to identify 
facts to refute this suggestion. That MMM implies that there are facts about what 
sentences say is thus an immediate concern.  
 
Let’s get clear about the nature of this problem, and attempt to make a 
response on behalf of MMM.205 For MMM to work there must be instances of the CS 
                                                        
203 As I noted in §1.3, the discipline condition is in part meant to ensure that the sentence has 
sufficiently determinate content to sustain the DS. 
204 Horwich argues against the claim that truth problematically relies on meaning in a footnote 
here: Horwich, “Is Truth a Normative Concept?,” 1134. This likely deserves some discussion, but I 
cannot provide it here; I will suggest, at least, that the conception of the DS that Horwich suggests is 
not the same as Wright’s.  
205 I will briefly note a second response that might be available for MMM. Wright’s account of truth 
is minimal, and is meant to rely on the barest materials. We needn’t, for example, suppose that 
there is a robustly representational relation between a sentence and the fact it picks out. Such 
representationality is a possible but non-essential feature of truth, with which the Cognitive 
Command crux is concerned. To take up the minimalist mantle, then, can we not simply arrive at 
the content of the sentence “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” by removing the quotes? That truth 
predication serves to disquote is, of course, a feature lionized by the deflationist, and the mere 
minimalist may inherit this characterisation (without also inheriting the denial that truth is a 
property). There appears to be much in common between “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” and 
Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’. The physical form of these two objects is surely similar—either in 
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for meaning ascriptions; meaning ascriptions must say that something is the case. 
This result would constitute an immediate reductio if MMM also implied that there 
are no meaning facts. But this is not how the position was characterised. We 
modified the meaning irrealist claim to Meaning Irrealism*: there are no non-
minimal meaning facts. In reply to the present objection, then, the mere minimalist 
about meaning may claim that there are instances of the CS for meaning 
ascriptions, but that the facts picked out by those instances are merely minimal. 
And indeed, an analogous reply seems available for the first problem I presented—
that MMM relies on rule-following in supposing that meaning discourse is norm-
governed. It could be suggested that there may yet be merely minimal facts about 
correctness with respect to a norm, and that these facts would be enough to 
sustain MMM. 
 
I have identified two necessary conditions on a sentence being minimally 
truth-apt—two characterisations of Wright’s discipline condition. It is clear that 
the satisfaction of these conditions is threatened by the KW sceptical 
considerations. But if the threat is against the mind-independent reality of meaning 
and rule-following, and the conditions may be satisfied on merely mind-dependent 
terms, then MMM may yet be tenable. And indeed, this might be thought to be one 
advantage of this approach over those made in previous sections. Wright’s 
framework offers a spectrum of mind-dependence, and there may be a 
comfortable position for meaning that is consistent with the conclusion of KW’s 
sceptical argument and characterises meaning as disciplined. 
 
The suggestion is that the advocate of MMM could respond to the objections 
raised above by claiming that it may be merely minimal that truth in meaning is 
                                                        
sharing many of the same letters, or, in their verbal utterance, sharing many of the same sounds. 
Could this physical similarity be sufficient to determine what is to appear on the right-hand side of 
an instance of the DS? 
 I think it clear that such a manoeuvre will be unsuccessful. There must be some semantic 
relation between S and C, and no similarity in physical form will suffice: even if the two objects 
differ only in their location on the page, or in time of utterance, there must still be some fact such 
that S says that C—a fact under siege from KW’s sceptical argument. It will be left open for the 
sceptic to insist that correctly removing the quotes from “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” results 
in Hemi means quunfish by ‘sunfish’. Wright considers a similar point in the footnote here: Wright, 
“What Could Anti-Realism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be?,” 420. 
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merely minimal, and that we had only ruled out the possibility of it being more 
than minimal that truth in meaning is merely minimal. Given that we have ruled 
out that possibility, MMM implies that MMM is at best minimally true. This is not a 
particularly surprising result. It is intuitive that the degree of minimalism 
exhibited by a sentence is due—at least in part—to what it means. If what a 
sentence means is itself a merely minimal matter, then it quite naturally follows 
that the degree of minimalism enjoyed by a sentence is merely minimal matter.206  
 
 But I do not think that this response will work. Take the following two 
sentences: 
 
1. “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” says that Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’. 
2. “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” is correct iff F.207  
 
The claim made is that meaning ascriptions may yet sustain instances of the DS 
because it may be minimally true that those ascriptions have content, and 
minimally true that those sentences have certain disciplinary conditions. But now a 
certain recursion emerges. If the sentence in 1, for example, is minimally true, then 
it sustains an instance of the DS, and thus an instance of the CS. If merely minimal 
resources are to be up to the job, then, this must be the case: 
 
3.  ““Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” says that Hemi means sunfish by 
‘sunfish’” says that “Hemi means sunfish by ‘sunfish’” says that Hemi means 
sunfish by ‘sunfish’”. 
                                                        
206 Wright makes this point here: Ibid., 435. There is an interesting intersection between Wright’s 
discussion in section IX of this paper and my present discussion. While I will not, unfortunately, be 
able to investigate the matter comprehensively, I will suggest some similarities and differences. 
Wright argues that mere minimalism about meaning implies mere minimalism about whether or 
not some subject is merely minimal, and thus minimalism about itself. He suggests that while the 
position is not inconsistent, it is rendered rationally untenable (a move I mentioned in fn. 197). 
There are two noteworthy differences between this discussion and mine. First, that Wright is not, 
here, motivated by Kripke’s Wittgenstein; he arrives at MMM instead from considerations about 
anti-realism about ordinary psychology. And secondly (and likely relatedly), Wright’s discussion 
concerns whether truth in meaning is minimal or robust, whereas I am concerned with whether 
there can be even minimal truth. Wright does not, in this article, consider whether the dependence 
of the DS on matters of discipline threatens the consistency of MMM with the soundness of KW’s 
sceptical argument. Much more could be said relating these two discussions, but for now I can 
simply acknowledge the broad contact between them and move on.  




A process which will, of course, continue indefinitely—as it will, mutatis mutandis, 
for sentence 2. It is merely minimal all the way down: sentences say what they say 
only in virtue of there being a sentence that says that those sentences say what 
they say.  
 
There are two problems with this picture. The first is that, on this account, 
MMM is simply spinning its wheels.208 It is not, of course, a contradiction to rely on 
the materials that sustain minimal truth in claiming that certain sentences have 
the materials to sustain minimal truth. But it seems to be a quite useless 
suggestion. To claim, when faced with the objection that meaning ascriptions lack 
the necessary discipline for minimal truth-aptitude, that some meaning ascriptions 
(like sentence 1) have the necessary discipline, is to beg the question.  
 
The second problem is this. On Wright’s minimalism, truth-aptitude 
emerges from our disciplined practice of uttering certain sentences. It is an 
interesting question whether this practice must be actual practice. I think it must 
be at least close to actual. As Jackson, Oppy, and Smith characterise the necessary 
discipline, it is sufficient usage that suffices for a sentence to have determinate 
content: 
No amount of purely syntactical information in the sense at issue is in itself 
sufficient to determine that there is a rich enough pattern of usage to 
determine truth conditions.209  
The worry for the present MMM response is that it relies on there being patterns 
of usage for ridiculous sentences. If sentence 3 is to be merely minimally true—
and it certainly cannot be more robustly true than that—then another sentence, of 
                                                        
208 This is point is similar to a worry Miller raises for a quasi-realist approach to non-realism about 
meaning (a position which is largely similar to what I have called non-eliminative non-factualism): 
“The quasi-realist about meaning is not attempting to construct one notion of correctness out of 
another, but rather attempting to construct a notion of correctness out of materials which are to be 
described with no invocation of any notion of correctness whatsoever . . . [they] appear to be 
attempting to conjure something out of nothing.” Miller, “What Is the Sceptical Solution?” My claim 
is that the current MMM response is an attempt to build something (minimal truth) from itself—if 
this is impossible, then it is akin to attempting to build something from nothing.  
209 Jackson, Oppy, and Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness.” (emphasis mine.)  
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double the length, must receive the same treatment. The process will repeat, and it 
will surely at some point cease to be plausible that there are—or even could be—
rich patterns of use.210 It is hard to see how there could be disciplined use of a 
sentence which is too long for a human to utter in their lifetime. The entire venture 
has no foundation: the absence of instances of the CS will ripple upwards, 
ultimately resulting in the absence of an even minimal fact that Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’.    
 
 If these considerations are correct, then MMM—at least as the upshot of the 
KW sceptical argument—is not an option.211 There cannot be truth in meaning 
discourse once we have accepted the sceptical argument, even if truth is construed 
as Wright’s minimalist suggests.212 This account of truth places demands on 
sentences that cannot be met if KW’s sceptical argument is sound: no sentences 
are equipped for correctness, or for sustaining the CS. The result, then, is that 
meaning ascriptions are not apt for minimal truth. And then, since there are no 
sentences that cast ontic shadows, there are no minimal meaning facts. We end up 
with the following, stronger, version of meaning irrealism: 
                                                        
210 The point persists even if the relevant usage is construed as somehow dispositional: there will, I 
think, be some point at which the sentence is simply too long for there to be a disposition to use it 
in any way. 
211 Consider how these considerations would play out if meaning was not supposed to be merely 
minimal. Since any truth property incorporates the DS, and any instance of the DS relies on an 
instance of the CS, a similar recursive dependence may still arise even for the meaning realist. If 
there is a true statement of every fact, then the truth of some meaning ascription relies on the truth 
of another (via the DS and CS), which thus relies on the truth of another, and so on. The difference 
is that, on the MMM account, there is no more to the meaning facts that are required for instances of 
the CS than there being a minimally true sentence that states them. If meaning facts are merely 
products across the DS of true meaning ascriptions, and for those ascriptions to be true there must 
be a meaning fact, we simply flip back and forth across the DS without finding any ground. If, as the 
meaning realist claims, meaning facts are not mere ontic shadows, and they have some substance 
independent of any instance of the DS, then we do find ground, and any regress is unlikely to be 
vicious. (One interesting consideration is whether the realist would face the worry that the 
necessary truths would surpass the limits of possible disciplined usage. But if meaning is real then 
there are likely to be tools available to deal with such sentences—for example, considerations of 
compositionality.) 
212 I think it clear that these considerations would also rule out the possibility of deflationary truth 
given KW meaning irrealism. The deflationist will not claim that there is a norm of truth in meaning 
discourse, but they must still claim that meaning ascriptions can be correct or incorrect, and likely 
that what is on the LHS of the DS (the truth ascription) means the same thing as what is on the RHS; 
which would rely on something like the CS. Deflationism and minimalism were both introduced as 
accounts of truth as metaphysically neutral, such that it is not exclusively available to the realist. 
What we have found, in a sense, is that these notions are not metaphysically neutral at all, when it 
is the metaphysics of meaning that is in question. If a sentence is apt for either such truth, the game 




Strong Meaning Irrealism: There are no facts, minimal or otherwise, such that 
anyone means anything by an expression.  
 
I earlier claimed that KW’s sceptical argument motivates the denial that there are 
more than minimal meaning facts. From KW’s discussion—in particular his 
account of assertibility conditions—we might expect that there could yet be merely 
minimal meaning facts. But the sceptical argument has even these facts within its 
scope. To accept KW’s argument from within Wright’s framework is to deny that 
there are minimal facts of any sort: to accept Strong Meaning Irrealism. 
 
We end up what I earlier called sub-minimalism about meaning: meaning 
discourse is without the assertoricity necessary for minimal truth-aptitude. This 
amounts to eliminativism. There are no correctness conditions for meaning 
ascriptions—no meaning ascription is better or worse than any other, and there 
cannot, then, be a valuable function performed by uttering those sentences. The 
hope, in introducing Wright’s framework, was that departing from the traditional 
error-theoretic and non-factualist models, and gaining some nuance with respect 
to the variety among truth properties, would produce a safe home for the KW 
meaning irrealist. But we are still without a defence against eliminativism. To 
accept KW’s sceptical argument and adopt Wright’s framework forces us into an 
unpalatable corner, in which no meaning ascription is better or worse than any 
other. We may as well simply stop talking about meaning altogether.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
We set out to account for a body of talk for which we have denied that there are 
any facts for that talk to describe. For many subjects, such a task may not be 
particularly troublesome—we can imagine some pervasive human practice 
working out to have a markedly different nature than its appearance suggests. But 
the characterisation of a discourse—at least on traditional terms, and at least in 
part—is the characterisation of the meaning of the sentences in that discourse. 
When the subject of the sceptical threat is meaning itself, such characterisation 
becomes particularly difficult. To investigate this problem, I assumed KW meaning 
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irrealism: that KW validly arrives at the conclusion that there are no meaning 
facts.213 I considered three categories of characterisation of meaning discourse—
error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. These characterisations aim to 
be consistent with the denial of the reality of meaning facts. They also offer forms 
of non-eliminativism, with the hope of providing an account of meaning discourse 
that vindicates its continued practice. What we have found is that the latter move 
is difficult, and that there seems to be no such vindication available. I will briefly 
summarise the investigation which led to this result. 
 
 The quickest reading of “Hemi means addition by ‘+’”—at least for those 
unfamiliar with the metaphysics of meaning—is that it picks out some fact in the 
world: the fact that Hemi means addition by ‘+’. Having denied that there are such 
facts, an error-theory is the first stop, and I considered an error-theory about 
meaning in §2.5. If there are no meaning facts, then perhaps we seek to describe 
them but fail, and our atomic and positive meaning ascriptions are thus false. A 
distinction between non-eliminative and eliminative error-theory turns on 
whether there is some non-truth norm—a norm that sentences may differentially 
satisfy despite uniformly failing to satisfy the standard for truth. But, on 
consideration of the shared rule-like characteristics of meaning and accordance 
with a norm, a non-eliminative error-theory cannot be consistent with KW 
meaning irrealism. What’s more, since a sentence must be meaningful to be false, 
even an eliminative error-theory is not an option for the KW meaning irrealist.  
 
 Non-factualism offers a more severe option. On such an account, meaning 
ascriptions are not descriptions of states of affairs at all, and are neither true nor 
false. Non-factualism dodges the fundamental problem of the error-theorist: if they 
are not truth-conditional, meaning ascriptions needn’t have the meaning 
necessary to be truth-conditional. And I defended meaning non-factualism against 
Boghossian’s charge that the view implies a contradiction about the factuality of 
truth. But upon consideration of the distinction between non-eliminativism and 
                                                        
213 This discussion is general and not specific to Wright’s framework, so I will use “Meaning 
Irrealism” to refer to the original formulation: there are no meaning facts. This formulation does 
not explicitly deny that there are minimal meaning facts, but as we found in §2.7.4, it may imply it. 
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eliminativism, an analogous problem arises to that for the error-theorist. For 
meaning ascriptions to have a valuable function there must be conditions of 
correctness governing their utterance—correctness that faces the same sceptical 
attack as meaning itself. But, unlike the error-theory, a position is available: 
eliminative non-factualism. While such a theory appears consistent with the 
soundness of KW’s argument, eliminativism remains strongly unpalatable. 
 
 The plan, then, was to seek greener pastures. The metaphysical framework 
presented by Wright in Truth and Objectivity offers a more elaborate denial of 
realism, in which realism debates are characterised as debates about the degree of 
mind-independence associated with the standard of truth at work in an assertoric 
discourse. Mere minimalism about meaning characterises meaning discourse as 
governed by a truth norm that is maximally mind-dependent. Meaning ascriptions 
are true or false, but that truth involves no adherence to a mind-independent 
standard. But this position, too, was found to be unavailable if KW’s sceptical 
argument is sound. Meaning discourse may appear to have the assertoricity 
necessary for the operation of a minimal truth norm. But for meaning ascriptions 
to have the necessary discipline they must sustain instances of what I called the 
Content Schema (CS)—S says that C—and they must be governed by norms of 
warranted utterance. Both of these things are within the scope of the sceptical 
attack. I considered whether this discipline can itself emerge from merely minimal 
materials, but the move seemed to be a failure. In the end, from within Wright’s 
framework we are forced to adopt sub-minimalism about meaning: the view that 
there is no truth in meaning discourse, of even a merely platitudinous variety. Sub-
minimalism is in the same boat as eliminative non-factualism: it seems not to be 
inconsistent, but it leads to an undesirable eliminativism on which there seems no 
point in ascribing meaning. 
 
 It will be worthwhile to generalise from the worries we have identified. The 
three models of non-realist discourse that I have considered do not, of course, 
exhaust the possibilities. But I think that the investigation is sufficiently broad that 
we identify two general difficulties that will threaten any attempt to characterise 




 The first is that no characterisation can depend on meaning ascriptions 
having the kind of content represented by satisfaction of the CS. The sceptical 
attack rules out the possibility of meaning ascriptions saying anything. The most 
prominent casualty of this result is, of course, truth. Meaning ascriptions cannot be 
true or false: given that it is a platitude that a sentence is true when and only when 
what it says is the case is the case (and false when what it says is the case is not the 
case), possessing a truth-value requires that a sentence says that something is the 
case. This result rules out a meaning error-theory, but I have argued that it also 
rules out mere minimalism. There seems to be no way that we can characterise 
meaning discourse as governed by truth—or any other norm that invokes the CS—
while accepting KW’s sceptical argument. 
 
 The second general difficulty arises from the broader rule-following 
considerations. I sought to establish in §2.3 that accepting KW’s argument for 
meaning must go hand-in-hand with accepting an analogous argument for 
accordance with a norm. This imposes a serious constraint upon any attempt to 
characterise meaning talk. Any characterisation that posits correctness conditions 
for meaning ascriptions relies on the kind of rule-following facts that are within 
the scope of KW’s sceptical attack. Just as we have ruled out the possibility of a 
subject grasping an indefinitely large set of correctness conditions for accordance 
with what they mean—and thus the possibility of meaning—we have ruled out the 
possibility of a subject grasping an indefinitely large set of correctness conditions 
for accordance with any norm at all—and thus the possibility of norm-governed 
utterance.214  
                                                        
214 It is worthwhile to pause and consider whether what we have found for meaning irrealism as 
motivated by KW applies to any meaning irrealism. I think it clear that any meaning irrealism will 
face the first difficulty: for a sentence to sustain the CS there must surely be a fact about what it 
means. But in §2.3 I characterised the norm-following point as an upstream matter—something 
that doesn’t follow directly from the denial that there are meaning facts. This observation prompts 
consideration of a non-KW meaning irrealism that avoids general sceptical worries about the 
possibility of correctness conditions, and that may thus face only the first of the two general 
worries. Such a theory may, indeed, be consistent with a non-eliminative non-factualism, on which 
meaning ascriptions are correct or incorrect despite not being true or false. This may be a formal 
possibility. But I think it an unlikely one. It is hard to imagine what might motivate the denial that 
there can be the conditions of correct use that constitute meaning without also motivating the 




 If these two difficulties cannot be overcome, then KW meaning irrealism 
imposes serious constraints on the characterisation of meaning discourse. The 
most striking constraint, I think, can be put in terms of the distinction between 
non-eliminativism and eliminativism. I have construed the pursuit of a tenable 
characterisation of meaning discourse as the attempt to stave off eliminativism; to 
retain some function for meaning ascription despite the denial of realism. What my 
investigation seems to suggest is that we have no choice but to concede to the 
eliminativist. The three forms of non-eliminativism that I considered—
supplementing either an error-theoretic, non-factualist, or mere minimalist 
account of the discourse—were found to be unsuccessful. There may be some 
unconsidered tenable non-eliminativism. But I think that we can hypothesise 
against such a prospect, in consideration of the second problem. It is doubtful that 
there can be a non-eliminative account of meaning discourse that doesn’t rely on 
correctness. The non-eliminativist claims that there is value in talking of meaning. 
For this position to be at all available, there must be such value despite there being 
no evaluation of correctness or incorrectness across that talk. I will return to such 
thoughts in the next chapter. For now, the point is merely that the odds appear 
stacked, quite generally, in favour of eliminativism.215  
 
 The upshot of the discussion of this chapter is that the KW meaning irrealist 
seems forced to adopt the following position: 
 
Eliminative Ultra-Non-Factualism about Meaning: Meaning ascriptions are not 
apt for even minimal truth. Meaning ascriptions are not correct or incorrect with 
                                                        
215 I will make one suggestion. In §2.7 I found no way to prevent eliminativism within Wright’s 
framework while accepting KW’s sceptical argument. Part of that discussion included the claim that 
KW’s argument may not rule out mind-dependent meaning facts; those that do not imply realism, 
and that would not offer a successful response against the sceptic in Chapter 2 of WRPL. The model 
of such facts offered from within Wright’s framework—that they may be generated across the DS 
when sentences in meaning discourse satisfy a certain standard—was found to be unsuccessful. 
For the most part, the failure was due to the dependence of the DS upon matters under attack from 
KW’s sceptical argument itself. But we may model mind-dependent meaning facts in a different way. 
If we can identify meaning facts that (1) are not within the scope of KW’s argument, and (2) that do 
not rely on sentences sustaining instances of the DS, then we may yet produce a non-eliminative 
account of meaning discourse that is consistent with KW meaning irrealism. For now, of course, I 
must make do with acknowledging and setting aside this consideration. I will briefly return to this 
point in §3.3.2. 
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respect to any norm of utterance, and there would be nothing of value lost in 
abandoning the practice of uttering them. 
 
This is, in effect, a stronger version of the theory at which we arrived in §2.6. 
There, truth was limited to a robust conception, on which only sentences in realist 
discourse can be true. Having now considered whether meaning ascriptions are 
apt for the minimal truth proposed by Wright, we have found that KW meaning 
irrealism implies that no meaning ascriptions are truth-apt, even when the 
requirements for truth-aptitude are considerably lower. 
  
 Let us return to the initial motivation for considering meaning discourse. I 
am seeking to evaluate the tenability of KW meaning irrealism. I characterised the 
question of the existence of meaning facts as distinct from the question of what we 
are doing when we appear to talk of those facts. But these two matters are closely 
related. The thought behind the strategy of this chapter is that the tenability of 
meaning irrealism turns, at least in part, on the tenability of the characterisation 
provided of meaning discourse. And now, given that my generalised reasoning 
goes through, we have found only eliminativist characterisations to be available. 
The tenability of meaning irrealism, then, turns in part on the tenability of 
eliminativism; a position that KW describes as “insane and intolerable”.216 The 
point can be put like this. If there are no straight solutions to KW’s argument—no 
hidden satisfactory meaning facts, or errors in the reasoning—then it is sound. 
What is at stake, if such a solution cannot be found? It is not merely that we must 
deny that in talking of meaning we successfully describe reality, as the error-
theorist claims. It is not merely that we must deny that our talk of meaning even 
attempts to describe reality, as the non-factualist and the mere minimalist claim. 
What is at stake for meaning discourse is that we seem forced to deny that any 
meaning ascription is more correct than any other, and thus that our meaning talk 
is more than unregulated noise. And since, as seems plausible, if ascribing meaning 
has a function then it is correct to make such an ascription when doing so will fulfil 
that function, there is thus no such function at all. 
                                                        




 No considerations have been raised, as far I can tell, that justify the outright 
denial that this is a formal possibility. But we are far from happy to concede to 
eliminativism. It is one thing to claim, for a body of talk ubiquitous among humans, 
that it does not describe reality. But it is quite another to claim that it is mere 
illusion that there is any difference in correctness among that talk, and that it 
serves any function. This is an unpalatable claim. It may, indeed, be so unpalatable 
that we would rather reject the philosophical reasoning which led to it than to 
accept it. Perhaps it is the case that there is no point in meaning talk. But tenability 
is more demanding than consistency. If we accept KW’s sceptical argument then 
we appear forced to advocate the abandonment of meaning discourse. Insofar as a 
theory should be judged on the palatability of its consequences, we have found 
that KW meaning irrealism is untenable. If we wish to retain the legitimacy of 
















The argument against meaning realism made by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) in 
Chapter 2 of Wittgenstein on Rule and Private Language (WRPL), if it is sound, has 
dire consequences.217 That argument concludes with meaning irrealism: there are 
no meaning facts.218 Some of those consequences were presented in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis—in particular, we found no way to avoid an eliminativist account of 
discourse about meaning, on which there is no value talking about meaning at all. 
In this final chapter, I will take a step back from considerations about meaning 
discourse in particular, and discuss the consequences of KW’s sceptical argument 
on discourse in general. First, I will show in §3.2 how opposition to meaning 
realism appears to globalise to non-realism elsewhere. In §3.3, I will summarise 
the findings of this thesis as a set of four available responses, of varying tenability. 
Finally, in §3.4, I will return to the first question: when the dust settles, how 
tenable is it to accept KW’s argument and deny meaning realism? 
 
3.2 Globalisation 
In Chapter 3 of WRPL, KW characterises meaning ascriptions as lacking truth 
conditions but possessing assertibility conditions: there are no meaning facts to 
state, but we may be nonetheless justified to ascribe meaning in certain conditions. 
To support this account, Kripke characterises one divergence between the account 
of language found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and that found in the later 
Philosophical Investigations:219 
Wittgenstein replaces the question, “What must be the case for this sentence 
to be true?” by two others: first, “Under what conditions may this form of 
words be appropriately asserted (or denied)?” second, given an answer to 
                                                        
217 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. 
218 I use “KW meaning irrealism” to stress that it is KW’s sceptical argument which motivates the 
irrealist claim. 
219 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Dover ed. (Mineola, N Y.: Dover 
Publications, 1999); Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
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the first question, “What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice 
of asserting (or denying) the form of words under these conditions?”220 
The suggestion is that the characterisation of meaning discourse to which KW’s 
sceptical argument leads may be just part of a broader project, and that the 
considerations made for that discourse may be generalisable. 
  
 Since I am concerned with consequences, purely background matters may 
not be of central interest. But this is not a purely background matter. As Wright 
and Boghossian have pointed out, we can derive such generalisations from KW 
meaning irrealism itself.221 All sentences are within the scope of the denial that 
linguistic expressions have conditions of correct use. The threat, then, is that the 
non-realist position at which we arrived for meaning discourse may indeed be 
global: that we must deny that uttering sentences of any kind serves a function. 
 
 Let’s get clear about how this globalisation works. For the most part, all we 
need to do is to reflect that most of the considerations made in Chapter 2 did not 
rely on the sentences in question belonging to meaning discourse. I focussed on 
those sentences because characterisation of meaning discourse may be thought to 
be partly constitutive of a non-realist account of meaning. But now we can see that 
there was little in that discussion that was specific to meaning ascriptions. Take 
the following four sentences as test cases:222   
 
A: “Sunfish are the largest bony fish.” 
B: “Sunfish are not the largest bony fish.” 
C: “Beethoven’s Eroica is beautiful.” 
D: “Foob is foog.”  
                                                        
220 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 73. 
221 See, for example: Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations,” 524; Wright, Truth and 
Objectivity, 209; Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language,” 104. Wilson 
suggests that Boghossian and Wright get the globalisation “back to front”; that the implications for 
language in general are part of KW’s argument itself, rather than a secondary consequence: Wilson, 
“Kripke on Wittgenstein and Normativity,” 376. This makes little difference to my present 
discussion, since KW meaning irrealism has the same global implications either way.  
222 It is easier to put this discussion in terms of sentences. But the point, of course, is meant to apply 
to any linguistic expression. (Although to generalise from sentences would require modification of 




On an ordinary reading of these sentences, there are many important differences 
between them. They are distinct in physical form: they are simply composed of 
different shapes. They appear to differ in truth-value: A and C seem true, B false, 
and D neither true nor false. A and C plausibly differ with respect to mind-
independence: the size of fish, it seems likely, is an objective matter; the beauty of a 
musical work less so. And finally, they appear to differ in terms of what we have 
called discipline: for the first three sentences, there seem to be conditions under 
which their utterance is correct, while the utterance of D (we may safely assume) 
is never evaluated as correct or incorrect. 
 
 This much is intuitively—and perhaps hopefully—the case. But to accept 
KW’s sceptical argument is to deny most of this account. Firstly, consider robust 
truth: the kind of truth such that a sentence must bear some strong 
representational relationship to mind-independent facts to meet the standard, and 
which thus implies that the subject matter of that sentence is real. It is such a 
property that A may be thought to enjoy, in contrast with the other sentences. But 
KW’s argument quickly rules out this possibility. For A to be true in this sense 
there must be some fact about what it states, that picks out a particular part of the 
world. Such a fact is within the scope of KW meaning irrealism. With respect to 
robust truth, each of the four sentences fare the same: no sentences are robustly 
true. 
 
 From the denial that there are any robustly true sentences alone, it may yet 
be an option to suppose that sentences can be robustly false. This might be 
contended for B, and denied of the remainder. But we can quickly see, from the 
discussion given in §2.5 of the error-theoretic option for meaning discourse, that 
this too will not be an option. The argument from Boghossian that I presented in 
that section was that false sentences must have truth conditions. That which 
prevents A from achieving robust truth also prevents B from achieving robust 
falsity: both properties rely on sustaining a relation to a particular mind-
independent fact. This representationality is inconsistent with KW meaning 
irrealism, even when it is supposed that the representation is inaccurate—when it 
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is supposed that the sentence is robustly false. These considerations of robust 
truth and falsity are thus attributable to the impossibility of a sentence possessing 
robust truth conditions.223 
 
 At this point, then, we have arrived at the global claim as KW characterises 
it: whatever we are doing when we utter sentences, it is not the utterance of 
robust truths or falsehoods.224 If this is far as the problems go, then we may hope 
yet to identify a difference in quality between the four sentences listed above. But 
KW meaning irrealism imposes further constraints. Consider non-robust truth: 
                                                        
223 A fails to be robustly true, not because it is not a mind-independent fact that sunfish are the 
largest bony fish, but because of the limitations of meaning. This point has interesting implications 
for the intersection of realism with meaning. I don’t have space for a full investigation, but I will 
indicate the thread that such investigation may follow. First, compare A with “Hemi means sunfish 
by ‘sunfish’’. What we have found is that neither sentence has robust truth conditions. Such a denial 
is often taken to constitute non-factualism about the sentence in question. But there is something 
odd about treating these two sentences are similarly non-factual. The oddness is that, while in the 
case of the meaning ascription we have denied that it has robust truth conditions and that Hemi 
means addition by ‘+’, in the case of A we seem to do only the former. We did not deny that it was 
the case that sunfish are the largest bony fish. That is an empirical matter that is surely out of reach 
of our a priori argumentation. What we denied is that there is any statement of that fact. The 
question is whether this result should constitute non-realism about fish sizes. If it is necessary for 
realism about any subject matter that there are true sentences that describe that matter, then one 
implication of KW’s sceptical argument is global non-realism. 
 This seems to me an unhappy result. I think it desirable to be a realist about fish size, and I 
don’t think that considerations about the semantic limits of our sentences should rule that out. It 
may be considered a problem for KW meaning irrealism that it forces us into this position. But I 
think that it may, instead, motivate more careful characterisation of realism. The suggestion is that 
there may be a distinction between the non-factualism which we have attributed to meaning 
ascriptions and that which we have attributed to A. Our characterisation of A is non-factualism by 
the backdoor: that the sentence is not a statement of fact is due not to the absence of any facts about 
fish or size, but to the impossibility of statement.  
Can there be a workable distinction between this account and what we claim of meaning 
ascriptions? If there is, then it may yet be possible to be a realist about some matters while denying 
realism about meaning. It would be a problem if the only available distinction was simply that there 
are facts about fish size but no facts about meaning. It is likely necessary, to specify whether facts of 
a certain type exist, for there to be meaningful description of those facts. One thought is that we 
may be able to distinguish between A and meaning ascriptions on the basis of the explanation or 
motivation for denying that they state no fact. We arrived at the denial that meaning ascriptions 
have truth conditions at least partly via considerations about the absence of meaning facts, 
whereas the analogous denial for A involved no metaphysical considerations about the nature of fish 
size. 
In sum, while it appears difficult for the KW meaning irrealist to be a realist about 
anything, there may be a characterisation of metaphysics that avoids the denial that it is the case 
that sunfish are the largest bony fish. The matter needs further investigation. Help may be found 
from philosophers who to some extent oppose the linguistic turn in metaphysics: the idea that 
metaphysical matters are at root matters of the meaning of sentences. See, for example: Devitt, 
Realism and Truth; Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy.  
224 Recalling, as I claimed in §2.7.1, that KW denies of meaning ascriptions the kind of truth 
available only to the realist about meaning; he concedes that there may be true meaning 
ascriptions if truth is construed as the deflationist—and likely the minimalist—suggests.  
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truth that is consistent with the denial that a true sentence has a real subject 
matter. Wright’s minimalism, introduced in §1.3, provides a compelling model of 
such truth. The thought is that, while the four sentences fail to possess the 
necessary robust truth condition to state a mind-independent fact, they might yet 
qualify for a truth property that does not rely on such a truth condition. A and C 
may be thought to be non-robustly true. But we found in §2.7.4 that this 
supposition is inconsistent with the acceptance of KW’s sceptical argument. It is 
platitudinous that any truth property will require a sentence to sustain an instance 
of the Disquotational Schema (DS): “P” is true iff P. And for sentences to be so 
equipped there must be facts about their content—facts that are within the scope 
of KW meaning irrealism. The result is the same for non-robust falsity: sentences 
must still sustain instances of the DS—or at least, an equivalent schema for falsity, 
featuring the negation of “P”—to qualify as non-robustly false. 
 
 To generalise from the results thus far, what we have found is that no 
sentences are apt for even minimal truth. A sentence is true only when what it says 
is the case is the case, and false only when what it says is the case is not the case.225 
The denial that any sentences have the meaning necessary to say that something is 
the case amounts to the denial that any sentences are true or false—a result that, 
as we have seen, seems to persist even given a minimal construal of truth. The 
result, to use the terminology from Chapter 2, is global ultra-non-factualism: no 
sentence, from any discourse, is even minimally true or false. 
 
 There may be some function to talking that is independent of truth. The 
most obvious candidate for such a function is C. Such aesthetic judgements can 
plausibly be given an expressivist characterisation, such that the utterance of C is 
not the expression of a truth-conditional belief, but the expression of some pro-
attitude towards the Eroica. A and B, too may be candidates for a function that is 
consistent with a lack of truth-aptitude.226 These sentences would hopefully 
contrast, in this case, with the nonsense sentence D. But as I noted throughout 
                                                        
225 This is the Aristotelian claim about truth that I introduced in the General Introduction. 
226 In which case it may work out that A fulfils the function and B does not; that A is better in this 
sense that B. 
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Chapter 2, the consequences of the sceptical strategy run deeper than truth. The 
possibility of any correctness conditions for our utterances seems to be ruled out 
by a more general analogue of KW’s sceptical argument. What is problematic about 
the possibility of an utterance according or failing to accord with the speaker’s 
meaning is also problematic for the possibility of an utterance according or failing 
to accord with any other standard. It is quite clear that such considerations would 
globalise. There are no facts for any sentence that could render utterance correct 
or incorrect in any conditions. It is often the case that we do or do not utter 
sentences. But is seems never to be the case that we should or should not utter 
sentences: there is no disciplinary standard governing our production of sentences 
whatsoever. 
 
There are physical differences in form between A, B, C, and D. But if the 
argument in Chapter 2 of WRPL is sound, then there are no differences between 
them in their truth-value or their correctness. KW’s argument, in effect, flattens the 
landscape: in terms of accordance with norms of utterance (including truth 
norms), all sentences are precisely equal.227  
 
 One way to characterise this result—I am sure there are others—is in terms 
of the distinction I have discussed between eliminativism and non-eliminativism. 
                                                        
227 There is another potential globalisation that, while worth acknowledging, cannot be fully 
investigated here. This is the implication from how meaning discourse fares with respect to 
Wright’s realism-relevant cruces to how any discourse so fares. Since I have argued that no 
discourse qualifies for even minimal truth, the constraints on that truth found in the cruces are not 
of central importance—but the question may be of consequence elsewhere. Wright discusses this 
matter here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 221. The question, for each crux, is whether the realist 
condition it supplies can anywhere be satisfied if it is unsatisfied in the case of meaning. Wright’s 
discussion most central concerns Cognitive Command (CC), which I introduced in §1.4.3. The 
globalisation seems to go through for this crux: since the content of a belief is given by its meaning, 
if there can be faultless disagreement about meaning then there can be faultless disagreement 
about anything. The disagreeing parties may simply disagree about the meaning of the purportedly 
conflicting beliefs, and they can do so without fault. This much coheres with the connection 
between CC and representationality: KW’s argument militates against there being sentences that 
can correspond to mind-independent matters. We can place, alongside the above general 
constraints on sentences, the impossibility of the exertion of CC: no sentences are governed by a 
correctness norm sufficiently strict that disagreement must have resulted from error. This is an 
important consequence of KW meaning irrealism, and it deserves a more comprehensive 
discussion—as do many other matters Wright introduces in Chapter 6 of Truth and Objectivity. But 
I cannot make such investigation here.  
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The distinction concerns whether there is value in engaging in a certain practice.228 
In Chapter 2, I found that in accepting KW’s sceptical argument we are forced to 
accede to eliminativism about meaning discourse: none of the attempts to grant 
meaning talk a function were consistent with KW meaning irrealism. Now that we 
are thinking globally, we can see that this threat is quite general. Without a 
convincing account of what we are doing when we utter a sentence—an account 
that renders such a practice valuable—why not simply abandon the practice 
altogether? If there are no disciplinary standards at work in any discourse, then 
there is nothing that distinguishes our utterances from mere noise. And if we 
produce no more than noise when we utter words then it is hard to see what point 
there could be to continuing the practice. We have thus arrived at the following 
position: 
 
Global Eliminative Ultra-Non-Factualism: No sentences are apt for truth, even 
when truth is construed minimally. No utterance is correct or incorrect, or fulfils a 
function. There would be no value lost in abandoning the practice of uttering 
sentences.229  
 
 I think it helpful to represent the argument that leads to this claim as 
follows—although I am sure this summary is not without the loss of important 
detail. It is necessary for there to be value in talking that doing so has some 
function. If there is some such function, then a sentence either fulfils the function 
or fails to fulfil it. It then follows that there will be some correctness at work in the 
practice of talking: it is correct to utter a sentence only when doing so fulfils the 
function of that sentence.230 If KW’s sceptical strategy is sound then there can be 
no such correctness: any supposition that an utterance accords with a norm 
respected by the speaker will produce opportunity for the sceptic’s attack. It 
                                                        
228 Value, to recall §2.4, that may be theoretic or pragmatic; sentences may be pragmatically 
valuable, even if they offer no theoretical utility for describing reality. 
229 To reiterate an earlier note: I have put this in terms of sentences for ease of presentation, but 
the position applies quite generally to any linguistic expression. 
230 If the function is description, for example, then it is correct to utter a sentence that successfully 
describes (and incorrect when the sentence fails to describe). Or if the function, as the non-
eliminative non-factualist may suppose, is instead to express an attitude, then it is correct to utter a 
sentence that successfully expresses that attitude; when one actually has that attitude.  
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follows, then, that KW meaning irrealism implies that there is no value in uttering 
any sentence. There would be nothing lost in simply stopping talking.  
 
3.3 A Menu of Options 
This is obviously an unhappy result. But before we move on to making an 
evaluative claim about KW meaning irrealism in the next section, let’s take a step 
back and consider what outs there may be. I will present four options, ordered by 
increasing severity. If my considerations are correct, then precisely one of these 
options must be selected. We must either refute KW’s sceptical argument, accept 
eliminativism about all talk, or reject one of the steps that take us from KW’s 
argument to eliminativism. The latter options—§3.3.2 and §3.3.3 below—serve as 
speculative suggestions: they exploit places where, as it seems to me, there may be 
gaps in the argument to eliminativism.  
   
3.3.1 Find A Straight Solution 
Firstly, we may reject KW’s sceptical argument with a straight solution.231 There 
may be some response we can make to the sceptic that prevents the non-realist 
conclusion. On such an account, there are meaning facts, and such facts may be 
mind-independent. We would not, then, be forced to deny that sentences can be 
robustly representational, truth-apt, correct or incorrect, and valuable. This is not 
to say, of course, that there are no other considerations which militate against 
sentences being equipped for these properties. But the unpalatable consequences 
would not arise in the manner I have described in this thesis.232 
 
3.3.2 Find an Innocuous Correctness 
We may attempt to find some characterisation of correctness that is unchallenged 
by the KW sceptical argument, and thus prevent the implication from the 
                                                        
231 A straight solution, as I have noted, is one that denies that the argument is sound. KW himself 
opts for a sceptical solution, which accepts the argument but seeks to weaken the sceptical blow. 
KW introduces the distinction here: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 66. 
232 For discussion of straight solutions, see: Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”; Jerry 
A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Explorations in 
Cognitive Science; 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright, 
Rule-Following and Meaning (Chesham [England]: Acumen, 2002); Wright, “Kripke’s Account of the 
Argument against Private Language.”, and the discussion of Wright’s judgement-dependent account 
of meaning described in fn. 193. 
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soundness of that argument to the absence of correctness conditions among 
sentences. If some innocuous correctness is found then we may yet suppose that 
there are norms at work in discourses—even if, as seems likely, the comprising 
sentences are insufficiently contentful for truth to be one of those norms. While I 
think the prospect doubtful, I have included this option to acknowledge two steps 
in the argument that may conceivably be denied. Firstly, that KW’s sceptical 
argument generalises to any standard of correctness. And secondly, that the fate of 
mind-dependent meaning as characterised in Wright’s framework generalises for 
any account of mind-dependent meaning. To deny the first would require some 
account of correctness of a very different sort than those considered here. And to 
deny the second would require some resources for generating mind-dependent 
facts such that those facts (1) do not rely on the nature of our talk about them; a 
feature found to be problematic for merely minimal meaning facts in §2.7.4, and (2) 
do not imply realism about meaning. It is unclear how either of these possibilities 
could be pursued, and I will set them aside. 
 
3.3.3 Find Alternative Functions 
Next, we may reject the implication from the absence of correctness to the absence 
of function. At the very beginning of this thesis, I introduced the notion of meaning 
as offering one way to investigate what we are doing when we talk the way we do. 
That we produce certain sounds and shapes is simply empirical. What KW shows 
to be problematic, I suggest, is certain features of the explanation that we 
ordinarily give of that practice; explanation in terms of meaning, and related 
notions like understanding. On this third option, we may attempt to find some 
function that offers enough value to prevent eliminativism, but that is sufficiently 
divorced from the problematic notions that it is consistent with KW’s sceptical 
argument. 
 
 There is much that could be said along these lines, and I will settle for just 
one suggestion. If there is a function to uttering a sentence, then there surely must 
be facts about whether or not that function is fulfilled. But perhaps this is not a 
problem unless we suppose that fulfilling that function is a broadly intentional 
activity. Utterances may be better or worse without there being any sense in which 
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we try to utter the better ones. The sceptic would have an opportunity for attack if 
such intention was necessary: they could demand an account of that fact in virtue 
of which that intention is or is not fulfilled in any particular case. But if there may 
be function without intention, then there may be no such opportunity. Whether 
the function is fulfilled by a particular utterance may, that is, be a matter that is 
independent of the thoughts of the utterer. If we avoid the implication that a 
subject must have knowledge of the reasons for uttering, then perhaps there 
needn’t be any sense in which that subject grasps an indefinitely large set of 
correctness conditions.233 
  
 The claim, in effect, is that uttering sentences may be akin to other 
biological activities. Running, for example, likely has some function—and there can 
surely be instances of that activity that are better or worse with respect to 
fulfilling that function. This value could perhaps be attributed to evolutionary 
adaptivity. With respect to such adaptivity, it is better to run away from a bear than 
it is to run off a cliff. We might seek to explain our practice of utterance (and the 
appearance of patterns in that practice) in similar terms. We could tell an 
evolutionary story about why many humans say “I am thirsty” when they are 
dehydrated, and that story might suffice for there to be value in continuing to utter 
such a sentence in those conditions. The KW sceptical considerations would take 
hold the moment we supposed that, for the utterance of “I am thirsty” to have this 
function, the utterer must be attempting to follow the rule that they should utter it 
only when they are dehydrated. We would then have to account for the indefinitely 
large set of correctness conditions that must be contained in the mind of the 
                                                        
233 Such an account would, of course, be a drastic departure from the conception of utterances as 
meaningful. I cited, in §2.3, Wright’s claim that “the, as it were, impersonal meaning of an 
expression must supervene upon what individuals mean by it.” (Wright, Crispin, “On Making Up 
One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention,” 117.) There is little sense in there being ungraspable 
meaning—so argument that there can be no grasped meaning implies that there is no such thing as 
meaning. But this need not, perhaps, be the case for the alternative functions that utterance might 
have. That there can be no intentional pursuit of better sentences does not imply that there are no 
better sentences unless that quality must be, in a sense, graspable. One interesting point of contact 
here is with KW’s discussion of Fregean objective sense (Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language, 53.) Here, KW accepts that there can be objective facts about the extension of the 
addition function: a set of ordered triples. The problem only arises when we suppose that a subject 
understands an expression as picking out that set. My claim, in effect, is that while such 
understanding is necessary for meaning, utterance may have a non-semantic purpose for which 
that is not necessary; for which it will suffice that there are facts akin to the extension of addition. 
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utterer. The present suggestion is that there could be functional utterance without 
any of these problematic notions. If the patterns in our practice of running are 
attributable to our evolutionary history, then perhaps the patterns in our speech 
are too. 
 
 Such a picture of utterance comes with serious costs, of course. It will likely 
be very difficult to explain mental activity, and that our sentences appear to 
provide some degree of communication. But a move of this sort may nonetheless 
prevent eliminativism. There might be value to running, even if that value cannot 
be intentionally pursued. If utterance can sustain a similar account, then we may 
yet stave off the eliminativist.234 
 
3.3.4 Accept Global Eliminativism 
Finally, we may simply bite the bullet. It is mere illusion, on this account, that we 
are doing anything worthwhile when we utter sentences. For there to be such 
value there must be some function, and KW’s sceptical argument has ruled out the 
possibility of the norms of correctness that seem necessary for there to be such a 
function.235 As I have said elsewhere, eliminativism does not seem inconsistent. I 
do not think it impossible that talking is without value. But it is, clearly, a 
dreadfully unpalatable position. And this unpalatability is drastically amplified 
now that it is clear that it is not only the practice of talking about meaning that is 
under siege. The sentences used in physics, in ordering food at a restaurant, in 
greeting someone on the street: each of these, on this account, are without value, 
and nothing would be lost by abandoning them. This is far from an acceptable 
result. It seems to overstate the weight of philosophical troubles upon non-
theoretical behaviour: the burden of dealing with a conflict between theory and 
practice of this kind should likely be on the philosophy, and not on ordinary 
                                                        
234 It is important to note that such an account needn’t characterise every utterance as performing 
the same function. There might be—as seems plausible—quite different functions to saying “Hold 
the door!” than saying “Sunfish are the largest bony fish”. In effect, this discussion imposes a 
constraint on the functions available to sentences: that they cannot engender the kind of 
correctness ruled out by KW’s sceptical argument. There may be many different functions that 
satisfy this constraint. 
235 I’m assuming here, of course, that the option in the previous section is rejected. 
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human activity. And it is hard not to think it simply intuitive that there is a point to 
talking, and that we would suffer great losses in abandoning the practice. 
 
3.4 The Tenability of Kripke-Wittgenstein Meaning Irrealism 
Such are the apparent consequences of accepting the KW sceptical argument. We 
now return briefly to the original motivation for the investigating these 
consequences: evaluation of the tenability of accepting the argument. Several 
considerations have been made that impinge on this tenability. I will reiterate the 
two that have received the most discussion.236 
 
 Firstly, we must adopt eliminativism about meaning discourse. Elsewhere, 
the denial that there are facts of a certain type might be accompanied by an 
explanation of our talk about those facts, under which that talk remains valuable. 
KW’s sceptical argument prevents such non-eliminativism, and leads us to a 
complete rejection of the practice. It is one thing to consider whether it is tenable 
to suggest that a pervasive human practice is without value. But it is another to be 
forced to adopt such a position, as we appear to be in the present case. KW’s attack 
on meaning runs so deep that it threatens not only the metaphysics of meaning, but 
the value of meaning as a subject of linguistic activity.  
 
 Secondly, we must adopt eliminativism for all discourse. We might, with 
enough effort, be comfortable rejecting talk about meaning. It may already be 
intuitive that that talk is to some extent fraught. But it is surely unpalatable to 
suppose that there is nothing of value in our talk in general. It is difficult to make 
sense of the suggestion that there are no patterns of utterance in, for example, 
asking for water at a restaurant; that there is no difference in correctness between 
that request and “Foom is foog”. Whatever the strength of the philosophical 
                                                        
236 Two others, that I will mention only briefly, are as follows. Firstly, that non-realism about 
meaning likely goes hand in hand with non-realism about mental content: I mentioned this in §2.3. I 
don’t have space to investigate this implication here, but it will effectively serve to multiply the 
concerns developed for the possibility of valuable utterance: it may not be consistent with KW 
meaning irrealism to suppose that it is valuable to think. This would, of course, be a seriously 
problematic consequence. Secondly, the point I raised in fn. 223 that it will be difficult to be a 
realist about anything while accepting KW’s sceptical argument. We will likely be forced into 
unhappy metaphysical corners, in which it will be a struggle to suppose that such ordinary things 
as tables and chairs (and the size of fish) are real.  
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difficulties faced by the attempt to vindicate the appearance of function in our 
practice of utterance, those difficulties seem likely to be outweighed by the 
plausibility of that appearance. In response to compelling argument that there are 
no recognisable patterns that suffice for correctness in our talk, it seems better to 
think that there is some hidden philosophical error than to accept the argument as 
sound.  
 
Global eliminativist ultra-non-factualism paints a dramatically unpalatable 
picture of our practice of utterance, on which there are no teeth to the cogs: our 
expressions spin freely and engage with nothing, and thus perform no function.237 
Of course, reality need not be palatable. No considerations I have made—as far as I 
can tell—have ruled out the possibility of a world in which there is no such thing 
as meaning, or that we inhabit such a world. But consistency does not suffice for 
tenability, and the cost of accepting KW’s sceptical argument as sound is steep. On 
the basis of the severity of constraints it imposes on the nature of linguistic 
expression and our utterance thereof, I conclude that KW meaning irrealism is 
untenable. 
 
This result provides strong motivation not to accept KW’s argument as 
sound, and to find a straight solution. There may be such a solution, and we may 
thus avoid denying realism about meaning. In that case, this investigation serves 
merely to illustrate the important role played by meaning and correctness: that the 
value of talking appears to depend on them. But the strength of the motivation 
                                                        
237 It is important to note that among the sentences that are found without function by KW’s 
argument are the very sentences of that argument itself. The KW meaning irrealist claim that there 
are no meaning facts—and every premise and consequence—fails not only to be true but to be 
correct in any way. And this includes, of course, everything I have written. There is no standard 
under which any of these sentences are evaluated as better or worse than other others: they are 
equivalent in all but physical form to “Foom is foog”. This does not imply, of course, that these 
claims are false, or incorrect; they are no worse than other sentences. In particular, “KW’s argument 
is sound” is no worse than “KW’s argument is not sound”. While this is a troubling situation, it is 
unclear how troubling it is. One related matter that I have raised elsewhere (see fn. 223) is that a 
failure of a sentence to be true need not be the failure of the fact it appears to state to obtain. To say 
that “KW’s argument is sound” is not true likely says little about whether KW’s argument is sound, 
if that lack of truth is attributable purely to meaning irrealism. 
 It might be suggested that the argument implies that there is no reason to believe its conclusion: 
such reason would rely on some kind of correctness. But then, of course, that line of reasoning 
likewise fails to produce reasons to believe. This matter is likely due more investigation, but for 
now I will favour the more obviously troubling global eliminativist consequences.   
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does not imply that the attempt will be successful. If the Kripke-Wittgenstein 
sceptical argument proves resilient, then we face a serious threat: that, for all our 

















































“Blessed is the man who having nothing to say, 
abstains from giving us wordy evidence of the fact.”—






Appendix A: Potential Verification Transcendence 
This discussion concerns Wright’s metaphysical framework, discussed in Chapter 
1. All assertoric discourses are governed by a truth norm. Every sentence in those 
discourses either satisfies the norm and is true, or fails to satisfy it and is false. One 
way that the truth properties at work in different discourses may differ is whether 
the sentences in that discourse are potentially verification transcendent (PVT): 
 
PVT: Truth is potentially verification transcendent iff whether a sentence is true or 
false is independent of whether we possess a method that will in principle produce 
evidence that it has that truth-value. 
 
In this appendix, I will establish the distinction characterised in this crux, show 
how it may be realism-relevant, and then suggest that it seems inapplicable to 
realism debates about meaning. 
 
It might the case, for a given discourse, that whether a sentence in that 
discourse meets or fails to meet the standard for truth can transcend any 
verification that it does so. Truth is PVT in such a discourse. Given that some 
verification is necessary for knowledge, this amounts to the claim that truth in a 
discourse of this sort can outrun knowledge; a sentence “P” can be true even if it is 
not possible to know that P. Every assertoric sentence is disciplined by a 
warranted assertibility norm and a truth norm. When truth in a discourse is PVT, 
sentences in that discourse can satisfy the truth norm without satisfying the 
warranted assertibility norm (and can fail to satisfy the truth norm without their 
negations ever satisfying the warranted assertibility norm). 
 
 The alternative is that truth cannot transcend verification. A discourse may 
be such that the truth-value of the comprising sentences is epistemically 
constrained. Whether a sentence satisfies or fails to satisfy the standard for truth 
is never a matter beyond our epistemic capabilities. For any sentence about which 
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we are not certain that there is evidence for or against it, then, we cannot be 
certain that it is true or false at all. Truth in discourses of this sort is not PVT. 
 
 In Michael Dummett’s characterisation of realism debate, this distinction is 
the distinction between realism and anti-realism.238 Wright instead incorporates 
potential verification transcendence into his account of realism debate as just one 
of four realism-relevant cruces.239 Let us confirm that the distinction is indeed 
realism-relevant and marks a potential point of divergence between the realist and 
their opponent. It is quite plausible that truth that is PVT is more mind-independent 
than truth that is not. Say that some sentence is true but that there are no potential 
grounds on which it would be justified to claim that it is so. The standard that such 
a sentence meets in being true cannot be wholly dependent on the mind. 
Otherwise, what could prevent it from being recognisable in principle that the 
sentence has met the standard? 
[When the truth of a sentence is potentially verification transcendent,] we 
are forced to recognise a distinction between the kind of state of affairs 
which makes such a statement acceptable, in the light of whatever standards 
inform our practice of the discourse to which it belongs, and what makes it 
actually true. The truth of such a statement is bestowed on it independently 
of any standard we do or can apply; acceptability by our standards is, for 
such statements, at best merely congruent with truth.240 
If truth can outrun knowledge then there must be something more to that truth 
than satisfaction of our standards for endorsing sentences. There must be some 
mind-independent matter that (at least in part) determines whether a sentence 
meets the standard for truth.  
 
                                                        
238 For the relevant Dummettian sources, see Wright’s footnote here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 
3. For further discussion, see the introduction here: Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning, and Truth 
(Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell, 1987). 
239 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 12. Part of the reason for this is that PVT marks a plausible 
distinction between the realist and the anti-realist in only some cases. This issue is severely diluted 
when PVT is just one of four respects in which realists and anti-realists can disagree. There are 
certain subjects—Wright’s examples include comedy and morality—for which even the realist 
about those subjects wouldn’t wish to contend that truth outruns potential verification. And 
indeed, this is what we will find for meaning.  
240 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 4. 
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 Truth that is PVT, then, is to some extent more mind-independent than 
truth that is not. Since the mind-independence of truth contributes to the realism-
status of any discourse in which that truth operates, one realism debate for some 
discourse D is debate between the following two positions: 
  
PVT Realism(D): Truth in D is PVT. The sentences in D are true or false 
independently of whether we know a method that would in principle allow us to 
identify that truth-value.  
 
PVT Anti-Realism(D): Truth in D is not PVT. It is not the case that the sentences 
in D are true or false independently of whether we know a method that would in 
principle allow us to identify that truth-value.241 
 
Given that the epistemic standards from which truth is claimed by the realist to be 
independent include knowability, we can also represent these positions in the 
following way: 
 
PVT Realism(D): Sentences “P” in D can be true without it being knowable in 
principle that P, or false without it being knowable in principle that not-P. 
 
PVT Anti-Realism(D): Sentences “P” in D cannot be true without it being 
knowable in principle that P, or false without it being knowable in principle that 
not-P. 
 
                                                        
241 In light of the minimalism that we have adopted, the following charge could be made against this 
position. Since the truth-aptitude of a sentence is settled purely by the syntactical form and 
discipline exhibited by that sentence, the anti-realist must accept that any assertoric sentence is 
true or false, even if we have no evidence either way. One available response is that, if we have no 
evidence either way, then that sentence is not governed by a warranted assertibility norm, and thus 
is not even apt for minimal truth. If this response is made, it may put strain on Wright’s framework; 
truth may not be as promiscuous among sentences as we had thought. Another response available 
to the anti-realist is that there is some distance between a sentence being truth-apt and being true 
or false; they might claim that the sentence in question is of the right sort to be governed by truth, 
but refrain from committing to that sentence actually having a determinate truth-value. This 




 To illustrate the positions available in this debate, consider the following 
oft-used example: 
 
Goldbach’s Conjecture: Every even integer is the sum of two primes. 
 
This claim has not been proven, and we have no method by which to acquire a 
proof. And the same is the case for the negation of the claim: we have no 
counterexample to Goldbach’s Conjecture, and no method to produce one. There is 
no guarantee that Goldbach’s Conjecture will ever be within our epistemic limits. 
The PVT realist about mathematics commits to the conjecture being true or false 
nevertheless. Mathematical matters are settled, they claim, independently of 
whether we can access them. The PVT anti-realist about mathematics makes no 
such commitment; given that we have no assurance that the conjecture (or its 
negation) is knowable, and that knowability is necessary for truth, we cannot 
justifiably consider it to be true (or false).242   
 
 We can also discuss whether truth in a discourse is epistemically 
constrained in terms of superassertibility. Superassertibility is a construction out of 
assertibility that Wright presents as an improvement on accounts of truth as 
something epistemic, such as that proposed by Hilary Putnam.243 It is defined as 
follows: 
 
Superassertibility: A sentence is superassertible if some actually accessible state 
of information—a state of information which this world, constituted as it is, would 
generate in a suitably receptive, investigating subject—justifies its assertion, and 
will continue to do so no matter how enlarged upon or improved.244 
                                                        
242 To clarify: the anti-realist needn’t be committed to the claim that Goldbach’s Conjecture actually 
is unknowable. It is quite consistent with the anti-realist’s position that a proof of Goldbach’s 
Conjecture is stumbled upon at some point in the future, and that it is found to have been knowable 
and true after all (or mutatis mutandis for the negation of the conjecture). But we have no such 
proof at the moment, and no good reason to think that there is one to be found, and thus cannot 
claim that the conjecture has a determinate truth-value if we have denied that truth in mathematics 
is PVT. 
243 Wright argues against Putnam’s internal realism here: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 38–44. 
244 This is the definition Wright provides here: Crispin Wright, “Précis of Truth and Objectivity,” in 
Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 




Superassertible sentences are those that are warranted, and that will continue to 
be warranted after any improvement to the warranting state of information. I 
don’t have the space to thoroughly investigate this notion, but the central idea is 
this. In Wright’s argument against deflationism, described in §1.2, it was found 
that it follows from the Disquotational Schema (DS)—“P” is true iff P—that truth 
cannot be warranted assertibility; at least, not wherever there may be neutral 
states of information. In the terms I adopted in discussion of minimalism, we can 
characterise this result as the claim that warranted assertibility is not a truth 
property. Warrant does not have the platitudinous characteristics: it is not the case 
that a sentence is warranted if and only if what it states is the case. But this needn’t 
generalise to the failure of every epistemic property to qualify as a species of truth. 
Superassertibility may qualify. The second condition imposed—that 
superassertible sentences remain warranted after any increase in the quality of 
the available information—renders superassertibility a minimal truth property in 
certain contexts. It would (largely) be sufficient for superassertibility to be a 
minimal truth property for sentences “P” that the following schema obtains:245 
 
DSSA: “P” is superassertible iff P 
 
Say that we accept PVT realism for some discourse: there can be sentences in that 
discourse that are determinately true or false yet for which we know no method to 
verify that truth-value. Say that “S” is such a sentence, and that it is true. Since it is 
epistemically inaccessible that “S” is true, then by the DS for truth, and the 
assumption that epistemic access transmits across a biconditional, it is likewise 
epistemically inaccessible that S. Given DSSA, then, it is epistemically inaccessible 
that “S” is superassertible. But this cannot be the case. When a sentence is 
superassertible some accessible state of information justifies its assertion. 
Sentences like “S”, then, are counterexamples to DSSA; S is the case, but “S” cannot 
be superassertible. If S is a matter settled independently of our epistemic 
standards, then it can maintain no biconditional with the superassertibility of “S”. 
                                                        
245 As acknowledged in §1.3, it does not directly follow from the DS that every platitude will be 
satisfied by the property in question—but the remainder may be satisfied without much difficulty. 
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Wherever we accept PVT realism, the right-to-left half of DSSA fails, and 
superassertibility thus fails to qualify as a minimal truth property. 
 
 But consider a discourse in which truth is not PVT; a discourse in which any 
sentence “P” is true if and only if it is in principle knowable that P. Wright argues 
that, for such a discourse, DSSA may be derived.246 We arrive at the right-to-left half 
of the DSSA,  
 
P ⟹ “P” is superassertible, 
 
by reflecting that denying PVT implies that knowability follows from truth, and 
that superassertibility follows from knowability.247 And Wright derives the left-to-
right half,  
 
“P” is superassertible ⟹ P, 
 
by showing that, given the denial of PVT, if P is not the case then “P” is not 
superassertible.248 We have thus found that superassertibility has the 
disquotational property whenever the subject sentence is part of a discourse that 
does not feature PVT truth. For any such discourse, then, superassertibility will 
have the platitudinous characteristics and will qualify as a minimal truth 
predicate.  
  
 The introduction of superassertibility thus provides an alternative 
characterisation of the positions available in realism debates about PVT: 
 
PVT Realism(D): Superassertibility is not a truth property in D. 
  
PVT Anti-Realism(D): Superassertibility is a truth property in D.249 
                                                        
246 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 58. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid., 59. 
249 Wright argues that, given that superassertibility is a truth property in D, a further distinction 
can arise. We have accepted that “P” is superassertible iff it is true. But we might yet distinguish 






Having established an account of potential verification transcendence, I will 
now apply the debate to meaning discourse.250 The realist about meaning in the 
PVT debate commits, for some meaning ascription about which we have no 
method to identify its truth value, to that ascription nonetheless having a 
determinate truth value. The truth of a true meaning ascription, the realist 
contends, is something which is settled even when that ascription may be beyond 
our epistemic bounds. The non-realist, when faced with a meaning ascription that 
may lie outside these bound, will withhold commitment to it being determinately 
true or false. Truth and falsity are constrained by evidence, so if we have no 
justification at present for believing a certain meaning ascription or its negation, 
we cannot at present be sure that it is true or false at all.  
 
I noted earlier that, for certain discourses, the question of whether truth in 
that discourse is PVT is misplaced, and does not seem to mark a distinction 
between the realist and their opponent. In such discourses, even the realist will not 
claim that truth is PVT. Wright suggests as much for comic discourse: 
It might seem implausible to claim that the sense of humour is a faculty 
which enables us to track independently constituted comic qualities; but it 
would ascend to a quite difference order of implausibility to add that the 
obtaining of such qualities may altogether transcend, even in principle, our 
abilities of recognition.251 
Whether something is funny—the thought runs—is a matter that must be within 
our epistemic means. There is a sense in which this is a victory for the comic non-
realist. But there is another—and, I think, stronger—sense in which it is simply a 
reflection of the nature of comic facts, with which the realist will have no quarrel. 
                                                        
sentences are true because they are superassertible. This point foreshadows the introduction of the 
Euthyphro Contrast, discussed in §1.4.2, and represents one intersection between the Judgement-
Dependence and Potential Verification Transcendence cruces. I cannot discuss the point here, but 
see: Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 79. 
250 This application depends on the introduction of the Kripke-Wittgenstein argument, given in 
§2.2. 
251 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 8. 
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Even the comic realist will admit that it is essential to comedy that the comic facts 
are in principle accessible; if something is funny, then it must be able to be 
appreciated as such. 
 
It is quite plausible that meaning is a subject of this sort. Can it be the case 
that a subject means something by an expression without there being some 
justification available in principle that that fact obtains? It seems to me that it 
cannot—and that we needn’t accept the Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical 
argument to be confident in this claim. What a subject means by an expression is a 
matter for which some appreciation must be at least in principle available, and 
thus that will never be beyond epistemic means. Indeed, that truth in meaning 
discourse is not PVT seems implicit in the strategy of KW’s argument: if there could 
be true meaning ascriptions for which there is no justification, then the failure to 
justify to the sceptic any such ascription given idealised epistemic access (i.e., given 
every possible justification) could not suffice for the constitutive scepticism at 
which KW aims. The upshot, then, is that while meaning falls on the non-realist 
side of the PVT crux, it is in a sense a hollow victory. With respect to this crux, 
truth in meaning discourse fails to achieve additional mind-independence. But this 
is due to the nature of meaning, rather than the success of KW’s sceptical efforts.  
 
While PVT may in many cases offer a compelling debate between the realist 
and their opponent, then, it does not in the case of meaning. To suppose that there 
can be meaning facts beyond our access seems too steep a demand, even for the 
meaning realist. We must look elsewhere for matters in Wright’s framework about 
which KW’s sceptical argument has important consequences: see the discussion of 
minimal truth in §2.7.1 and §2.7.4, and Judgement-Dependence and Cognitive 
Command in §2.7.2 and §2.7.3 respectively. 
 
Appendix B: Width of Cosmological Role 
It is a platitude that all truth properties exhibit a certain correspondence to facts. 
Cognitive Command (introduced in §1.4.3) is one respect in which this 
correspondence can have a substance over and above that which is ensured by this 
platitude: the relation between the truth of true sentences and the facts they state 
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can be more or less robust. This final crux offers a second respect. Truth in some 
discourse D1 and truth in some discourse D2 can differ in that the facts themselves 
in D1 are more robust than the facts in D2. Wright posits Width of Cosmological Role 
(WCR) as a measure of the robustness of the facts to which a certain truth 
property corresponds. The plan for this appendix, as for the previous one, is to 
first establish a genuine distinction between facts of one type and facts of another, 
show how this distinction may be realism-relevant, and then suggest that the crux 
does not offer a useful realism debate for meaning. 
 
  Wright argues that the Disquotational Schema (DS)—“P” is true iff P—
ensures that from every true sentence an at least minimal fact will emerge.252 The 
anti-realist can happily contend that there are facts to which the true sentences in 
the discourse in question correspond; facts are not isolated to real subjects. But 
anti-realism is constrained to facts of a certain sort: 
The states of affairs purportedly depicted by merely minimally true 
sentences do not seem to do anything except answer to the demands of our 
minimally true thoughts.253 
In any assertoric discourse there are certain sentences that satisfy the standard for 
truth.254 For any such sentence there is a fact that it states. But if this truth is 
merely minimal, then there is nothing more to these facts than this correspondence 
they have with true sentences. If there are things that facts can do—explanatory 
roles they might have—that are unavailable to the kind of facts to which the anti-
realist is constrained, then the explanatory role of the facts in a discourse might 
mark a distinction between realism and anti-realism.  
 
Classes of facts do intuitively vary with respect to the explanations they 
offer, but we need a formal characterisation. One such characterisation might be 
                                                        
252 Wright, 25. 
253 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 181. 
254 This is assuming that the possibility of an error-theory is excluded. I discuss this possibility in 
§1.5; for now, it is harmless to assume that some of the sentences in an assertoric discourse are at 
least minimally true. 
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found in the Best Explanation accounts discussed by Harman and Wiggins.255 But 
Wright rejects such accounts.256 For Wright, the question is not whether the facts 
are necessary inclusions in best explanations, but instead which kinds of 
explanation the facts in question can offer.257 There are some explanations to 
which even merely minimal facts can contribute. And there are some available 
only to facts that have additional substance. The task, then, is to specify this 
distinction.  
 
  Wright characterises four types of explanation.258 Take, as an example, the 
fact that the rocks are wet. This fact can explain facts of the following four types: 
 
(1)  Cognitive effects. For example: my perceiving, and hence believing, that the 
rocks are wet. 
(2)  Precognitive-sensuous effects. For example: a small (prelinguistic) child’s 
interests in his hands after he has touched the rocks. 
(3)  Physical effects on agents. For example: my slipping and falling on the 
rocks. 
(4)  Physical effects on non-agents. For example: the abundance of lichen 
growing on the rocks. 
 
A first attempt at analysing the robustness of a fact, then, is to claim that this 
robustness is determined by which of (1) through (4) that fact can explain. But we 
will need a different approach. Wright shows that even the most minimal of facts 
can offer explanations of these four types, and thus that this simple criterion for 
robustness will not provide an adequate distinction. The central idea is this.259 A 
truth norm governs any assertoric discourse. To any true sentence in that 
discourse there corresponds a fact that it states. The satisfaction of the truth norm 
by a sentence “x is F” can explain a subject’s belief that x is F; someone may have a 
                                                        
255 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1977); David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998). 
256 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 182, 189. 
257 Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” 199. 
258 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 197. 
259 For further detail see: Ibid., 194. 
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belief because they recognise the content of that belief as satisfying a certain norm. 
(We needn’t be limited to belief here, but this will be enough to make the point.) 
Now that even minimal facts are shown to be capable of explanatory links to 
propositional attitudes, the floodgates open. There are many cases that quite 
plausibly exhibit explanatory relations between beliefs and facts of any of the four 
specified types. Say, for example, that we admit nothing more than the minimum 
to truth in moral discourse. And say that the sentence “This institution is unjust” 
has this minimal truth property. We may cite the truth of this sentence as 
explanation of the fact that a certain subject believes that this institution is unjust. 
All that this requires is that the subject in question is sensitive to truth in morality; 
that they have reason to believe a moral ascription if it is true. In virtue of the DS, 
and the quite plausible assumption that explanations can be transmitted over a 
biconditional, we can then say that the subject believes that the institution is 
unjust because the institution is unjust. The subject with this belief proceeds to 
burn down the building housing the institution in question. We thus have an 
explanatory connection between the injustice of the institution and the burning of 
a building: a fact of type (4) in the above taxonomy. It is easy to see how similar 
results could be found for the other classes of fact. Merely minimal truth, then, can 
figure into explanations of a wide range of phenomena.  
  
 To impose a distinction between minimal and robust facts, Wright simply 
excludes the kinds of cases where cognitive access to the relevant facts is an 
intermediate step in the explanation. The above demonstration of how a minimal 
moral fact may explain the burning of a building includes the beliefs of a subject as 
part of the explanatory chain. For a fact to be robust, Wright claims, it must have a 
role that does not depend on any thought about it. The fact that the institution is 
unjust, then, would not qualify as robust on the basis of the above explanatory 




WCR: The width of cosmological role of a fact is the extent to which citing that fact 
is potentially contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, 
our being in attitudinal states which take that fact as object.260 
 
The distinction between those facts that are robust and those that are not is that 
the former contribute to a wide variety of phenomena independently of our 
thoughts about them, while the latter do not. Robust facts are those that are more 
than simply a reflection across the DS from true sentences. To see that this 
distinction is realism-relevant, consider the nature of a truth property that 
involves correspondence to facts with wide cosmological role. For a sentence to 
meet the standard set by such a property, it must adhere with facts that have mind-
independent explanatory roles. Correspondence is more demanding when the 
corresponding facts are robust, and a discourse in which truth involves this 
relation is regulated by matters that are independent of our minds. WCR thus 
constitutes a genuine distinction between realism and non-realism. We can 
formalise the positions available as follows:  
 
WCR Realism(D): Truth in D corresponds to facts that have wide cosmological 
role; facts that can contribute to explanations of many things other than, or other 
than via, our being in attitudinal states for which those facts are the object. 
 
WCR Anti-Realism(D): Truth in D corresponds to facts that—a priori—have 
narrow cosmological role; facts that can contribute to explanations of few things 
other than, or other than via, our being in attitudinal states for which those facts 
are the object.261 
 
                                                        
260 Ibid., 196. 
261 Wright includes a condition of a priority on the anti-realist’s claim that a given set of facts have 
narrow cosmological role. It would not be sufficient if the facts in question were—as Wright puts 
it—“accidentally lazy”; it must be part of the nature of those facts that they fail to figure into 
cognitively unmediated explanations (to whatever extent). We don’t need to impose the same 
condition on the claim of the WCR realist, because the possibility of providing any cognitively 
unmediated explanation—a priori or otherwise—suffices for a fact to have the relevant robustness. 
See: Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” 200. 
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There is, clearly, some lack of precision in the number of types of 
explanation sufficient for having a wide or narrow explanatory role. But the nature 
of debates in this area, and the positions for which a realist or anti-realist will wish 
to argue, are nevertheless clear. When the facts stated in a discourse have a wider 
cosmological role than those in another discourse, the former features a more 
objective truth property than the latter, ceteris paribus. The realist, in this debate, 
argues to widen the role of the facts in question, and the anti-realist fights to 
narrow it. 
 
Now consider the width of the explanatory roles exhibited by meaning facts. 
In virtue merely of satisfying the platitudes, truth in meaning discourse may 
explain our beliefs about what a subject means by an expression. If “Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’” satisfies the truth norm that operates over meaning discourse, 
then it is an (at least) minimal fact that Hemi means addition by ‘+’. We can then 
explain Aroha’s belief that Hemi means addition by ‘+’ as due to her sensitivity to 
this truth norm. And then, once we have connected the fact to our talk about it, a 
large variety of facts may be explanatorily connected to the fact that Hemi means 
addition by ‘+’—perhaps that Aroha trusts Hemi’s arithmetic skills and thus visits 
their bakery, and then that the door to Hemi’s bakery opens, and so on. These 
kinds of explanations are available to any minimal fact. For the realist to emerge 
victorious from debates about WCR, meaning facts must be able to contribute to a 
variety of explanations independently of our thought about them. 
 
The question, then, is whether meaning facts may have these mind-
independent roles—and whether KW’s sceptical argument motivates one of the 
positions offered by this crux. But as for Potential Verification Transcendence 
(discussed in Appendix A), there is a strong sense in which Width of Cosmological 
Role is not properly realism-relevant in the case of meaning. The matter of what a 
subject means by a certain sign is a matter that is always intimately related to a 
certain subject—the one for whom what they mean is in question. It seems to 
misconstrue the nature of meaning to suppose that there are things that meaning 
does independently of the cognitive activity of any mind. What Hemi means by ‘+’ 
may explain a wide range of phenomena; whether they pass their mathematics 
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exam, for example, or whether they get hired as an accountant. But it is quite 
doubtful that any such explanations could be offered that do not involve, as an 
intermediary step, Hemi’s mental contact with the meaning of ‘+’. If this is right, 
then the realist position offered in the Width of Cosmological crux is out of the 
question.262  
 
There is, as for PVT, a sense in which this is a victory for the non-realist. But 
I think it better to take these considerations to reveal that WCR is not properly 
realism-relevant for meaning in the first place. A realist about wetness may 
identify mind-independent explanations available to the wetness of rocks. But it is 
too steep a requirement for the meaning realist to identify roles available to 
meaning facts that are independent of mental activity. Meaning facts have narrow 
cosmological role. But we needn’t take any heed of KW’s sceptical argument to 
arrive at this result. To reiterate the concluding point of Appendix A: if we want to 
identify the consequences of KW’s sceptical argument on the state of meaning 
discourse in terms of Wright’s framework then we should look elsewhere. I discuss 
such consequences in §2.7: for minimal truth in §2.7.1 and §2.7.4, and Judgement-
Dependence and Cognitive Command in §2.7.2 and §2.7.3 respectively. 
 
  
                                                        
262 Wright suggests that morality is an example of a discourse for which the possibility of wide 
cosmological role is doubtful: Wright, “Truth in Ethics,” 200. He writes here that “It is hard to think 
of anything which is true of sentient but non-conceptual creatures, or of mobile organisms, or of 
inanimate matter, which is true because . . . a moral fact obtains and in whose explanation it is 





A. J. Ayer (Alfred Jules). Language, Truth, and Logic. Penguin Books, 2001. 
 
Aristotle. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1924. 
 
Blackburn, Simon. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. 
Oxford [Oxfordshire] : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 
1984. 
 
Boghossian, Paul A. “The Rule-Following Considerations.” Mind 98, no. 392 (1989): 
507–549. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.392.507. 
 
———. “The Status of Content.” The Philosophical Review 99, no. 2 (1990): 157–184. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2185488. 
 
Butler, Finn. “Kripke-Wittgenstein Meaning Scepticism and the Sceptical Solution.” 
University of Otago Honours Dissertation, 2017. 
 
Davidson, Donald. “Rational Animals.” Dialectica 36, no. 4 (1982): 317–28. 
 
———. “Thought and Talk.” In Mind and Language, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan, 
1975–7. Clarendon Press, 1975. 
 
Devitt, Michael. Realism and Truth. 2nd ed. with a new afterword. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Divers, John, and Alexander Miller. “Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist 
Conception of Belief.” Analysis 55 (1995): 37. 
 
———. “Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth.” 
Analysis 54, no. 1 (1994): 12–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/3328097. 
 
Dyke, Heather. Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. Routledge Studies in 
Contemporary Philosophy ; 13. London ; New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Field, Hartry H. Science without Numbers. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. 
 





———. “Assertion.” The Philosophical Review 74, no. 4 (1965): 449–465. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2183123. 
 
Gibbard, Allan. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
Grice, H. P. “Meaning.” The Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377. 
 
Haldane, John, and Crispin Wright. Reality, Representation, and Projection. Mind 
Association Occasional Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. 
 
Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977. 
 
Hattiangadi, Anandi. Oughts and Thoughts Rule-Following and the Normativity of 
Content. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007. 
 
Horwich, Paul. “Is Truth a Normative Concept?” Synthese 195, no. 3 (March 1, 2018): 
1127–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1208-8. 
 
———. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford [England] : New York [N.Y.]: Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Jackson, Frank, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith. “Minimalism and Truth Aptness.” 
Mind 103, no. 411 (July 1, 1994): 287–302. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/103.411.287. 
 
Jackson, Frank, and Philip Pettit. “A Problem for Expressivism.” Analysis 58, no. 4 
(1998): 239–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00128. 
 
Jerry A. Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. 
Explorations in Cognitive Science; 2. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987. 
 
Kripke, Saul A. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary 
Exposition. Harvard University Press, 1982. 
 





McGinn, Colin. Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation. 
Aristotelian Society Series ; v. 1. Oxford ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell, 
1984. 
 
Miller, Alexander. “An Objection to Wright’s Treatment of Intention.” Analysis 49, no. 
4 (1989): 169–173. https://doi.org/10.2307/3328551. 
 
———. “Differences with Wright.” Philosophical Quarterly 54, no. 217 (2004): 595–
603. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00376.x. 
 
———. “On Wright’s Argument Against Deflationism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 
51, no. 205 (October 2001): 527–31. 
 




———. “Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and the Truth about Intention.” 
Synthese 171, no. 3 (2009): 433–442. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9316-
8. 
 
———. “Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 23, no. 3 (May 27, 2015): 323–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1042004. 
 
———. “Rule-Following Skepticism.” In The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 
454–63. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London ; New York: Routledge, 
2011. 
 
———. “What Is the Sceptical Solution?,” forthcoming. 
Miller, Alexander, and Ali Saboohi. “Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem 
or New?” Acta Analytica 30, no. 2 (2015): 171–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0237-5. 
 
Miller, Alexander, and Crispin Wright. Rule-Following and Meaning. Chesham 
[England]: Acumen, 2002. 
 
Price, Huw. “Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa Became Extinct.” 
Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998): 241–54. 
 
Quine, W. V. “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation.” The Journal of 




———. Word and Object. Studies in Communication. Cambridge: Technology Press of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960. 
 
Ramsey, F. P., and G. E. Moore. “Symposium: Facts and Propositions.” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 7 (1927): 153–206. 
 
Smith, Michael. “Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about 
Truth.” Analysis 54, no. 1 (1994): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/3328096. 
 
Tappolet, Christine. “Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth 
Predicates.” Analysis 57, no. 3 (1997): 209–210. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/57.3.209. 
 
Wiggins, David. Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. 3rd ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
 
Wilfrid Sellars. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” In Science, Perception and 
Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. 
 
Williamson, Timothy. “Critical Notices.” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 2, no. 1 (March 1, 1994): 109–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570786. 
 
Wilson, George M. “Kripke on Wittgenstein and Normativity.” Midwest Studies In 
Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1994): 366–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-
4975.1994.tb00295.x. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. John Wiley & Sons, 2009. 
———. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dover ed. Mineola, N Y.: Dover Publications, 
1999. 
 
Wright, Crispin. “Excerpts from a Critical Study of Colin McGinn’s Wittgenstein on 
Meaning.” In Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, 143–69. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001. 
 
———. “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language,” 91–115. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
———. “Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities.” In Saving the 
Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity., 155–82. 




———. “On Making Up One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention.” In Rails to Infinity: 
Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 116–42. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
———. “Précis of Truth and Objectivity.” In Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes 
from Truth and Objectivity., 3–10. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2003. 
 
———. Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
———. Realism, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. 
Blackwell, 1987. 
 
———. “Realism, Pure and Simple? A Reply to Williamson.” In Saving the 
Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity., 61–81. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
———. “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.” In Saving the Differences: Essays on 
Themes from Truth and Objectivity., 241–87. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003. 
 
———. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
 
———. “Truth in Ethics.” In Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and 
Objectivity., 183–204. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
———. “What Could Anti-Realism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be?” In 
Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity., 407–42. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
———. “Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project of 
Theoretical Linguistics.” In Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 170–213. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
 
